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This work-based project is an investigation of the interaction between multicultural crews 
and safety management systems and the influences of this interaction on health and 
safety in the offshore oil Industry. This study has been carried out in partial fulfilment of 
the requirements for the Doctorate of Professional Studies at the Institute of Work Based 
Learning, Middlesex University, London. The aim of this project is to minimise 
occupational casualties in the industry by exploring the social science paradigms of 
human action and cultural diversity, and it relies heavily on ethnographic methodologies. 
The qualitative data collection techniques chosen are structured observations, semi-
structured interviews, focus groups and a research diary. The key themes that emerged 
from the project highlighted the perception of high consequences/low probability risk 
among the working community. In this context, the cultural relativity of the hazard 
perception is an instrument used to maintain group solidarity. The group that emerged 
from this work-based research is culturally-biased according to a ‘way of life’ that 
characterises it, and predisposes it to adopt a particular view of society at work. The data 
collected and analysed in this ethnographic investigation establish the fact that cultural 
bias and shared values have influenced how safety is lived and, most importantly, seen 
and perceived by the workforce community. The concept of “cross-cultural safety 
consciousness” is proposed in this research, along with a conceptual model for a practical 
approach to safety based on its findings, with the aim being to reduce the number of 
incidents in the offshore oil industry. The project may have an international impact and 
relevance; professional organisations and maritime trade unions have displayed interest in 
the outcomes of this investigation.  
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This work-based project is an investigation of the interaction between multicultural crews 
and safety management systems and the influences of this interaction on health and 
safety in the offshore oil industry. It addresses the variability in perceptions of risk 
between and among different groups of seafarers. M. Douglas (1982) argues that Risk 
Perception is socially constructed and that this is often unrecognised in modern 
organisations with multicultural employees. These considerations are all the more topical 
and important given that, in 2007, for example, the offshore oil industry suffered five 
fatalities, 445 medical treatment cases and 277 restricted work incidents (IADC 2008). In 
2008, the number of fatalities increased to nine, the medical treatment cases to 459 and 
the restricted work incidents to 279, with a total man-hours of 173,281,728(1) (IADC 2009). 
The 2009 statistics have yet to be published, however 2010 brought the tragic incident in 
the Gulf of Mexico, involving the explosion and subsequent sinking of the Dynamically 
Positioned MODU (Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit) “Deepwater Horizon”, which caused the 
death of eleven crew members and probably the worst environmental pollution ever to 
have happened at sea. 
The aim of this project is to look at how to minimise occupational casualties in the 
industry, by exploring the determinants of the work practices of multiethnic and 
multicultural crews working under the peculiar conditions of the offshore industry. To 
accomplish this strategic aim, I have used a number of social science paradigms of 
human action and cultural diversity, relying heavily on ethnographic methodologies to 
investigate the dynamics of Risk Perception. I explore safety structures and how these 
relate to behavioural patterns or professional practices, which in turn may be derived from 
shared or divergent approaches to seafaring workplace values about what constitutes 
safe practice. I investigate the ‘structures’ defined by laws, national legislation, company 
practice and ship practice, as well as individual behaviour patterns and the meanings or 
values attached to these and I look at the interaction of the human element, composed by 
the multi-cultural crews working on mobile offshore drilling units (MODU’s) with the safety 
management systems. In other words, I will also be looking at the effects of ‘agency’(2), 
that is, how disparate groups of seafarers involved in the offshore segment of the 
industry–who are living, breathing, professional individuals from different ethnicities and 
cultures-behave and what, if any, shared meanings they attach to `risk’. 
' OO'
Multinational crews in this industry are an irreversible trend. Kahveci et al. (2002) report 
that approximately 65 percent of the world’s merchant fleet have adopted multinational 
crewing strategies and I feel that it is important to study how this interaction influences 
health and safety in this industry. The recent study of Bailey et al. (2007) proposes that 
nationality is the main predictor of the perceptions of each type of potential injury at sea. 
This study will investigate the proposition that crews working in a multicultural 
environment, as defined by Cultural Theory (Douglas 1982), have heterogeneous 
perceptions of risks and that this has possible impacts on health and safety behaviours.  
In addition, the fact that human factors account for between fifty and ninety percent of 
accidents at sea (Kuo 2007, Horck 2005, Thompson 2008, Sutherland et al. 2000) 
highlights the importance of this project. Every study reports an involvement of the human 
element at some point in the causal chain. The research I undertake is therefore based on 
a study of the crew of an ultra deep-water Mobile Drilling Unit (MODU), of which I am the 
Captain, engaged in oil and gas exploration worldwide. We have in the region of 
seventeen nationalities involved in a total crew of 172 persons. 
Health and Safety is a key concern in today’s working environment. Every industry is 
putting a lot of effort into making the workplace safer, for a variety of reasons. Big 
corporations face an ethical dilemma due to the fact that it is not acceptable in today’s 
society to see employees, and hence members of the society, suffer accidents while 
working. Also, considerable national and international legislation has been passed since 
the Second World War, setting health and safety norms in an attempt to create an 
international ‘safety regime’, especially within the EU context, as is detailed later on in the 
chapter. I would add that endeavours to avoid incidents are also dictated by marketing 
reasons and, more pragmatically, by the costs involved in dealing with unfortunate events. 
A safe company is surely more “marketable” than competitors with poor safety records. 
Policy makers are constantly developing new rules and regulations, trying to create a 
framework within which workers are able to practice their trades in an incident-free 
environment. Globalisation has surely added another ingredient to the already complex 
issue; we are moving from the local village to a global, borderless market, and this has 
been crucial in creating a multicultural environment.  
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I am a practising Master Mariner working for the world’s largest offshore drilling contractor. 
I am in command of ultra deepwater dynamically positioned drillships engaged in oil and 
gas exploration worldwide and have about twenty years of sea experience. My main 
function is to provide marine support to the industrial operation of the vessel, and I have 
the authority and discretion to take whatever action is required for the safety of the crew 
and the vessel and the protection of the environment.  
To be more precise, I am responsible for the safety, security, stability, dynamic 
positioning, pollution prevention, regulatory compliance, marine operations and 
seaworthiness of the ship. I manage its continuous surveys and the renewal of statutory 
certificates, as required by the Classification Society and the statutory regulations. I also 
ensure compliance with environmental protection requirements, as specified by the 
company policies and regulatory bodies, and that the quality, health, safety and 
environmental policies and programmes are communicated to and understood by all 
personnel. I coordinate the weekly emergency drills and monitor and evaluate the crew 
responses; I am the Person in Charge (PIC) in the event of an emergency and I am 
accountable for managing any situation which may arise aboard the vessel. I play an 
active part in the weekly safety meetings, quality improvement programmes and safety 
management systems.  
I graduated from the Nautical Technical Institute in Rome, Italy and from the Navy 
Reserve Officer’s Course, at the Italian Naval Academy. Having completed the course and 
become a commissioned Navy Officer, I served for four and half years on different war 
ships, leaving the Italian Navy with an honourable discharge as Sub-Lieutenant. I then 
had a brief period of working on a container ship and later, in 1992, began working in the 
offshore oil industry. Here, I have achieved valuable experience in different operational 
environments, such as pipe laying, construction and drilling activities. I obtained the 
Master Mariner’s certificate of competency in 1995. I have also specialised as a Dynamic 
Positioning Operator since 1997, and since then I have served on dynamically positioned 
vessels. I have been on worldwide assignments to regions such as West and South 
Africa, the North Sea, South and Central America, South Korea, Norway, Holland and the 
UK. These experiences enriched me, culturally, as I saw different countries and 
communities, and this sparked my interest in safety culture among diverse workforces.  
This interest in maritime safety management has been enhanced academically through 
my studies for the Master of Science degree in Work Based Learning (Marine Operations 
and Safety Management) which I received from Middlesex University in 2004. My final 
' OP'
project was a case study based on a MODU, researching the risk assessment and 
accident hazards in this industry (De Rossi 2004). This widened my general knowledge 
about safety management in the offshore industry. 
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Moreover, I have successfully claimed a recognition and accreditation of learning (RAL) at 
the doctoral level for obtaining 100 credits at level 8 for “Advanced developments in 
professional practice”, in the “Marine Operations and Safety Management” area of 
learning. (Appendix R) 
In the RAL claim, I demonstrated the use of interdisciplinary knowledge with a large 
amount of autonomy and responsibility for professional projects of a complex and high-
level nature within my professional practice. I explained that I am well aware of my legal 
and ultimate responsibility and authority while exercising my professional practice, and 
that I have used my leadership in an appropriate manner. I also showed that the 
knowledge claimed is heterogeneous and not solely discipline-based, as it is 
characterised by shifting away from cognitive and discipline-based fundamental principles, 
towards contextualised results. Thus, it is clearly trans-disciplinary, embracing science 
and technology as well as social science. 
In the claim, I also illustrated that in my professional life I have used my knowledge, skill 
and experience to make executive decisions with financial and operational impacts. I 
explored the safety management of my profession, including a description of how I was 
able to manage an emergency situation in an efficient and professional way. This is 
defined by Schön (1987) as “artistry”, meaning the competence a practitioner uses in an 
indeterminate zone of practice, in trying to fill the gap left by the professional curriculum.  
To summarise, I pointed out that my practice is very dynamic, and I systematically use my 
professional knowledge in order to achieve a clear objective, which is a safe and efficient 
operation, and this in turn generates a profit for my company. The emphasis of the RAL 
was, in fact, to reflect upon and analyse an essential part of my practice, which is the 
safety management of offshore operations. Because of this emphasis, I consider my RAL 
claim at the doctoral level to be a solid springboard for this project, in which I have 
focused my efforts on a particular aspect of the wider range of practices I have been 
engaged in during my professional career, that is, to achieve the safest possible working 
environment for my fellow professionals in the offshore industry.  
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A paradigm worth mentioning is the work-based nature of this research; the Institute for 
Work Based Learning has developed an innovative approach to personalised learning for 
full-time professionals who are also, in the research context, practitioner researchers. In 
fact, the stakeholders–defined as the University, the doctoral candidate and a 
representative of the professional practice–sign a formal learning agreement.   
This aspect was highlighted several times in various pieces of feedback received at the 
research proposal stage, such as that from a former colleague, who stated: “It is nice to 
see that there are some hands-on people around who can competently talk about the 
industry and not only "desk captains".  Industry really needs this”  (3) 
As this project was carried out under the umbrella of the work-based learning paradigm 
(Armsby 2000), it was able to generate, among professionals and organisations, 
knowledge that is defined by Gibbons et al. (1994) as ‘Mode 2’. This differs from the 
discipline-based ‘Mode 1’ which is investigator-initiated and likely to be produced within 
academia.  
Gibbons also argues that this mode of knowledge has become the main method of 
production of subject disciplinary research in universities. The alternative, Mode 2 
knowledge, is subject to the quality control of market acceptability, as well as peer 
reviews, in order to achieve its ‘validity’. It is created in broader and trans-disciplinary 
social and economic contexts on the basis of real world projects and problem solving. 
However, I can see the paradox involved in moving from Mode 2 to Mode 1 knowledge, 
having put the former within an academic framework and perhaps twisted it into Mode 1, 
while looking for ‘academic validation’. I am not arguing that Mode 1 knowledge is not 
important; traditional academia is still relevant for building skills and competence in 
professions, and providing their knowledge base, and thus has a legitimate role. However, 
Heath (2001) argues that ‘in this knowledge rich age schools cannot continue to be the 
exclusive or even necessarily the primary sites of learning’. Schön (1983) states that 
universities are committed, for most part, “to a particular epistemology, a view of 
knowledge that fosters selective inattention to practical competence and professional 
artistry”. In fact, new knowledge is nowadays produced by professionals and practitioners, 
and this project has entered, in its own right, into this classification. 
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The offshore oil industry, like all industries, is constantly putting effort into making its 
operations safer. Big corporate interests are involved and safety records are now carefully 
scrutinised in order to remain competitive in the fiercely contested energy market. A big 
corporation cannot afford incidents and accidents for the reasons mentioned earlier. Its 
performance is measured in safety terms as well as other values, because there is no 
successful operation if it is not also safe and incident-free. This work-based project has 
focused on exploring the health and safety issues of the offshore oil industry, more 
precisely in the field of the upstream oil sector or exploration and production (E&P). This is 
the very sector where the energy operators develop oil and gas drilling exploration 
campaigns worldwide. In this sector, technology is paramount, exploration is moving into 
deeper and deeper water,(4) and what was a wild dream a decade ago is now the norm. 
Thus, equipment and crews are working at the cutting edge of know-how. Mobile Offshore 
Drilling Units (MODUs) are exploring hundreds of miles off the continental shelf. 
The world fleet is expanding year after year in the search for new energy supplies for the 
ever-growing world needs, due in part to rapid industrialisation in the emerging markets. 
Globalisation has radically affected this industry. The very nature of the worldwide 
explorations has helped increase the flexibility of the global human resources market, and 
over the years this has created a multicultural community, bound by the expertise in the oil 
and gas industry. (5) 
The thought of loss of life during the execution of one’s profession is unbearable in today’s 
society. In my opinion, this problem deserves a thorough effort and I for one want to 
contribute towards a safer workplace. The high numbers of incidents and accidents 
suggest that something must be done to drastically reduce these figures. Tackling the 
problem from a different prospective may shed some light on this very complex and multi-
layered matter. The different perspectives mentioned earlier will enable me to take 
stances on the issue from various cultural points of view and perhaps from a more 
interpretivist-oriented perspective. In fact, many studies on health and safety have been 
carried out in the past that have focused on more positivist-inclined behavioural 
psychology (see, for example, the work of Stranks 2007, Shuterland et al. 2000, Cooper 
1999 and 2002) rather than on more culturally-informed approaches to meanings and 
shared meanings. The latter is where I intend to place the emphasis in this project. 
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By definition, a MODU is a vessel capable of engaging in drilling operations to explore for 
or exploit resources beneath the sea-bed, such as liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons, 
sulphur or salt (IMO MODU Code, p.3). Under the generic MODU description, a self-
propelled unit is defined as a unit certified to navigate independently and a drillship is a 
self-propelled ship-shaped monohull surface MODU (IMO Res. A891(21)). 
The MODU drillship is therefore a large ship equipped with a drilling system and a derrick 
located on the middle of its deck. In addition, a drillship has a so-called ‘moonpool’ on its 
deck, which is an opening in the hull that permits the drill pipes, lowered from the derrick, 
to reach the bottom of the ocean and drill the seabed. 
The offshore installation manager (OIM) is the competent person appointed in writing by 
the owner as the person in charge (PIC) of the MODU. He/she has complete and ultimate 
command of the unit and all personnel on board are answerable to him/her. On a self-
propelled unit, the ship’s captain or Master is generally appointed by the company as the 
OIM. This is usually the case because all maritime crew members on self-propelled 
mobile offshore units and, where required, on other units, should meet the requirements of 
the international convention on standards of training, certification and watchkeeping for 
seafarers, as amended (IMO STCW Code). The maritime crew comprises the OIM, the 
barge supervisor, the ballast control operator and the maintenance supervisor as well as 
other deck and engineer officers, radio operators, and ratings, as defined in regulation I/1 
of the STCW Convention, as amended (IMO Res. A891(21)). 
A MODU is organised into different departments; usually, it is composed of the drilling 
department headed by a Toolpusher, the maintenance or technical department headed by 
a Maintenance Supervisor or Chief Engineer, the deck department headed by the Chief 
Mate or Stability Section Leader, and the catering department headed by a chief steward: 
they all report to the OIM. The drilling department deals with all of the drilling-related 
operations, including picking up pipes and casings on the derrick and using them to drill 
the seabed, and operating all of the related drilling systems and equipment. The 
maintenance or technical department is responsible for power generation and propulsion 
and the maintenance of all the electrical, hydraulic and mechanical equipment on the 
MODU. The deck or marine department is broadly responsible for the navigation and 
positioning of the MODU, its stability, the lifesaving and fire fighting equipment and ship-
to-ship operation, including offloading cargo and fluids from supply vessels. The latter are 
vessels used to supply the MODUs with equipment and food provisions. The catering 
' OZ'
department is responsible for the food preparation and general housekeeping and 
cleaning of the accommodation quarters, which includes cabins and offices. Usually, there 
is also a client representative on board, and often third-party engineers and technicians 
specialised in specific drilling tasks, such as drilling fluid control, remotely-operated 
vehicle operations, and geological data acquisition.  
 
Figure 1.a: Typical MODU – Drillship organisation 
The crews usually spend a period of 28 days on board alternated with 28 days of rest 
ashore. During the period on board the MODU, the crews are divided into night and day 
shifts of twelve hours. At the end of each period on board, each individual will have 
worked for a total of at least 336 hours, without a single day off. The operations therefore 
never stop; the day shift is followed by the night shift and, in this way, drilling activity is 
continuously ongoing. Working life aboard a MODU is thus quite concentrated. Most of the 
crewmembers are exposed to intense manual labour for prolonged periods of time. In their 
twelve hours off duty, they have the use of recreation rooms, where it is possible to 
engage in social activities and watch television programmes. 
The latest generation of MODUs are chartered worldwide by the oil majors for day rates of 
over 500,000 USD and, in the event of an unplanned halt in the drilling operations, for any 
unforeseen reason, a percentage of the rate is deducted.  The urgency of the operational 
performance is therefore often dictated by the commercial pressure on the crews to avoid 
a non-productive time and thus a financial penalty commensurate to the time lost.  This 
commercial pressure, if not dealt with and filtered by the MODUs management, may 
easily induce the crews into non-compliance with the safety regime, which may well result 
in incidents and accidents. It must also be borne in mind that every operation on a MODU 
is strictly recorded and then scrutinised by the client. Because of the high day rates, the 
charterer of the MODU is expecting a high performance and this may induce pressure on 
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the crew to perform over and above the contractual requirements. The department most 
exposed to this commercial pressure is surely the drilling department, which carries out 
the core of the MODU’s operations. If the drilling operations stop, the MODU is then in 
non-productive mode, whilst if the problem is on the maintenance or marine side this may 
not result in a commercial penalty due to the high redundancy of the systems on board 
modern units.  
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In this industry, safety management systems are comprehensive and virtually every 
operation is carefully planned and thought through beforehand. Unfortunately, despite this 
planning, incidents and accidents still happen, as the statistics I present in this project 
dramatically show. 
There are international regulations that lay down rules about how to manage safety at 
sea, enforced through the United Nations’ International Maritime Organisation (IMO). The 
Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS ’74) is the most important treaty protecting the 
safety of mariners. In recent years, all maritime nations have made a synergic effort with 
the intention of making the ships safer and the seas cleaner and, in July 1998, through a 
process of tacit acceptance, the SOLAS Convention was amended with a new Chapter IX, 
entitled the ‘International Management Code for the Safety of Ships and Pollution 
Prevention’, otherwise known as the ISM Code. This effort to improve the safety at sea 
was made in the light of major incidents that happened in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
such as the capsize with consequent loss of life of the passenger ferry “The Herald of 
Free Enterprise” in 1987, the huge amount of oil pollution from the tanker “Exxon Valdez” 
off the coast of Alaska in 1989, a fire on the cruise ship “Scandinavian Star” in 1990 which 
caused extensive loss of life, the tanker “Braer” which was driven onto the Shetland 
Islands in 1990 causing major pollution, the sinking of the ferry “Estonia” in the Baltic Sea 
in 1993 with dramatic loss of life and another major oil spill from the “Sea Express” in 
Milford Haven in 1996.  
In brief, the ISM Code is a set of guidelines on how to develop, implement and monitor a 
safety management system to ensure the safe operation of ships and pollution prevention.  
The biggest incident in the offshore oil industry was undoubtedly the “Piper Alpha” 
disaster. “Piper Alpha” was a platform exploiting a reservoir about 110 miles northeast of 
Aberdeen, extracting and separating a mixture of oil, gas and water. On the 6th of July 
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1988 an explosion followed by a series of smaller explosions and fires caused 167 
fatalities. The UK Government ordered a public inquiry under the chairmanship of Lord 
Cullen, the finding of which were published in November 1990 (Cullen 1990), a total of 
106 recommendations were made, all accepted by the Government. The most significant 
is surely the concept of the “Safety Case”, in which an operator of offshore installations is 
required to submit to the regulatory body a safety management system specifying the 
preventive measures taken and the mitigating measures for reducing the effects of a 
major incident if one does occur. Auditing of the operators’ safety management systems 
was another of Lord Cullen’s recommendations, as well as the system of “permit to work”, 
which is a set of procedures that must be followed before the “go-ahead” is given for any 
activity carried out on the installation. Evacuation, escape and rescue must also be 
planned for and the plans submitted to regulatory bodies; in brief, a set of rules where lay 
down to regulate the offshore oil activities. 
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I believe that investigating the interaction between the human element, composed of the 
multicultural crews working on MODUs, and the safety management system and its 
influences on health and safety will be beneficial for the offshore oil industry. The research 
outlined in this work-based project has clear implications for practice, and integrates 
national cultures with communities of practice within a health and safety context. 
This project not only provides a different perspective on dealing with the concept of safety, 
but also develops the literature on and for a specific professional community of practice 
(Wenger et al. 2002), formed by multicultural human resources engaged in a process of 
collective learning in a shared domain of human endeavour. Cultural awareness in this 
globalised world should not simply recommended, it should be mandatory, and hopefully 
the IMO and offshore regulatory bodies will acknowledge this need and set a framework 
for developing training courses for practising seafarers and offshore oil workers. 
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Footnotes: 
1) A man-hour is the amount of work performed by a worker in one hour. 
2) For Giddens, structures are rules and resources (sets of transformation relations) organised as 
properties of social systems. Rules are patterns people may follow in social life. Resources relate 
to what is created by human action; they are not given by nature. Rules and resources that govern 
and are available to agents, constitute ‘structure’. Agency, as defined by Giddens, is human action. 
Agents' knowledge of their society informs their actions, which reproduce social structures, which in 
turn enforce and maintain the dynamics of action. (Giddens, 1986) 
3) Author’s personal correspondence 
4) In 2000, the ship I was serving on, the “Deepwater Expedition”, set the world water-depth 
record, for drilling in 9,144 feet of water. Later the same year, the “Deepwater Millennium” broke 
the record in 9,200 feet of water. In 2001, the “Discoverer Spirit” twice broke the record, in 9,687 
feet and 9,727 feet of water respectively. In 2003, the “Discoverer Deep Seas” set the current world 
record, becoming the first rig in the industry to drill in more than 10,000 feet of water, in 10,011 feet 
to be precise. 
5) What I understand by globalisation is the process by which regional economies, societies, and 
cultures have become integrated through a global network of communication, transportation and 
trade. (Friedman 2005) 
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In the first part of this chapter, I will state the aim and objectives of this work-based 
research. I will then explore the terms of reference, with particular emphasis on culture, 
organisational culture and, an important aspect of the latter, safety culture. From there I 
will contextualise the safety management concepts used in the offshore oil industry. I will 
then explain how and why I use Mary Douglas’s (1982) Cultural Theory, applied to 
organisations, to comprehensively assess “workplace culture”. I will also explore the 
literature about the use of Cultural Theory for empirical research and about its value in 
defining risk perceptions among different cultural groups, based on the assumption that 
the perception of the risks is socially constructed. 
In the second and last part of the chapter I propose the research statement and research 
questions, supported by the theoretical and conceptual framework. 
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The aim of this work-based project is to investigate methods and practices for minimizing 
occupational casualties in the offshore industry by exploring the social science paradigms 
of human action and taking into account the complexities involved in crews with cultural 
diversity. The project relies heavily on ethnographic methodologies as participant 
observer.  It addresses the variability in perceptions of risk between and among different 
groups. Mary Douglas (1982) affirms that ‘risk perception’ is socially constructed. This is 
often unrecognised in modern organisations with multicultural workforces. 
The objective of this research is to investigate the interaction between multicultural crews 
and safety management systems and the influence that this has on health and safety in 
the offshore oil industry, based on the socially constructed and individual perceptions of 
risks. The research therefore focuses on a multicultural environment, as defined by 
Cultural Theory (Douglas 1982). This theory proposes that risk perception is created by 
culture rather than individual psychology, as an explanation for differences in risk 
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judgments, and it indicates the existence of an individualistic, egalitarian, hierarchist and 
fatalistic ‘way of life’. Risk perception is the subjective judgment that people make about 
the characteristics and severity of a risk, which is defined as the probability of harm 
occurring.  
The first questions should be: Is there a problem in the industry? And what are we going 
to investigate?  
Despite the set of rules and regulations, detailed in Chapter 1, which regulate the health 
and safety in the industry, my interest in exploring occupational casualties is based on the 
number of incidents and accidents that are still taking place. In 2007, the drilling offshore 
drilling industry has suffered experienced five fatalities, 445 medical treatment cases and 
277 restricted work incidents. (IADC 2008).  
In 2008 the numbers of fatalities increased to nine, the medical treatment cases to 459 e 
the restricted work incidents to 279. (IADC 2009) 
As I mentioned earlier, people losing their lives while carrying out their profession is 
increasingly unacceptable in today’s society, and I believe that a lack of cultural 
awareness plays a role in this contest. Many studies on health and safety have been 
carried out in the past, which have focused on psychology (see, for example, the work of 
Stranks 2007, Shuterland et al. 2000, Cooper 1999 and 2002) rather than on multicultural 
diversity. The latter is the topic I have investigated in this research. 
My professional experience has suggested to me that there is a lack of cultural awareness 
and continuing fallacious stereotyping among multicultural crews. These kinds of crews 
are an irreversible trend, and I believe that the changing nature of the globalised skilled 
and unskilled workforce employed in the industry requires this research. In addition, I aim 
to add considerably to the literature on maritime health and safety.  
On this note, the IMO, the United Nations agency concerned with the safety of shipping 
and cleaner oceans, has already addressed the importance of the human element. All 
new regulatory proposals have to be scrutinised by a sub-committee to ensure they are 
compatible with the human ability to comply with them (IMO 2003). 
My main points of focus in this project are as follows: 
! find out qualitatively how the multicultural workforce understands the ‘safety 
system’; 
! qualitatively classify the Risk Behaviour Types;  
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! classify the risk perceptions of the multicultural workforce  
 
! Match the empirical findings concerning the multicultural workforce’s 
understanding of the ‘safety system’ and the Safety Vision’s understanding of 
these concepts; 
 
! look at the special case of the drilling industry–its special needs and current 
condition; and 
 
! address issues arising from the different health and safety ‘regimes’ through 
empirical research. 
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This part of the chapter explores the literatures pertinent to the multicultural context of this 
work-based research. The concepts of culture, culture in organisations, safety culture, 
safety management, multiculturalism, cultural theory in analysing work organisations and 
their applications are investigated. 
 
2.2.1 Definition of Culture and its Use in Organisational Research 
 
Culture is a concept that has been defined in many ways. The etymology of the word 
derives from the Latin cultura, stemming from colere, which means "to cultivate". From 
this etymological standpoint, it is clear that culture is a dynamic concept, which can take 
different shapes and meanings. In broader terms, culture has been defined as a ”way of 
life”. For instance, when we refer to the “American culture” or the “Japanese culture”, 
these shorthand terms implicitly suggest a particular perception of the world and hence a 
way of life. Margaret Mead (1937, quoted in Monaghan & Just 2000) defines the 
difference between the culture and a culture. The former is traditional behaviour, which 
has been developed by the human race and learned by each generation. A culture is 
instead, according to Mead, less precise. It can refer to a given society, or group of 
societies, or a certain race or area, or to a certain period of time. Thompson & Wildavsky 
(1990) define the “way of life” as a combination of cultural bias and social relations, the 
former refers to shared values and beliefs, and the latter denotes a pattern of 
interpersonal relations. 
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Another early definition of culture by the English anthropologist Edward Tylor (1832-1917, 
quoted in Monagham & Just 2000) is the “accumulation of human accomplishment”. Later 
the famous German-American anthropologist, Franz Boas (1858-1942), described this 
value as a set of cultural glass lenses that provide us with a means of perceiving the world 
around us. This is a very powerful definition, which I founded very useful for 
understanding modern organisations. Schein (2004:7) reports that, in order to make sense 
of situations biased by our own assumptions, it is necessary to take a cultural perspective, 
and learn to see the world through a “cultural lens”. This echoes the concept expressed by 
Boas at the early stage of the social anthropologic studies. Again, Hofstede (2005) reports 
that “everybody looks at the world from behind a windows of a cultural home” (p.363). 
Hofstede (2005:3) points out that “culture” in most Western languages means civilization 
or “refinement of the mind” and that the results of such refinement include education, art 
and literature. However, according to Douglas (1990), cultural stability, especially in the 
Western world, is short-lived, as homogeneity is achieved with difficulty and is always on 
the brink of dissolution. In short, she claims that “the culture is nothing if not a collective 
product” (1992:125). 
Schein (2004:7) testifies that managers often speak of developing “the right kind of 
culture”. This suggests that the word “culture” is used in a superficial and perhaps 
incorrect way, with the assumption being that there are “good” and “bad” cultures. In 
reality, culture for a group is what personality or character is for an individual. The way we 
see people is mainly through their personality traits and behaviour. The former can be 
broadly defined as what a person is, the latter as what a person does. This concept is also 
true for a culture. In fact, we can observe the behaviour of the group in a particular culture, 
but very often we cannot see what really constrains it, which is what matters the most. 
In a complex society, individuals belong to many different organisations and, therefore, a 
given cultural unit is, in reality, a complex set of overlapping subcultures (Schein 
2004:119). Just one of the models that we always bring to any new group situation is the 
model of our own family, which is the group in which we spend most of our early life. 
Hofstede & Hofstede (2005) suggests that, in a broader sense, culture is a “mental 
software”, arguing that it is “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the 
member of one group or category of people from others” (p.4). 
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2.2.2 Organisational Culture 
The concept of organisational culture has been studied extensively in the last two 
decades, and it is widely acknowledged that this concept is a critical determinant of an 
organisation’s success or failure. Schein (2004) suggests that it is easy to observe what 
happens in an organisation, for example leadership failures, poor marketing and so on 
but, in the effort to understand why such things happen, “culture as a concept comes into 
its own” (p.xi). 
Many definitions are suggested for organisational culture, for example Hofstede & 
Hofstede (2005) call it “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the 
member of one organisation from another” (p.402) 
Glendon & Stanton (2000) describe two broad perspectives of organisational culture, 
which they call functionalist and interpretative. The former is applicable to an organisation 
which has a culture to support a set of strategies and systems dictated by management, 
primarily goals and visions. It is a ‘top down’ perspective, where leaders try, and often fail, 
to initiate a culture, for example through the rigorous adoption of formalised risk 
management practices (Kuo 2007) or by simply dictating a set of rules and regulations. 
The interpretative approach is instead a ‘bottom up’ approach, as it allows for the 
existence of sub-cultures within an organisation, which are a pattern of basic assumptions 
that an organisation has developed over a period of time to cope with its problems, and 
then taught to new members (Schein 2004). 
Glendon & Stanton (2000) also note that most organisations display elements of both 
approaches, for example using the interpretative mode to analyse mistakes from the past–
the so-called “lesson learned” process–along with a functionalist approach in terms of 
formal methods of hazard identification and risk assessment. Douglas (1992) does not 
view this concept as “static” but, on the contrary, as a way of life created continuously by 
everyone involved in the organisation. In other words, it is the result of the daily activity, 
conversations and negotiations between members of the organisation.  
Hendry (1999a) highlights that despite the substantial attention devoted by management 
and scholars to organisational culture, there have still been few attempts to bring cultural 
theories of social anthropology into the management arena. 
Through the organisational culture framework, it is possible to understand how values, 
attitudes and beliefs about safety are expressed and how these influence the direction 
taken by the organisation. As articulated in Chapter 1, the disaster involving the Piper 
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Alpha platform (Cullen,1990), dramatically highlighted the importance of these values and 
led to the term ‘safety culture’ arising in its own right in the offshore industry. The issue 
also became of general concern after the disaster involving a nuclear power station in 
Chernobyl, in 1986.  
 
2.2.3 Safety Culture 
In the context of this project, it is important to clearly define what is meant by “maritime 
safety culture”, as it is a recurrent theme in the research. The definition used here is “a 
belief, philosophy or faith held by groups or individuals on safety matters which is 
demonstrated in practice through the attitudes, actions and behaviour adopted by the 
people of an organisation or a nation” (Kuo 2007) 
Lützhöft (2004) suggests that trying to fix “human error” by incremental improvements in 
technology or procedures tends to be largely ineffective due to the adoptive compensation 
of the user. In fact, many organisations, in an endeavour to improve workplace safety 
performance, have recently moved away from a focus on engineering and ergonomic 
physical design and its relationship with employee performance, towards a focus on safety 
climate and/or organisational culture analysis. (Sutherland et al. 2000) 
Rousseau’s (1988) study added considerable knowledge to the safety literature. His 
review of the notion of a safety culture is underpinned by the concept of a group 
phenomenon, an expression of held norms consisting of shared beliefs and values. 
It is also worth noting that the IMO Secretary-General E. E. Mitropoulos has stated that 
“safety is not an absolute concept and the levels chosen are based on shared values” 
(quoted from the foreword in Kuo 2007). The concept expressed by the Secretary-General 
refers to the same shared values already identified as a cultural bias in determining a 
specific “way of life” (Thompson & Wildavsky 1990). 
Kuo (2007) reports that there is no obvious answer to the question “what is safety?” as 
there are no absolute items that can give a clear definition. This is because individuals 
have different perceptions of what is “safe” and what is “unsafe”. Kuo’s definition captures 
the idea that it is the individual perception that determines the concept “safe”: “safety is a 
human perceived quality that determines to what event the management, engineering and 
operation of a system is free of danger to life, property and the environment” (2007:274). 
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As mentioned in Chapter 1, the research of Bailey et al. (2007) suggests that nationality is 
the main predictor of perceptions of each type of potential injury at sea. The study also 
demonstrated that different groups have relative perceptions for each type of injury at sea, 
however it does not indicate which nationalities have the most accurate perceptions of 
risk. Douglas (1982) affirms that risk perception is socially constructed. Perhaps it is now 
time to bring into the organisational management arena the concept of cultural theories 
(Hendry 1999a) with particular emphasis on the safety aspect, and this is the objective of 
this research. 
2.2.4 Safety Management in the Offshore Oil Industry 
The terrible wake-up call of the Piper Alpha disaster dictated that a different approach to 
safety was needed. Traditional safety management systems placed responsibility for 
safety on managers and often to a ‘safety committee’. The former could not be 
omnipresent to prevent incidents or accidents happening and the latter had little or no 
authority at all. Most importantly, these approaches placed the responsibility for safety on 
somebody else, rather than on the workforce itself, making them feel that they were not 
accountable for their actions (Sutherland et al. 2000). Based on the Piper Alpha 
investigation, the major implementation required by the Cullen report (1990) was the 
adoption of a Safety Case by owners of offshore installations associated with hydrocarbon 
activities in the UK Continental Shelf. (Offshore Installation-Safety Case-Regulation, 2005) 
The brief idea is that the owner must ensure that management systems are in place to 
address health and safety issues, including methods for reducing risk levels for the major 
hazards and controlling them effectively.  
Kuo (2007) suggests a fresh approach to the Safety Management System, called the 
Generic Management System (GMS), which consists of two interlinked parts-the 
Management System and the Process Scheme-as represented in Figure 1. 
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The Management System comprises five elements, as follows: 
1. Define " The objective and performance criteria, which set the goals  
2. Organise  " The resources and execution plan, to ensure the goals can be met 
3. Implement  " The plan in practice, via a process scheme 
4. Measure  " The results  
5. Review  " Lessons learnt during feedback 
 
The Process Scheme is the interface with the implementation stage of the Management 
System, and consists of four generic steps: 
1. Hazard identification 
2. Risk assessment 
3. Risk reduction or mitigation 
4. Emergency preparedness 
 
It is evidently necessary to identify a hazard in order to first assess and then mitigate the 
risk, but often the terms risk and hazard are confused with each other. I therefore define a 
hazard as a situation with the potential to lead to harm, and the risk as the probability of 
harm being realised.  
There are several methods used in the industry to identify hazards, the most common 
being “hazard hunts” performed by skilled personnel prior to performing a task, with 
prompt cards suggesting different types of hazards such as engineering, energy, 
housekeeping, etc. 
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Once the hazard has been identified, we need to assess the risk, which is the probability 
of harm being realised. Risk assessment is a formal process of increasing the 
understanding of the risk associated with an activity. The process of risk assessment 
includes answering three questions: 
1 What can go wrong? 
2 How likely is this to happen? 
3 What are the impacts if it does? 
Qualitative answers to these questions are often sufficient for making good decisions 
about the allocation of resources for safety improvements but this does require a wealth of 
`qualitative’ knowledge and information. 
As a second means of analysis, quantitative methods generally involve modelling 
consequences and analysing the probability of occurrence. Often the two methods are 
combined to determine the risk. 
It is sometimes argued that in order to work in an incident free working environment, the 
need is to reduce the risk to zero. This is the so-called “zero risks” philosophy (Viscusi, 
1996). At its extreme, this approach could lead towards the consequence of ceasing the 
work completely, with the operation loosing all its benefits. 
According to Ball (2000), there are eight different concepts of safety, from the politically 
inspired zero risk type, to scientific methods such as risk factors, and finally pragmatic 
methods such as risk tolerability. Every approach has different strengths and weaknesses 
and each is affiliated predominantly to a specific profession, but those in use in the major 
industries are the pragmatic ones (De Rossi, 2004). 
The UK Offshore Safety Act 1992 transferred responsibility for offshore health and safety 
to the Health and Safety Commission and Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and brought 
the regulation of offshore safety (on the UK Continental Shelf) within the compass of the 
Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (HSWA). The Offshore Safety Act extends the 
application of Part I of the HSWA. This includes “securing the safety, health and welfare of 
persons on offshore installations”.  
The HSWA sets out the general responsibilities that employers have towards employees 
and members of the public, and that the employees have towards themselves and each 
other. These duties are qualified in the Act by the principle of ‘so far as is reasonably 
practicable’. In other words, the degree of hazard in a particular job or workplace needs to 
be balanced against the time, trouble, cost and physical difficulty of taking measures to 
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avoid or reduce the risk. This is a pragmatic approach, generally used in the Offshore 
Industry and referred to by the acronym ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable). 
Once the risk has been assessed based on the estimated consequence (C) and 
probability of occurrence (P), either through qualitative or quantitative methods, the next 
step is to reduce the consequences or the probability or both if the risk level is in the 
‘intolerable’ region.  
The final step in the Process Scheme is to prepare actions that should be taken in the 
event that a hazard becomes a reality, in order to minimise the effects. Plans are 
developed to deal with specific situations, based on data gathered through simulations 
and practical exercises.  
 
2.2.5 Multiculturalism 
Multiculturalism has been used in recent times as an umbrella term to characterise the 
moral and political claims of a wide range of disadvantaged and diverse groups, and it has 
been used around the world as a concept relating to ethnic mobilisation and to improve 
justice and equity (Rex and Drury 1994).  
Taylor (1994) provides a philosophical argument for the human need to be recognised for 
one’s distinctness, especially cultural distinctness. In his argument, he defends the rights 
of minority cultures to receive equivalent evaluations of their significance to global history.  
The concept of multiculturalism reflects the importance that culture plays in structuring our 
society and the relationships between its members.  However different groups may not 
belong to a single `homogenous’ entity called the `nation-state’ or a geographical territory 
may contain a multiplicity of ethnic, linguistic or religious social entities. In states or 
territories with a heterogeneous population, there is a tendency for ethnic, linguistic and 
religious groups to fight for recognition of their own identities in the political arena or in the 
sharing out of economic resources. (Hofstede & Hostede 2005).  In actual fact, a culture 
consists of the beliefs, values, behaviours and other characteristics common to the 
members of a particular group or society or, to use Douglas’s words, “the culture is 
nothing if not a collective product” (1992:125)  
It is mainly through culture that groups define themselves in relation to society’s shared 
values. Society is taken to mean a group of people who interact in such a way as to share 
a common culture. It must be noted, however, that a society does not always correspond 
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to a nation, a concept that was introduced following the colonial period of the mid-
twentieth century. Hofstede & Hofstede (2005) write that: 
“The invention of nations, political units into which the entire world is divided and to one of 
which every human being is supposed to belong–as manifested by her or his passport–is 
a recent phenomenon in human history.” (p.18) 
To see how a society does not necessarily correspond to a nation, we can think of the 
different groups that formed the former Yugoslavia. As the Balkan war dramatically 
showed, the different ethnic ‘societies’ there did not share the same concept of their 
nation.   
Blum (1998), however, describes how the character of the groups that we think of as 
“cultures” in a multiculturalism context, are intimately bound up with racial history. This 
aspect lays the grounds for a particularly intimate connection between culture and race, 
within the ethical foundation of multiculturalism.  
 
It is also true, on the other hand, that nationality is often the only feasible criterion that can 
be used for cultural classification, although it should be used with care for the 
aforementioned reasons. In the context of this project, separating people into different 
nationalities is just one indication of the different groups that exist, and shows just one 
level of the different layers that make up any given culture. The different nationalities 
involved in this research challenge a single cultural hegemony. 
Kahveci et al. (2002) report that approximately 65 percent of the world’s merchant fleet 
has adopted a multinational crewing strategy. A study by Ellis & Sampson (2003) 
suggested that multinational crews dominate the global workforce of seafarers, with the 
top ten labour-supplying countries all being represented, although new nations such as 
Myanmar were also found amongst the labour force. 
Tiryakian (2003) writes:  
“I begin by the assertion that the term ‘multicultural’ is an empirical demographic condition 
referring to a society (which may or may not be a nation-state but may also include an 
empire) having two or more ethnic groups, each having cultural traits that may have some 
overlap with the other group(s), yet is distinctive enough to form a different cultural identity 
and community.” (p.23) 
 
These new emerging communities provide the context in which the meanings of objects 
and events are constructed and renegotiated. It is important to highlight that communities 
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of practice are crucially distinct from the institutions in the context of which they arise. As a 
matter of fact, they are often at odds with the institutions in important ways.  
In the context of this project, the term of multiculturalism refers to a multicultural 
environment as defined by Cultural Theory (Douglas 1982). As mentioned earlier, 
Thompson & Wildavsky (1990) define the “way of life” as a combination of cultural bias, 
defined as shared values and beliefs, and social relations.  
The respondents of this research will be immersed in a multicultural context where shared 
values and social constrictions could differ among the different sub-cultures involved, as 
could the perceptions of the risks.  
M. Douglas’s version of Cultural Theory addresses cultural differences, and  as mentioned 
in Chapter 1, the globalisation, migration and general cultural diversity has resulted in a 
need to understand multicultural relations and this is true of the oil and gas industry as 
well. As I pointed out earlier, the very nature of worldwide explorations has increased the 
flexibility of the global human resources market, creating de facto a multicultural 
community bound by the expertise in the oil and gas industry. 
To clearly identify the human element that will be used in the context of this project, I will 
use Kuo’s (2007) definition of “human factors”, which is as follows: 
“Human Factors is concerned with the interfacing of a set of personal capabilities and 
characteristics with a combination of hardware, software, working environment and 
organizational culture in the effective performance at work” (p.174) 
To comprehensively assess organisational culture, or an aspect of it such as safety 
culture, we must start with an adequate model of culture. I propose using Cultural Theory 
(alternatively known as Grid/Group Theory, Douglas 1982; Thompson et al. 1992), which 
is a two-dimensional framework of cultural comparisons.  
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2.2.6 Cultural Theory  
The British anthropologist Mary Douglas (1921-2007) was the social scientist who 
introduced Cultural Theory (CT), it was then further developed by Michael Thompson and 
Aaron Wildavsky (1990).  
Douglas (2005) explains that social sciences are usually able to honour the principle of 
“ceteris paribus” (‘other things being equal’), which may be applicable in the late industrial 
society. Douglas’s argument instead concentrates on anthropological comparison, for 
example that of ancient forms of worship, such as the belief in witchcraft. In such 
situations, cultural differences are often so diverse that any comparison would be 
impossible. Initially, Douglas tried to elaborate a theory applicable to any culture, based 
on the idea that all humans would have the same reaction to dirt (Douglas 1966), 
preferring regularity over disorder. This initial theory was however rejected by the 
sociologist Basil Bernstein (1924 – 2000), who argued that any theory should allow for 
different reactions (Douglas 2005), and that something could be appealing to some 
people, such as contact with snails or serpents, but disgusting to others. Douglas (1994) 
suggests that the idea of eating human flesh may be absolutely revolting to us but at the 
same time we know that cannibals practise this ritual.  
Reflecting on Bernstein’s arguments and critiques, Douglas then matured her original 
concepts into a theory initially called Grid and Group, which was designed to trace the 
distribution of values in a cultural framework. Grid refers to the degree to which 
individuals’ choices are circumscribed by their position in society. Group refers to the 
degree of solidarity among members of the society, and the personal control exercised by 
members over each other. These dimensions were based on the work of the classical 
sociologist, Emile Durkheim, also admired by Bernstein.  
Douglas (2005) explains how the Grid/Group analysis changed as a result of the input of 
Thompson and Wildavsky (1990), into a dynamic theory focusing on three assumptions. 
Firstly, it was understood that every kind of society comprises all four cultures at a social 
organisation level; secondly, at a cultural level, each of the four cultures are self-defined 
and in opposition to the others; finally, highlighting the cultural dynamics, it was assumed 
that the relation between cultures in a given society is a catalyst for conflict. 
Moreover, Douglas points out that “Cultural Theory starts by assuming that a culture is a 
system of persons holding one another mutually accountable” (1992:31). 
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In the context of this research, it should be noted that CT implies that risks are socially 
constructed; in other words, people choose what to fear and how to fear it in order to 
maintain their pattern of social relations (Douglas & Wildavsky 1982). 
Furthermore, according to Wildavsky & Dake (1990: 42), the cultural theory of risk can 
“predict and explain what kind of people will perceive which potential hazards to be how 
dangerous”, and this is an important aspect in the work-based research conceptual 
framework.  
 
Briefly, this theory comprises two dimensions, representing two types of control: the first is 
exerted for and by the group, which is a personal control exercised by members over each 
other. The second includes a rich variety of anonymous controls that do not stem directly 
from the group, such as conventions that control behaviours, the rules of the road, 
standards of decency, polite conventions, etc. The theory thus proposes four major 
biases, based on views and values, as follows: 
 
•Individualist 
Low grid and low group. Individualists makes their choices in a way that is unconstrained 
by society and lack close ties to other people. They value individual initiative in the 
marketplace, and fear threats like war or natural cataclysms, as they would impede free 
exchange. The individualist view of nature is described as resilient; they believe that 
nature will return to its original stable position after any disturbance, and therefore 
embrace the trial-and-error theory, trusting that the system will fix itself in the end. 
 
•Egalitarian 
Low grid and high group. As the name suggests, these individuals usually live in voluntary 
associations or groups where everyone is equal, and where the good of the group comes 
before the good of any individual. From a risk perception point of view, egalitarians are 
sensitive to low-probability and high-consequence risks (such as nuclear power), 
demonstrating in this way their solidarity with the “society”. This group also sees nature as 
very fragile; they think that any disturbance will send it crashing down. The egalitarians 
advocate the precautionary principle; they prefer traditional ways of life that have proven 
to be sustainable, rather than risking disaster by trying new technologies. 
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• Hierarchist 
High grid and high group. The hierarchists believe that society has a well-defined role for 
each member. They believe in the need for a well-defined system of rules and fear social 
deviance (such as crime) that disrupts those rules. An example of the hierarchist society is 
the caste system in India. This group believes that nature is tolerant, and that we can 
move within certain limits but if these limits are exceeded the system will collapse. They 
thus rely heavily on experts, who can identify those limits and establish rules to keep 
society within proper bounds. 
 
•Fatalist 
High grid and low group. As the position on the two axes suggests, the fatalists feel 
isolated in a world that, in their view, imposes arbitrary constraints on them. They view 
nature as uncontrolled, and free to move in any random direction. With these beliefs, they 
feel that there is little they can do to control their situation and therefore are resigned to 
take whatever fate throws at them. Often fatalists are excluded from CT analyses, 
because of their passive stance. 
 
There is also a fifth perspective, the asocial Autonomous group. Hermits fall under this 
classification as they withdraw from social interaction, having an autonomous way 
of life. Because so few people fit this description, and it is by definition not a viable 
basis for a society, it is often ignored in CT analyses. 
 
  
 
Figure 3: Graphical Representation of Cultural Theory 
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2.2.7 Use of CT for empirical research 
CT and the work of Mary Douglas has had a wider influence outside the discipline of 
social anthropology; she is widely cited in diverse disciplines such as political science, 
policy studies, organisational theory, risk prediction and management. Examples include 
studies on perceptions of health-related risks (Langford et al. 2000), industrial safety 
(Gross & Rayner 1985), risks at collective and individual levels (Dake 1991), the empirical 
measurement of individual perceptions of environmental risks (Steg & Siever 2000), 
theoretical criminology (Sparks 2001) and even information systems risk management 
strategies (Tsohou et al. 2006).  
Caulkins (1999) challenges the grid/group theory, asking whether the two dimensions of 
Douglas’s theoretical framework can be treated empirically and separately as she 
contends. This question is of the upmost importance. If the grid and group dimensions 
could not be empirically measured, then the theory would seriously lack validity.   
Caulkins uses a pilot study and factor analysis of pre-coded variables from the sixty-
culture Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) probability sample file. He first reviews the 
conceptual foundations of grid/group analysis, and then selects previously coded 
variables from the HRAF probability sample file to operationalise the variables of grid, 
group, and ideology or values.  
Interestingly, Caulkins defines himself as a fatalist, as does Douglas (2005). He also 
defines another anthropologist who has criticised Douglas’s theory, as an egalitarian who 
rhetorically defends the boundary between other disciplines and “pure” anthropology.  
Caulkins argues that, by using factor analysis, it should be possible to show the 
independence of the group and grid dimensions.  
The pilot study undertaken by Caulkins identified the fact that the grid variables loaded 
primarily on the second and third factors and the group variables predominantly on the 
fourth factor, thus supporting Douglas’s thesis. This is because if appropriate indicator 
variables have been chosen to support the theory, then the group indicator variables 
should load on a single factor, and the grid indicator variables on a different one. If, on the 
other hand, the grid and group variables had loaded on the same factors, this would have 
been much less supportive of CT. However some problems did come to light as a result of 
Caulkins’ work. It was shown that CT was not easily measurable using the existing cross-
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cultural data, and that the group/grid concepts were so dynamically interrelated that the 
factor analysis used was not effective.  
Further cross-cultural research based on CT, such as the study of individual perceptions 
of environmental risks (Steg & Sievers 2000), demonstrates, however, that significant 
variations in perceptions and preferences can be found among respondents classified in 
the four different groups, and these findings support Douglas’s theory. Other cross-cultural 
studies are also worth mentioning, such as the day-long assessments of 300 San 
Francisco citizens carried out by Dake (1991), which supported the existence of the 
cultural biases of hierarchy, individualism and egalitarianism and also the idea of the 
predictivity and preferences regarding risk taking at a social level, based on cultural 
biases, as per CT. 
The recent study of Mars (2008) applies and adapts an approach derived from CT, and in 
doing so suggests that corporate organisations can be classified as cultures with four 
archetypal categories as theorised by Douglas.  
The aforementioned literature suggests that the group/grid methodology is qualitatively 
measurable through the use of structured observation indices (adapted from Thompson et 
al, 1990; Douglas 1992; Langford et al, 2000), which capture the two dimensions of the 
theory (see Appendix A). 
2.3 Research Statement and Questions 
The focus of this research is to investigate the interaction between multicultural crews and 
safety management systems and its influence on health and safety in the offshore oil 
industry. The aim is to minimise occupational casualties in the industry by exploring the 
determinants of the work practices of multiethnic and multicultural crews in the peculiar 
working conditions of the offshore oil industry, on board an ultra-deepwater drilling ship, 
and by exploring the social science paradigms of human action and cultural diversity.  
My research will try to answer the following main questions: 
1. How does the interaction between the human element, represented by a 
multicultural crew, and the safety management systems that are in place, influence 
health and safety in the offshore oil industry? 
2. How have individuals interpreted and put into practice the safety culture adopted 
by the company? 
3. What do the crew really expect in terms of safety performance?  
4. How does the multicultural crew perceive the risks? 
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5. Is “zero incidents” a plausible goal? 
 
The project relies heavily on ethnographic methodologies, and was carried out through 
insider work-based research. Because of the aims and qualitative nature of the research, 
three main data collection techniques were chosen, namely, structured observations, 
focus groups and semi-structured interviews, and a research diary. Using these 
techniques, my objectives are to classify qualitatively the risk perceptions of the 
multicultural workforce through the use of the CT of risk (Douglas & Wildavsky 1982), to 
determine the risk behaviour types (Cooper 2002) and gain an understanding of safety 
systems. 
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C H A P T E R   3 
METHODOLOGY, RESEARCH APPROACH AND DATA COLLECTION TECHIQUES 
 
3.0  Introduction  
This chapter is divided into several parts. First, I will briefly review the methodologies used 
by practitioner researchers, and carry out an analysis of possible approaches for work-
based projects. I will then define and justify my chosen research methodology, 
ethnography, and the qualitative data collection techniques I have used in this research. I 
will also explore the advantages and disadvantages of the work-based researcher role, as 
well as the ethical issues related to this project. Finally, I will conceptualise the validity and 
reliability of the project and the strategy used for data analysis. 
3.1 Methodologies used by Practitioner Researchers 
 
Prior to discussing the methodologies used by practitioner researchers, I would like to 
take a broader look at research traditions in order to define the ontological and 
epistemological issues and thereby conceptualise the differences and prerogatives of 
each method.  
Epistemology or theory of knowledge is the branch of philosophy that studies the nature, 
methods, limitations, and validity of knowledge and belief. The word is based on the 
Greek words “!"#$%&µ' or episteme” (knowledge or science) and “()*+, or logos” 
(reason), and the primary question it addresses is "what is knowledge?"  
Practitioner research includes three main significant approaches: scientific and positivistic 
methodologies; naturalistic and interpretative methodologies; and methodologies from 
critical theory. Hitchcock & Hughes (1995, quoted in Cohen et al. 2000) suggest that 
ontological assumptions give rise to epistemological assumptions which give rise to 
methodological considerations, which in turn give rise to issues regarding instrumentation 
and data collection.  
It should be emphasised that research methods are not simply technical exercises. On the 
contrary, research is concerned with understanding the world around us, informing how 
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we view it, what we take understanding to mean and what we see as the purpose of 
understanding.  
Observed phenomena can be perceived as objective or subjective. From a positivistic 
point of view, science is the instrument used to comprehend the world and a means of 
understanding, predicting and controlling it, with the ultimate goal of generating a theory. 
However, scientific theory by its very nature could never be complete, in the sense of 
encompassing all that can be known or understood about a given phenomenon. The 
positivistic approach seeks large quantities of data with the intention of making 
generalizations. In contrast, a naturalistic approach aims to get closer to individuals and 
inside institutions in order to understand situations and people, which is the aim of my 
research, as explained in the previous chapter.  
As a mariner, the problem of calculating longitude comes to my mind: while it was 
relatively easy to determine the latitude, longitude was more difficult. Amerigo Vespucci 
was probably the first sailor able to calculate the longitude by comparing the relative 
positions of the moon and Mars with their anticipated positions, and to do so it was 
extremely important to determine the exact time. Here the objectivity of the observed 
phenomena is important. Hypotheses and concepts play a primary role in the scientific 
method as well as the set of procedures, which shows how the findings have been 
achieved and needs to be sufficiently clear that the results can be repeated.  
This is a classic positivist approach; it seeks large quantities of data with the aim to make 
generalizations.  
 
Fetterman (1998:8) points out that “people act on their individual perceptions, and those 
actions have real consequences, thus the subjective reality each individual sees is no less 
real than an objectively defined and measured reality”. 
 
In social science there are a variety of schools of thoughts with different epistemologies, 
Fetterman (1998) highlights that the ethnographer recognises the importance of 
understanding the epistemological basis for a selected model, with the main aim being to 
understand the subjectivity of the world of human experience. 
 
The methodologies used by work-based researchers are generally pragmatic. They are 
often underpinned by interdisciplinary skills and knowledge. Often, work-based knowledge 
involves the human dimension and professional practices WITHIN work organisations 
and, therefore, qualitative data are gathered, although some work-based projects involve 
‘hard science’ and therefore the choice in this case is quantitative. This work-based study, 
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supports the qualitative analysis. 
In short, as described by Armsby (2000) and Armsby & Costley (2003), work-based 
learning uses academic and theoretical knowledge in work-based projects which have a 
real and useful outcome.  
Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Glaser, B. 1992) is a very practical method 
used for work-based projects in which the theory is ‘grounded’ on data generated by 
research. It should not precede the research but follow it. The researcher should not have 
preconceptions while creating a theory, although a practitioner can be biased and 
influenced to a certain extent because of his of her subject expertise and experiential 
learning, but this must be acknowledged through reflective practice. 
The organisation and the professional background involved can affect the research 
methodology. For example, the research topic may be dictated by management, rather 
than left up to the researcher. In this case he may be less able to have his own 
perspective or tackle the research using his own initiative and reflective practice. I have 
clearly state the advantages and disadvantages of my role as a work-based researcher 
later on in this chapter, and I also acknowledged potential influences on my project.  In his 
ethnographic studies, Fetterman (1998) acknowledges the importance of biases. He 
elaborates on the concept of positive and negative functions. When controlled, biases can 
focus and limit the research effort, while when they are uncontrolled they can undermine 
the quality of the research.  
Often work-based learning develops its own epistemologies or multi-methodologies, as it 
is possible to use mixed methods appropriate to the type of research planned.  
Bell (1999:10) makes the point that ‘the case-study approach is particularly appropriate for 
individual researchers because it gives the opportunity for one aspect of a problem to be 
studied in some depth within a limited time scale’. The case study has also been 
described as ‘an umbrella term for a family of research methods having in common the 
decision to focus on inquiry around an instance’ (Adelman et al. 1977).  
Cohen et al. (2000) define case studies to be interpretative and subjective, and therefore 
well suited for qualitative studies. However, I did not select the case study approach for 
this project for various reasons, the main one being that I did not intend to study a single 
aspect of the problem, but many aspects. Thus, in my investigation, I took a naturalistic 
and interpretative approach, with an ethnographic methodology, in order to generate a 
grounded theory.  
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Action Research (AR, McNiff 2002, Burns 2007) is often used by work-based researchers 
as its prerogative is starting with a problem that needs solving. It is a strongly practical 
methodology drawn from Critical Theory. It is based on a spiral activity, where the 
researcher goes through repeated cycles. The spiral is composed of a Plan, a phase of 
Action and Observation and then one of Reflection; this cycle is then repeated with a 
revised Plan followed again by Action/Observation and Reflection. The aim of AR is to 
uncover the vested interests at work, revealing to the participants how they may be acting 
to perpetuate a system which keeps them either empowered or unempowered. Cohen 
and Manion (1994:186, quoted in Cohen et al. 2000) define AR as “a small-scale 
intervention in the functioning of the real world and a close examination of the effects of 
such intervention”.  
I contemplated the idea of using the AR approach, which is holistic, context-bound and 
produces practical solutions and therefore particularly suitable for professional-type 
research, which often deals with individuals and members of social groups and, most 
importantly, involves change intervention. I eventually decided not to use the approach, 
because of its feature of starting with a problem to solve (Bell 1999, Cohen et al. 2000), 
whereas my investigation did not start with a stated problem. I decided that, should I 
identify a specific, objective problem during my investigation then AR could be applicable 
for future developments of this research. 
 
 This approach starts with a problem situation to be addressed, so it can be applicable 
only in some researchers, which is not the case of this project. Soft Systems Methodology 
attempts to promote learning and appreciation of the problem situation between groups of 
stakeholders. Again, this methodology was not selected, as my investigation does not 
start with a problem situation as explained in chapter 2.   
 
Another methodology used by practitioner researchers is the Soft Systems Methodology 
(SSM, Checkland P. 1999). A key feature of SSM is that users are advised to keep the 
project vague and wide ranging for as long as possible, to not jump to conclusions but 
analyse the problem and any possible solutions before taking any action. There are two 
main modes within SSM, one involves real world activities and ideal models and the other 
involves systems thinking about the real world. This methodology places an emphasis on 
people’s perceptions of reality and work, with the notion of a problematic situation in which 
different people might perceive different aspects to be problematic. It attempts to promote 
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learning and an appreciation of the problematic situation by different groups of 
stakeholders. Again, this approach starts with a specific problematic situation that needs 
to be addressed, and so is applicable in only some cases.  My investigation does not start 
with a problematic situation as explained in chapter 2, thus this methodology was not 
selected. 
This work-based research involves the human dimension. Therefore, in my investigation I 
support a naturalistic and interpretative approach, with ethnographic methodologies and 
qualitative data, “where meanings rather than frequencies assume paramount 
significance” (Kirk & Miller, 1986:5). 
 
3.2 Research approach 
Because I am a participant observer in the community of practice under study for long 
stretches of time, that is, a month on board the drillship alternated with a month of rest, 
the ethnographic approach was selected as the most appropriated. This methodology 
allows me to carry out an intensive period of fieldwork, and then take a month’s break 
which permits me to make sense of what I have observed and recorded. Then, I can go 
back to the field and test my hypotheses. Although, historically, ethnography has been 
associated with anthropological studies, from the 20th century onwards, ethnography has 
featured increasingly in studies on education, organisations and communities (see, e.g., 
Kanter 1993, Fetterman 1998). The context in which the community under study is 
interacting with the Safety Management System, is extremely important to the project. 
Kanter (1993) highlights that people’s attitudes and behaviours take shape as a result of 
the experiences they have in their work. In a nutshell, her definition is: “the job makes the 
person”. 
As mentioned above, this research was developed under the interpretative paradigm as 
opposed to the normative one. The table below captures the key points of the two models. 
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   Table 1: Paradigm perspectives       
Normative Paradigm Interpretative Paradigm 
Human behaviour is rule-governed. Characterised by a concern for the 
individual. 
Investigated by methods of natural science. Aim to understand the subjectivity of 
the world of human experience, 
understand from ‘within’ 
BEHAVIOUR 
Behaviour responds to external environmental 
stimuli (i.e. the demands of society) or internal 
stimuli (i.e. hunger). In both cases, the cause lies in 
the past. 
ACTION 
Focus on action, and behaviour with 
meaning. The cause lies in the future. 
Actions are meaningful only if we are 
able to ascertain the intention of the 
actors and share their experiences. 
THEORY 
Generate a general theory of human behaviour and 
validate it through complex research methodologies. 
GROUNDED THEORY 
Begin with individuals and set out to 
understand their interpretations of the 
world around them. Theory is 
‘grounded’ on the data generated by 
the research. Theories should not 
precede the research but follow it. 
 
Source: Cohen et al. (2000) 
As explained earlier, qualitative analysis is appropriate for this study, and a strong 
emphasis is placed on the fieldwork that I have carried out as a participant observer 
(Fetterman 1998; Kirk & Miller 1986; O’Reilly 2005). 
Fetterman (1998) defines ethnography as “the art and science of describing a group or 
culture” (p.1). O’Reilly (2005) describes it as a “methodology that acknowledges the 
complexity of human experience and the need to research it by close and sustained 
observation of human behaviour” (p.1). These statements show how extremely relevant to 
my research ethnography is.  
I have used an emic perspective, which is defined by Fetterman (1998) as the insider’s or 
native’s perspective of reality. This concept is of relevance to my work-based research, as 
I am a participant observer and therefore am aware of the perceptions that I am trying to 
evaluate. This is in contrast to a priori assumptions that a researcher may make about 
how a system works (O’Reilly 2005). I am taking a ‘meaning-orientated’ point of view, 
which sees behaviours as determined by the phenomenon of experiences, rather than by 
external, objective and physical reality. In addition, ethnography enables me to observe 
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and analyse human interactions and gain results not achievable through classical 
positivistic and quantitative approaches.  
Fetterman (1998) argues that in his extensive fieldwork as a participant observer on 
research projects, the ethnographic approach has enabled him to understand the 
behaviours, moods, fears, and values of the community under study. He addresses 
culture as the broadest ethnographic concept, which either embraces a materialist or 
ideational perspective. The former is an interpretation of a culture which focuses on 
behaviours. In this view, culture is the sum total of the social group’s observable patterns 
of behaviours, customs and way of life. The definition of an ideational culture on the other 
hand is cognitive, and according to this approach, culture comprises the ideas, beliefs and 
knowledge that characterise a group of people. It should be noted that this definition 
specifically excludes behaviours, but Fetterman points out that the ethnographer needs to 
understand both behaviours and knowledge to describe a culture adequately, and it is my 
intention in this research to address both aspects.  
I found many descriptions of insider research in the literature, but they mostly relate to 
‘going native’ or becoming part of the culture studied. If there is a description of an 
anthropologist or ethnographer as an insider researcher, it is always made in cultural or 
ethnic terms, and does not refer to a researcher in a work culture, studying his/her own 
community of practice or profession, that is, practitioner research. I believe this is a very 
relevant point. 
Social anthropology often uses a form of investigation called participant observation 
(Hendry 1999) with the idea of finding out exactly what it is like to be a member of the 
society in question. This approach has advantages as it means that I do not need to ‘go 
native’ because my role as practitioner researcher already falls under the ‘native’ 
description. In addition, Kirk & Miller (1986:9) state that “qualitative research is a particular 
tradition in social science that fundamentally depends on watching people in their own 
territory and interacting with them in their own language, on their own terms”. 
Reflexivity, which, as Davies (2008) explains, expresses “researchers’ awareness of their 
necessary connection to the research situation and hence their effects upon it” (p.7), also 
plays a role in this investigation. 
Given this connection, I continuously reflected upon the effect that I might be having on 
the research itself in my role as practitioner researcher, and I constantly recorded my 
reflections and thoughts in my research diary.  
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Although there is an assumption that in both social and natural sciences we are 
investigating something ‘outside’ ourselves, often in the social sciences the researcher is 
in some way connected to the objective of the research. This is especially true in work-
based projects, and in my investigation I thus acknowledged the reflexivity and subjectivity 
of my studies. These issues were addressed through the ethical considerations and when 
I analyzed my role as work-based researcher, which is presented later on this chapter. 
This is the worker-researcher duality the `positionality’ which defines WBL.  
 
 
3.3 Sampling, Gaining Access and Data Collection Techniques 
 
Cohen et al. (2000) suggest that, in the real world, “the researcher should be able to 
study a group in its entirety” (p.143) but they also add that this is rarely possible and that 
“the researcher is faced with the issue of sampling” (p.143). 
Along with the methodology, the sampling strategy chosen can undoubtedly affect the 
quality of a piece of research (Cohen et al. 2000). Therefore, I carefully considered 
several important factors in selecting my sampling method, including expense, time and 
accessibility.  
In my role as a practitioner researcher engaged in an ethnographic study, I spent long 
stretches of time on board offshore units, which is where my target group works and 
lives. Although it can be very important in a research context, in this study the expense 
factor did not play a role, as I did not incur any costs in accessing my target group, the 
multicultural offshore community. 
The second factor I considered was time, that is, how much time could I devote to my 
project’s data collection phase? Again, the fact that I was taking the role of a practitioner 
researcher was significant. I spent a month at a time on an offshore unit on international 
assignments. During those periods I was constantly, 24 hours a day, immersed in the 
working community under study. I was thus able to devote much of my time to my work-
based research during the fieldwork phase, which took a total of 120 days. In addition, I 
was able to access the target group easily given that, as has already been mentioned, 
the community of practice is working and living in the workplace. 
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Another important aspect that I needed to consider was the sample size, the questions 
being: how much is enough? And how much is too much? I was engaged in a qualitative 
piece of research, with a total target group consisting of the 172 persons on board at a 
time. As highlighted by Cohen et al. (2000:93), “in an ethnographic or qualitative research 
it is more likely that the sample size will be small”. However, as I was not constrained by 
money, time or access in this project, I elected to carry out the following:  
! Semi-structured Interviews:  14 
! Focus Groups:   5  
! Observations:   74 
I considered fourteen interviews to be a sufficient number to collect the qualitative data I 
needed from the heterogeneous target group; five focus groups enabled me to interview 
25 persons and therefore strengthen the reliability of my data. 
I carried out seventy-four observations, quite a large sample, again due to the 
heterogeneity in the population.  
o Representativeness and parameters of the sample 
The target group is composed mainly of employees who work for the same company as 
the researcher and have at least one year’s experience offshore. 80% hold entry level 
jobs of different functions on board the offshore unit (marine/deck, technical and drilling) 
and the remaining 20% hold supervisory jobs. Having at least one year’s experience 
ensures that the sample employees have exposure to the offshore environment. The 
80/20 percent split between entry level and supervisory level employees was chosen to 
represent in percentage the total multicultural crew which is composed largely by entry 
level, hands on type of employees, but also by those in supervisory capacities, even if in 
a less extent. 
 
o Access to the sample 
My sampling strategy for selecting participants was based on asking them to volunteer. I 
asked the employees from the main sample if they were willing to participate in the 
research, informing them about the focus of the project and what their role would be 
through a participant information sheet (Appendix E). 
' UT'
o Sampling strategy 
A sampling frame (criteria for selecting sites and/or subjects) was developed to select the 
participants for the research and, given the goals and logic of qualitative research, a 
purposive sampling strategy (Cohen et al. 2000; Patton 2002) was selected as the most 
appropriate for this study.  
The other main method of sampling is the probability or random sample (Cohen et al. 
2000). The most important difference between probability and purposive (or non-
probability) sampling is that, in probability sampling, every member of the wider population 
has an equal chance of being included in the sample, which is not what I wanted in my 
sampling frame.  
As an insider work-based researcher I am very familiar with the target group and I had a 
clear idea (purpose) of the sample I wished to select, including people with an interest in, 
prior knowledge of and experience of the research context, with at least one year’s 
exposure of the offshore environment. I excluded those who did not suit that purpose. This 
sampling technique is in fact often employed in qualitative investigations, where non-
random sampling and the criteria used to select the participants is more important than 
the number of people interviewed. Individuals’ characteristics are used as the basis for 
selection, and they are most often chosen to reflect the diversity and breadth of the 
sample population.'''''
'
Figure 4: Graphical Representation of the Data Collection Techniques 
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3.3.1 Data collection techniques 
Due to the aims and qualitative nature of the research, I chose three main data collection 
techniques, which are detailed below. 
“Direct observation supplemented by immediate interrogation is the ideal course” (Royal 
Anthropological Institute 1951:27, quoted in Kirk & Miller 1986: 61). 
This quote represents the classical ethnographical approach. While traditional models 
assume the ‘cultural insider’ authority of the author, who claims the “native’s point of view” 
as the validity of his or her interpretation, this is not always the case. Fine (2003) argues 
that his work from the field reflected an isomorphism between empirical descriptions and 
what was actually happening “out there”. I do not have his authority as a trained observer, 
but I do agree with his assertion that today we no longer need to be reporters of the 
exotic, but rather interpreters of the patterns of work or domestic life.  
I wanted to describe and understand what was happening “out there” but I also had to 
bear in mind that I was also involved in the subject under study and a part of it. This 
meant that my subjectivity had to be made transparent through continuous reflection on 
the research process. Therefore I chose primarily: 
• a structured observation schedule (see Appendix A), 
• a research diary,  
• semi-structured interviews (see Appendix B) and 
• focus groups.  
 
3.3.1.1 Structured observations 
A structured observation schedule was adopted as a qualitative data collection technique 
to concentrate on the “workplace culture”. The anthropologist Mary Douglas (1992) does 
not view workplace culture as static but, on the contrary, she affirms that it is a way of life 
created constantly by everyone involved in the organisation, in other words it is the result 
of the daily activity, conversations and negotiation between members of the organisation. I 
benefited from my insider researcher role as participant observer which allowed me to 
understand the workplace culture from an “inside” perspective. I planned to collect around 
75 observations during the data collection phase of the research. The observations were 
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of the naturalist type, meaning that they would be hypothesis-generating rather than 
hypothesis-testing, which is typical of highly structured observation (Cohen et al. 2000). 
I was very aware of taking on a challenging task as it is often said that understanding 
human beings is more of an art than a science. In addition, part of the literature suggested 
that it is impossible to establish an explanatory social science to find regularities in human 
activity. However, in order to empirically measure the perceptions of the crew, as 
explained in the previous chapter, and to comprehensively assess the “workplace culture”, 
I drew heavily on the work of the anthropologist Mary Douglas (1921-2007). My reasons 
for doing this are based on the fact that I needed to measure, qualitatively, in my work 
context, the multicultural dimension based on an adequate model of ‘culture’. I thus 
proposed to use Cultural Theory or Grid/Group Theory (Douglas 1982; Thompson et al. 
1992), which, as explained in Chapter 2, is a two-dimensional framework of cultural 
comparisons comprising four distinctive ideologies or values.  
The group/grid methodology is qualitatively measurable through the use of structured 
observation indices (adapted from Thompson et al. 1990; Douglas 1992; Langford et al. 
2000) which capture the group and grid dimensions. Through this, my aim was to 
understand where along the two dimensions the observed multicultural workforce can be 
allocated.  
The measurable group indices are as follows: 
! Proportion of time spent in the group by a worker compared with other 
crewmembers. 
! Frequency of attending meetings and/or “Think” plans (safe job analysis, 
discussion and planning of operations). 
! Closeness of connecting character links 
! The ratio of shared to unshared interest, job knowledge. 
! Strength of the boundary of the group. 
 
Measurable grid indices are as follows: 
! Is the style “egalitarian” or is there a clear leader? 
! Are there “underdogs” and “top dog” types in the observed group of workers? 
! What are the theories of social justice that supports this distinction? 
! Grid is high whenever roles are distributed on the basis of social classifications 
such as: 
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\ age-grading \ nationalities \ sex 
In the observation schedule, I have decided to structure the grid and group indices (see 
Appendix A) in order to measure for qualitative variables the position of the crew members 
in the two dimensions of the Cultural theory. 
The workplace culture includes the safety culture of the multicultural crew, which is 
defined as follows: 
“A belief, philosophy or faith held by groups or individuals on safety matters which is 
demonstrated in practice through the attitudes, actions and behaviour adopted by the 
people of an organisation or a nation” (Kuo 2007:274).  
The safety culture is observable by a researcher with insider knowledge of the community 
of practice. He or she is able to qualitatively appraise specific characteristics such as the 
shared attitudes, values, beliefs and practices of the people at work. 
I was interested in measuring the risk behaviour types to develop qualitative variables and 
for this purpose I used the table below, which is adapted from Cooper (2002). For 
example, a crewmember attempting to lift a heavy weight using a crane, an operation that 
is very common in the daily activities of an offshore unit, with a lifting wire inadequate for 
the weight that is being lifted, counts as risk-producing behaviour. If the employee or 
group of employees is wearing the proper personal protective equipment (PPE), this is a 
mitigating behaviour. 
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Table 2: Classification of Risk Behaviour Types  
Behaviour Type Example 
Risk-Producing Lifting incorrectly 
Mitigating or Alleviating Wearing PPE 
Procedural (Risk Control Systems) Following explosion size controls 
Supportive (SMS System) Reporting accidents/incidents 
Safety Leadership Acknowledging safe behaviour 
 
 
3.3.1.2 Research diary 
I used a research diary as an extra means of gathering data, in addition to the semi-
structured interviews and structured observations. Although I was aware that compiling a 
diary could be time consuming, I felt that it could provide valuable information for my 
study. The two aforementioned data collection techniques would enable me to measure 
empirically the behaviours of the community under study in a clear and structured way. 
However, the diary would enable me to register in broader terms my involvement in the 
project. The diary would record the progress of the research in general and would 
eventually generate a history of the project.  
The diary would also be a useful tool for me to use to reflect on the project. I believe that it 
is an important tool for a participant observer researcher. I used it to record my 
experiences with my peers and the participants in the project, and my personal reflections 
on the fieldwork and the exploration of my professional practice. 
I wrote in my diary on a regular basis, generally at weekly intervals, but I also made an 
entry whenever I had an insight into the project. I used an electronic diary and made 
backup copies to avoid losing data. I used a notebook during the fieldwork to make quick 
notes, which could then be expanded on in the electronic diary.  
I wrote down what had happened since the last entry, including conversations, 
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discussions, interviews, topics for further study, thoughts and inspirations. I also wrote 
about my reflections on the project and possible plans for future research. 
3.3.1.3 Semi-structured interviews and focus groups 
As detailed below, I interviewed fourteen people and carried out five focus groups, using a 
purposive sampling technique to select the participants (Cohen et al. 2000; Patton 2002). 
Cohen et al. (2000:267) state that “(interviews) enable participants to discuss their 
interpretations of the world in which they live and to express how they regard situations 
from their own point of view”. It should be noted, however, that interviews reveal only how 
people perceive what happens, and not what actually happens (Bell 1999). 
I set a framework of themes to be explored in a two-way communication. This allowed the 
respondents the time and scope to talk about a specific subject, with the objective being to 
collect research data. In addition, this technique is a way of obtaining data about feelings 
and emotions that cannot be recorded easily during observations. Cohen et al. (2000) 
suggest that this type of interview is useful for framing questions that will contribute 
towards providing the knowledge sought. In addition, the technique allows the respondent 
to talk in depth and in detail about the given topics. Complex subjects can be clarified, and 
issues can be picked up that may not surface during observations. It is also easy to record 
the interviews with a tape recorder for future analysis. Unstructured interviews (Bell 
1999:138) may produce a wealth of valuable data, but it requires a great deal of expertise 
to control them and a great deal of time to analyse the results. Therefore, I selected semi-
structured interviews as the most appropriate for this research context.  
In the light of the research questions and in order to contextualise and frame the topics I 
had elected to explore, I divided the interview into five categories, as explained in detail 
below.  
# Section 1 
In the first section, my aim was to measure the understanding of “safety” as a qualitative 
concept. I was interested in comprehending the participants’ opinions. How did they define 
the notion? Did they see it as a value, a priority or something else? I was also interested 
in exploring any reactions to the company’s Safety Vision, which is that “operations be 
conducted in an incident-free environment, all the time, everywhere”. I felt that it was 
important to determine whether the multicultural crew was aware of the safety vision. It is 
' VU'
a goal set by management with regards to safety but can it be achieved if it is not known 
or understood? 
# Section 2 
In this section I aimed to measure the understanding of hazard identification, which is 
defined ‘as the potential to lead to harm’. I was interested in exploring this concept 
because I believe that, if it is not understood, the whole safety management system is in 
jeopardy. Hazard identification is the very first step in making an offshore oil environment 
safe. A lack of appreciation of this step makes it virtually impossible to assess the risk 
involved in an operation. If the participants were not able to understand this concept they 
would be unlikely to be able to identify the hazards involved in the operation.  
# Section 3 
This part of the interview is linked to the previous one. Specifically, I aimed to gauge the 
participants’ understanding of risk, which is defined as the probability of a harm being 
realised. The orthodox approach would be first to identify the hazard, and then assess the 
risk. Often the two terms are confused. I wanted to explore the concepts to understand 
whether the participants had a biased perception of them which could have an impact on 
safety management. Therefore, Sections 2 and 3 are conceptually linked and cover two 
important issues that need to be explored in the context of this research. 
# Section 4 
In this section, the aim was to determine whether the respondent had an understanding of 
the health and safety management system, and was committed to it. I was also interested 
in understanding the views of the multicultural sample of participants regarding 
management’s commitment to the safety system, as the literature suggests that this 
commitment impacts employees’ safety behaviour by 35 to 51 percent (Cooper 2006). In 
addition, I wanted to understand whether the participants experienced a “cognitive 
dissonance” (Festinger 1962). (see proposal p.3) 
# Section 5 
In the final section, I aimed to understand whether the workforce felt accountable for 
health and safety, in other words, whether they were aware of their own role in the safety 
system. The company takes a pro-active approach to the safety system. This is achieved 
by empowering the employees with the authority to stop any unsafe act. Is this the reality? 
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The last question in this section dealt with the impact (if any) on the participant’s life of any 
incidents that had occurred. 
The same semi-structured interviews were also used with the focus groups in order to 
gather data from a larger number of respondents, again chosen to fit the profile detailed in 
the sampling strategy. 
Focus Groups 
I conducted five focus groups each with between three and eight participants, making a 
total of twenty-five interviewees.  
O’Reilly (2005) states that focus groups are a data collection technique which were first 
used in market research to test reactions to new products. A well-known example cited in 
Morgan and Krueger (1998) involves the sale of boxed cake mixesB Historical antecedents 
of focus groups were also used during World War II. These included discussions of 
participants’ positive and negative emotional reactions to radio programmes. Today this 
technique is widely used in social research, especially in cultural studies, to research 
audience interpretations of cultural topics. O’Reilly (2005:132) describes focus groups as 
“a group of between four and twelve,. …selected and brought together to share a 
discussion about a topic”.  
Bryman (2004) reports that qualitative research based on this method can include quite 
large variations in the number of groups (citing examples of between 8 and 52) but points 
out that “there does seems to be a tendency for the range mainly to be from ten to fifteen” 
(p.349).  
A single focus group is very unlikely to fulfil the needs of the researcher but there are 
strong arguments indicating that too many groups would be a waste of time. If too many 
groups have been used, the researcher is likely to be able to anticipate what the group will 
say (Bryman 2004). 
Obviously time and money are surely a constraint, but given my role as practitioner 
researcher, I was able to organise five Focus Groups during the periods of time I spent on 
the ship, fully immersed in the community of practice that I am interested in.  
Cohen et al. (2000) highlight the fact that participants in focus groups interact with each 
other rather than only with the interviewer, which can help their views to emerge.   
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3.3.1.4 Data collection techniques: summary 
The aforementioned collection techniques were chosen to enable me to define 
qualitatively the multicultural workforce and to provide data which I could analyse and 
interpret to answer the research questions.   
 
   Figure 5: Graphical representation of data collection 
 
 
I used the informed consent approach (Davies 2008), which is standard across social 
research. I ensured that, during observations and especially during the interviews, 
participants were aware of my research, what it was about, why it was being undertaken 
and how it would be disseminated. 
I often acted as a “complete participant” (LeCompte and Preissle 1993:93-4,quoted in 
Cohen et al. 2000:310) as I had an insider role in the group being studied, and it would 
have been difficult to declare to every single member of the community that I was doing 
work-based research. I did, however, give to the participants a small signed statement 
about the research I was conducting, its purposes, and the use it would be put to 
(Appendix E). I do not believe that this project would be considered covert research, but 
the ethical considerations did have to be carefully addressed. This means that it was my 
responsibility to explain fully to the participants what the research was about and how it 
would be disseminated. The main aim was to ensure that the research could not be 
considered covert, that full consent had been obtained and it was conducted with the full 
knowledge of the participants. I also ensured confidentiality by not mentioning names, 
nicknames or any other codes which could identify the participants (Appendix E). 
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3.4 Consideration of my role as worker/researcher: advantages and 
disadvantages 
As I pointed out earlier in this chapter, I analysed my role as insider researcher and came 
to the conclusion that it had some advantages and some disadvantages for this project.  
Advantages:  
· Operating in an international context 
· As insider researcher I have access to a lot of knowledge, insight and information from 
the industry, in an international context, such as procedures, alerts, safety bulletins, 
safety lessons learned, etc. 
· Insider knowledge of the company 
· Good support from the management 
· I am involved in the safety of the ship and am therefore familiar with the issues 
· Reduce the difficulties in research in term of access to and rapport with participants 
 
Disadvantages: 
· Difficulty combining research with being an efficient and effective worker 
· Possible bias during the research a `critical suspicion` approach had to be adopted 
· Being closely involved in the team’s evolution and development worked against my 
attempts to gain sufficient distance to see the issues more clearly 
· An insider researcher may be tempted “not to tell” if the standards of the company 
seem inadequate 
· As an insider researcher there is a possibility of criticism and discussion of the findings 
 
I will now discuss the important issue of the ethical impact of this project. 
 
3.5 Ethical considerations 
I am aware that qualitative research in general, and ethnography in particular, especially 
in a work-based project, can raise ethical issues, as we are looking into people’s daily 
activities, watching them, asking them questions, and writing about what they do and what 
they say. Such an approach brings ethical dilemmas to the surface that are inherent in 
any situation involving a participant observer and participants. 
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O’Reilly (2005) argues that ethical considerations should not be a reason not to conduct 
research, but should keep us reflexive and critical. Since my work-based project is a piece 
of overt research I had to ensure that my role as insider research was clearly defined. I 
needed to ensure that the participants would not feel compelled to participate, and 
particularly that my role as the Master of the ship would not add pressure on the 
personnel being observed. To overcome this issue during the observations, I first asked 
the permission of the participants. It is part of our company management system to 
perform regular safety observations. The crew is thus used to this type of safety approach 
and so I did not envision encountering any uncomfortable feelings during my field data 
collections. Nevertheless, I ensured that the people being observed were made aware 
that my observations would be used for this project. This was explained to them prior to 
start of the observation. 
Regarding confidentiality, as mentioned earlier, I ensured that there was no mention of 
names during the collection and analysis of the data.   
It is important at this point to explain the difference between confidentiality and anonymity. 
The latter term indicates that nobody, not even the researcher, can identify who provided 
the data. This is impossible with an ethnographic approach. However, I was able to 
ensure confidentiality and, as will be explained to the participants, my observations and 
interviews will only be used for my research, and not for any other objective.  
In the light of these ethical considerations, this project is based on the voluntary, informed 
consent of the interviewees and observed employees. Thus, one of my responsibilities 
was to explain fully what the research would be about and how it would be disseminated. 
In brief, the aim was to ensure that the research did not turn into covert research, that is, I 
wanted to gain the full consent of those involved and conduct it with the full knowledge of 
the participants. As O’Reilly (2005:61) reports, the ISA Code of Ethics suggests that 
covert research should be avoided in principle, unless it is the only method by which 
information can be gathered or when access to usual sources of information is obstructed 
by those in power. 
Long-term projects, although carried out as overt research, can lead to people forgetting 
that they are being observed and researched, and this should be borne in mind in work-
based research. 
Another aspect of work-based research, and generally in any social research, is that the 
researcher is responsible not only to his or her profession, in terms of seeking practical 
knowledge and improvements, but also to the participants.  
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I took steps to ensure that my research respected the dignity of the participants. I cleared 
the research through official channels by formally requesting permission to carry out an 
investigation into my workplace and by submitting a learning agreement along with my full 
research proposal. My employer, as one of the stakeholders, signed this agreement. I also 
signed an ethical release form and submitted it to the IWBL. This meets the needs of the 
doctorate’s ethical requirements and the University’s Ethics Committee. 
My strategy in the field was as follows: 
I) I spoke to the people who would be asked to participate in observations and 
interviews, explaining the aim of my project. 
II) I ensured confidentiality by not mentioning any names, nicknames or any other 
codes which could identify the participants.  
III) At the end of the interviews, I showed the interviewees the draft transcripts. 
IV) I explained to the participants that I was doing this research as a DProf 
candidate and not as Master of the ship. I explained that participation in the 
project was absolutely voluntary.    
 
 
3.6 Validity and reliability 
In order to strengthen the reliability of the project, I asked a colleague to independently 
assess my schedule ratings. I also asked for his collaboration during the data collection 
and analysis phase as this will give me the possibility to share my analysis with a 
colleague within my practice, and hence a way of checking reliability. (Appendix F). 
I also triangulated the data gathered using the different collection techniques (structured 
observations, semi-structured interviews and diary) in order to enhance the validity of my 
findings.  
 
 
Figure 6: Data triangulation                                                                         
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In this chapter I have critically reviewed various research paradigms to explain how I 
selected my approach for this study.  
The ethnographic methodology and qualitative data collection techniques were analysed 
and shown to suit the needs of this investigation.  
It was explained that the data collected would be linked through triangulation, which would 
help to validate the findings and recommendations, along with the addition of a critical 
review of the data collected by an independent professional with command experience in 
the industry. 
Ethical issues related to the research were critically discussed as well as my role as a 
work-based researcher.  
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C H A P T E R   4 
PROJECT ACTIVITY 
 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter describes my project activity. I report the way I observed practices and 
measured types of behaviours during my ethnographic investigation with a depth of 
engagement. I spent a total of 120 days as a participant observer on board a dynamically 
positioned drillship for the fieldwork phase of this work-based research, working in three 
different countries, namely South Korea, Malaysia and India. 
   
   
 
Figure 7: Researcher engaged in the fieldwork activity 
I started this phase of my research after laying down the methodological foundation of my 
project activity as detailed in the previous chapter, critically selecting my research 
methodology and data collection techniques. The fieldwork activity of my qualitative 
investigation started in South Korea, as previously mentioned, more precisely in Busan 
port, where I joined a new drillship just delivered from the shipyard. I felt very fortunate to 
have the privilege of assuming command of a latest-generation dynamically positioned 
drillship with 96,000 tons of displacement, that was equipped to work in water depths of 
up to 12,000 feet (3,657 metres), and outfitted to construct wells up to 35,000 feet (10,688 
metres), with a crew of 172 persons of at least seventeen different nationalities. The 
delivery cost of the drillship was 685 million USD, and it was operating at a hiring rate of 
510,000 USD a day over a five-year contract.  
' YM'
I commanded the ship on her maiden voyage (De Rossi, V. 2009c) from Busan, South 
Korea, to Johor Bahru, Malaysia, where we stopped for commercial operations, prior to 
commencing exploring off the coast of India. Since then, I have been steadily assigned as 
her Captain during the drilling operations in Indian waters on a month-on-board-month-off 
basis. My data collection techniques enabled me to measure types of behaviours and 
practices that would not surface during my normal professional duties. This made me 
reflect on the appropriateness of my ethnographic methodology and chosen techniques. I 
also developed situational thinking during the fieldwork phase of my work-based 
research. This is obviously the core of my project and the days spent collecting data were 
invaluable. 
 
4.1 Research process and preparation 
As a Master Mariner in command of dynamically positioned drillships engaged in oil and 
gas exploration worldwide, I am very interested in the safety aspect of our operations–it 
was one of the main motivations behind my research. This interest has been channelled 
into an investigation of the interaction between multicultural crews and safety 
management systems and its influence on health and safety in the offshore oil industry. 
As stated earlier, my aim was to investigate the impact that globalisation has had on 
health and safety in this industry, as we move from local and national regulation regimes 
to a global, borderless market with a multicultural environment subjected to waves of 
national de-regulation and the pressures of competition.  
During the fieldwork, I was careful to pay attention to the ethical implications of my role as 
a work-based researcher in command of a drillship. This important issue was carefully 
addressed during the research process and proved to be a key element during the data 
collection phase. In the previous chapter, I explained in detail how I dealt with ethical 
issues during my ethnographic investigation as a participant observer.  
In gathering the data I interacted, in the context of the project, with crewmembers of at 
least ten different nationalities, and with crewmembers belonging to both the operations 
and maintenance departments of the drillship.  
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4.2 Data Collection 
! 4.2.1 Activity 1: Observations 
I collected a total of 74 observations over around 120 days spent on board the drillship, 
while it was engaged in oil and gas exploration. This is a bit less then one observation per 
day, which I found to be a workable average. I tried to perform one daily observation 
throughout my time on board, although I sometimes found this difficult due to my work 
commitments. Thus, on some days I was unable to observe practices and behaviours.  
I used a structured observation table (see Appendix A) to prompt me regarding what I 
needed to observe. This was quite different from what I looked at during my time on board 
the ship. I have looked at operations, practices and behaviours for a long time. I have 
spent the last eighteen years of my career in the offshore environment but I had never 
previously actually observed these practices in such a deep and reflective way. I was 
amazed to realise that I was able to observe, and most importantly record, events that I 
had seen many times before but never with such a deep level of engagement.  
My observations were broken down into two main objectives: to observe the grid-group 
indices (Douglas 1992) and the risk behaviour types. The first objective was significant for 
collecting data relating to Cultural Theory, while the second objective was equally 
important for determining the existing safety culture present on the ship.  
 
! First objective: Cultural Theory determinants 
One of my interests in collecting data through the structured observation schedule was to 
empirically measure the group and grid indices as outlined in Cultural Theory (Douglas 
1992, Thompson et al. 1990). 
While taking observations, I realised that, although I was a participant observer, by 
standing back and actually monitoring the various activities carried out on board the 
offshore installation, I was able to record measurable group and grid indices (Douglas 
1992), with the use of the table (shown in Appendix A) as a “prompt card”. 
As already mentioned, Cultural Theory has been applied before in studies related to risk 
perceptions, both health-related risks (Langford et al. 2000) and industrial risks (Gross & 
Rayner 1985) and with qualitative and mixed methodological approaches to identify the 
factors that influence the way the risk is perceived. Therefore, this was an important part 
of meeting my research aims.  
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The structured observation table (Appendix A) adapted from Thompson et al. (1990), 
Douglas (1992) and Langford et al. (2000) enabled me to record the measurable 
qualitative group/grid indices which captured the two dimensions of the theory as outlined 
in the table here below. I coded the group and grid indices with five categories, 1G to 5G 
and 1I to 5I, respectively (see Appendix G) 
Measurable Groups Indices:        Measurable Grids Indices: 
Proportion of time spent in the group by 
crewmember(s) (High/Low Group) 
Leadership style, i.e. no clear leader 
“egalitarian” style (Low Grid) 
Frequency of meeting and/or “Think” plan 
(discussion and planning of operations) 
(High/Low Group) 
A clear leader is identified (High Grid) 
Closeness of connecting character links 
(High/Low Group) 
There are “underdogs” in the group (High 
Grid) 
Proportion of shared tasks and job 
knowledge (High/Low Group) 
Individualist type, or work-alone type 
(Low Grid)  
Strength of the boundary of the group 
(High/Low Group) 
Roles are distributed on the basis of 
social classifications such as age, 
nationality, sex (High Grid) 
 
Table 3: Measurable Groups and Grids, adapted from Thompson et al. (1990), Douglas (1992), 
Langford et al. (2000) 
 
The anthropologist Mary Douglas (1992) views “workplace culture” not as “static” but as a 
way of life created constantly by everyone involved in the organisation. In other words, it is 
the result of the daily activity, conversations and negotiations between members of the 
organisation. This is what I observed during my data collection activities. 
It should be noted that the company I work for, and offshore contractors in general, 
encourage personnel to perform safety observations, which involves practical 
observations on the job site, in order to enable crewmembers to scrutinise safe and 
unsafe acts, with the intention of reinforcing the former and stopping the latter. The fact 
that this monitoring process was already in place and being carried out by crewmembers 
certainly helped me during my fieldwork, as the working community was already 
accustomed to being observed while performing their daily activities, and therefore did not 
feel uncomfortable as a result of my structured observations.  
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! Second objective: Safety Culture 
During my observations schedule, I was also interested in examining the safety culture on 
board the offshore installation, which is defined as follows: 
“A belief, philosophy or faith held by groups or individuals on safety matters which is 
demonstrated in practice through the attitudes, actions and behaviour adopted by the 
people of an organisation or a nation.” (Kuo 2007) 
The structured observation table prompted me to observe indicators of safe working 
practice, hazard identification, risk assessment and controls. I was then able to 
qualitatively record the risk behaviour type. The table below captures the key points and 
gives some examples. I coded the behaviour types into five categories, from 1B to 5B 
(Appendix G) 
 
BEHAVIOUR TYPE Example 
Risk Producing Improper Lifting 
Mitigating Wearing all PPE 
Procedural Following procedures, 
plan, risk assessment 
Supportive Reporting accidents 
Safety Leadership Acknowledging safe 
behaviour 
Table 4: Behaviour types, adapted from Cooper 2002 
 
My strategy in the field was simple. I asked the participants for permission to perform 
observations, which is also what the company requires when using the monitoring process 
mentioned earlier. When possible, I also engaged in a conversation with the participants 
prior to the observation, which served as an ice-breaking tool. The way the various teams 
were composed and the way they performed the different jobs and tasks gave me 
invaluable data and insights into the behaviour of this working community. For example, I 
observed in most of the activities very low grid and high group indices, which suggests a 
particular “way of life” or category, according to Douglas’s theory. 
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On a few occasions, I was involved in the activities I was observing and thus fulfilled 
completely the role of participant observer. I was involved in the activity and at the same 
time recording observations. In this role, I gained a lot of insights and gathered valuable 
data. In most of the observations, if not in all, at least two different nationalities of 
participants were involved. 
My observational agenda was quite simple. During the operational morning meeting we 
discussed the upcoming daily activities and therefore I was well aware of the various 
activities that were taking place on board the installation. 
The next step was to decide what activity I wanted to observe. I always chose an activity 
which involved more than one person, as I was interested in observing interactions within 
the multicultural crew. My interaction with the crew as participant observer was at the 
beginning of the observation, when I asked permission to perform my observation. I was 
very visible but I mainly stood back and observed the operation. Often I felt that I became 
almost invisible and a part of the working environment and I believe that after a while my 
presence did not interfere with the actions that were taking place.  
I became an active participant again only if I observed an unsafe act. In this case an 
ethical issue was involved in that it was my duty to avoid any possible injury to any 
member of the crew, which is also what I would like to achieve with this work-based 
research. However, on most occasions, my participation was limited to ask permission to 
observe, observing the work activity taking place, and discussing it with the crew, if 
appropriate, to give feedback about what I had observed. 
During the observations, I noticed that a particular safety tool was used quite often, the 
so-called “Time Out For Safety” or TOFS. 
The company recently organised training courses ashore to reaffirm the basic company 
health and safety policies. During these, TOFS was explained in full. It was emphasised 
that the executive management wanted to empower everyone to stop unsafe acts in order 
to prevent incidents.  
I found this expectation to be a very egalitarian way of conducting business. During these 
meetings ashore it was stressed that everybody had the right to call a TOFS if something 
did not look right. This encompasses the entire set of operations performed on board. For 
instance, a member of the maintenance team can stop the drilling activities if he or she 
thinks they are unsafe. Managers present at these meetings reiterated that everybody has 
the right to stop a job. Even if, after halting the operation, it is found to be safe, TOFS is 
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still considered to be good practice as it shows a commitment to safety. This tool 
empowers every employee to stop any operation when appropriate. It is a very powerful 
tool in an egalitarian society.  
I would like to relate a critical incident that occurred during my fieldwork activity, when I 
had to deal with a very angry electrician. He tried to stop a job by calling a TOFS, but 
apparently his instructions were not immediately followed. He became very angry with the 
team performing the task as he felt it was unsafe. He then complained to his supervisor 
and eventually the matter was brought to my attention. I decided to call the relevant 
parties to a meeting to clarify exactly what had happened.  
The story was as follows. The electrician saw a container being lifted by the main crane 
and he felt that the operation was unsafe as the load was swinging due to the ship’s 
motion. He called the TOFS but the crane operator did not stop the action. The electrician 
tried a few more times to stop the activity and finally the crane operator landed the 
container on the main deck. The electrician was very angry because he had been told on 
several occasions that he had the right to stop any job, but the crane operator had 
apparently ignored him or at least this was the electrician’s perception. The two were of 
different nationalities. 
Once I had the crane operator and the electrician together, I asked the crane operator his 
version of the story. He said that what the electrician articulated was correct; however, he 
was committed to lowering the container onto the deck and could not stop, as the load 
would have swung even more. To clarify the matter I then asked both of them if we could 
use the metaphor of an airplane taking off, that is, once the pilot is committed to lifting it 
off the ground, he cannot stop the aircraft as there is a so-called “point of no return”. Both 
of them agreed with this example and the issue was finally resolved there, as they 
understood each other’s position and perception of the event. However, this episode 
made me reflect on the idea of empowering the workforce to stop any operation they 
perceive to be unsafe. In this case the electrician was probably experiencing a cognitive 
dissonance between what he had been told and what was actually happening. This 
episode suggests that an egalitarian style is present in the working community, but it also 
shows the downside of putting into practice a safety model that permits and encourages 
everybody to stop operations as they see fit.  
The data I collected enabled me to develop an original approach to safety which I will 
elaborate on in detail in the next chapter. The originality of these observations is to bring 
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cultural theories into a working arena, which in turn has helped me to understand the 
organisational culture. 
! 4.2.2 Activity 2: Interviews 
I found this activity to be very interesting and stimulating because it enabled me to engage 
in in-depth, content-focused conversations with the working community. During this 
activity, I collected data from fourteen persons through in-depth semi-structured interviews 
(see Appendix B for the interview guideline) 
While engaged in this activity, I stressed one important point, which was that I was acting 
in my role as researcher and not as the ship’s Captain. I made this point very clear when I 
approached the potential participants, explaining in depth my goals and emphasising that I 
was engaged in work-based research, and that in this role I was asking their permission to 
carry out the interview. I provided them with the participant information sheet (Appendix E) 
and at the same time I explained the aims of my research.  
I must add that the very nature of ship life creates a natural bond among the crew, and 
this is also true on an offshore installation such as a drillship. In this particular instance, I 
was fortunate to have spent a considerable amount of time with most of the crew during 
the construction and commissioning phases of the drillship in South Korea. I had a very 
good relationship with many of the crewmembers, although I was not familiar with all of 
them. In addition, I have spent a significant amount of time off the ship on training 
courses, again with many of the crewmembers, and this has helped to create a 
comfortable atmosphere between us. Thus, the familiarity between myself and many of 
the members of the working community helped me to create an ideal environment for 
many of the interviews, as I fitted into the classic role of participant observer. 
Operational issue 
I had the operational issue of needing to find a suitable way to record the interviews. One 
of the choices was to use a voice recorder to tape them. The advantage of this technique 
is that it allows the researcher to concentrate on the interview and keep the interviewee at 
ease. The clear disadvantage is that it requires a large amount of material to be 
transcribed later. In addition, a tape recorder can make participants feel uncomfortable in 
many cases. I thus decided not to use a tape recorder. I found I was able to concentrate 
on the topic and keep the interviewee at ease while making notes on their answers in a 
paper notebook. Writing these notes down helped me to remember better what had been 
discussed. At the end of the interviews, I took the notes and entered them into a formatted 
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electronic document that I saved on my computer. I made backups to ensure that the data 
was not lost or damaged, especially as I was travelling extensively and my portable 
computer could easily have been damaged.  
During the semi-structured interviews, a two-way conversation allowed the interviewees to 
express their opinions, concerns and feelings. The fact that the interviews were semi-
structured allowed the conversation to flow where it needed to in order to deal with the 
issues at hand, as opposed to cutting the conversation off if it strayed too far from the 
topic.   
Every time I approached an individual to ask them to take part in an in-depth interview, I 
spent some time engaging in an ice-breaking conversation in order to make them feel at 
ease. In addition, I decided to visit the participants in their own workplace, as I realised 
that they would feel more comfortable there than they would in my office, for example, as 
it is a formal location. I went to different locations on the ship to meet people from different 
departments. This was not seen as a threatening act as I customarily make rounds of the 
ship on a daily basis and the crew is used to seeing me outside my office frequently.  
I selected possible participants from my sampling target beforehand. I then approached 
them and greeted them and engaged in the ice-breaking conversation. I always asked if 
the individual was busy, and if that was the case I told them that I would like to have a 
chat with them at a more convenient time, emphasising that this did not involve a 
disciplinary or performance-related reprimand, but was about some research I was 
conducting. This happened on a few occasions, and I always went back to visit the 
individual again or waited for the individual to let me know when he was available. I used 
this approach in order to show them that the interview was not in any way an order or an 
instruction from me; they could wait until later or refuse, if they so wished. However, if the 
participant was not busy and I had the chance to talk to them immediately, I explained 
once again that I was talking not as the Master of the ship but rather as a researcher. I 
explained that I was carrying out a piece of work-based research and asked them to 
imagine for a moment that we were off the ship and having a conversation on a train or in 
a pub. I noticed that this approach helped a lot, as the individuals tended to feel more at 
ease when thinking in this context. I then handed over the research participant sheet 
(Appendix E) and, at the same time, explained in my own words my research aims and 
my objective in collecting data. I also emphasised that the conversation was completely 
anonymous and that there would be no mention of name, position or any other acronym 
that could reveal their identity. On all fourteen occasions I found the participants willing to 
help. 
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Once the participant had agreed to the interview, I asked their permission to take notes 
and thanked them for their participation in my research, emphasising once more that this 
would remain confidential. I noticed that metaphorically stepping down from my position 
as Master and wearing my researcher’s hat made the participant at ease. Even though I 
noticed that some junior members were a bit uncomfortable, they still gave their opinions. 
I believe that the choice of interviewing them in their own workplace made them feel 
comfortable and drew an honest dialogue from them, giving me the opportunity to explore 
concepts such as hazard identification and risk assessment in a deeper way. The more 
interviews I held, the more confident I became, and by the end of the process it had 
become easy to approach a participant and start an interview. Although it is a large ship, I 
saw the participants on many occasions after the interviews and participant G became 
especially interested in my research topic. We engaged in discussions that helped me to 
reflect on my project and I captured many of these thoughts in my research diary. 
Between the five focus groups and the fourteen in-depth interviews, I dialogued with 
participants of ten different nationalities, which I consider to be a very multinational and 
multicultural sample group. The language used was English, and although this was not 
the first language for many of the participants or for me, our knowledge was more than 
enough to engage in conversation on topics related to our profession. In addition, as the 
official company language is English, there is a minimum proficiency standard that has to 
be met by all employees. Therefore, I found that language was not a barrier. 
 
Figure 8: Researcher’s interaction with different nationalities during the data collection 
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! 4.2.3 Activity 3: Focus Groups 
In my fieldwork activities I have used a multiplicity of data collection techniques and this 
has helped me not only to merely gather data but also to register observations, feeling 
and shared belief of the working community. One of the data collection techniques used in 
the work-based project was the Focus Group. 
Suter (2000) highlights that “the main difference between participant observation and 
focus groups is that the former observes behaviour in its natural setting, while the latter 
observes behaviour in unnatural social settings”.  However I found focus groups to be an 
appropriate data collection strategy, and one which complemented the in-depth interviews 
and participant observations quite well. Unlike other methods of data collection, the focus 
groups were conversational and this facilitated the gathering of information. 
I conducted five focus groups with between three and ten participants each, making a total 
of 25 respondents. Although in general it is not easy to organise focus groups, I found that 
being on board an offshore installation 24 hours a day for a month at a time made this 
logistically easier than it might be in a different, and perhaps more conventional, working 
environment.  
For the focus group sessions, I used the same semi-structured interview sheet (Appendix 
B) that I used for the in-depth interviews. My major objective for the meetings was thus 
clearly identified beforehand. I had a very basic agenda: I welcomed the participants, 
reviewed the agenda, reviewed the goal of the meeting, took questions and answers, 
wrapped up and said a final thank you to the participants. 
 
Focus groups are basically multiple interviews so I approached the group as if I was 
holding an interview. I explained in detail the aim and objective of my research, and 
handed out participant information sheets. I also stressed that I was acting as a work-
based researcher and not as the shipmaster. Moreover, I ensured that the group 
understood that there were no right or wrong answers, but that I was looking for honest 
feedback which would, in turn, help my research.  
The focus groups varied in size as I approached the participants individually to ask if they 
were willing to participate, to explain the research context and to provide them with a 
participant information sheet (Appendix E). 
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One technique that I used on two occasions was to hold focus groups at the end of the 
ship’s safety meetings, asking permission to carry out a series of questions to people who 
wanted to participate. On board offshore installations it is the norm to hold weekly safety 
meetings. This is a consolidated routine carried out worldwide. The crew is accustomed to 
these meetings and I found that this method worked quite well. The participants had 
already been participating in a meeting about safety and they felt at ease answering 
questions on the same topic. I felt that this helped them not to feel threatened or 
uncomfortable. I believe that this approach helped me to obtain honest and reliable data. 
 
Again, I emphasised that participation was completely anonymous; there would be no 
mentions of names or other cronyisms that would identify a participant.   
I took notes but at the same time I was actively listening so that the participants would feel 
that I was interested in their answers.   
I worded each question carefully. I was afraid that because of the multinational nature of 
the groups there could have been communication problems but this turned out not to be 
an issue. I read the questions out loud, but then I expressed the same concept in different 
words, to ensure that the message was clear.  
I also ensured that there was even participation amongst the group. If one or two persons 
were dominating, I ensured that others had the chance to speak too.  
On another occasion I gathered the participants in an office space close to the 
navigational bridge. In this particular instance the participants were of three different 
nationalities. This was my third focus group and I had also held about thirteen interviews 
by this point so I was quite confident in controlling and managing the group. I had very 
good feedback from the participants, and I was able to engage them in a very stimulating 
and informative meeting. I registered their points of view with regards to the main 
objectives of the meeting. After this focus group, I started to anticipate and was almost 
able to guess the participants’ answers. This indicated to me that I was gaining a very 
good insight into the working community. I began to understand their feelings about the 
safety management systems much more clearly.  
My fourth focus group was carried out in a similar mode to the previous one. Again I used 
the office space next to the navigational bridge, inviting three participants of different 
nationalities. I was able to engage them in a quite relaxed conversation. One participant 
was very keen and expressed his point of view very effectively. I also gathered a very 
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good, and may I say, honest response from this group and I appreciated the way they 
expressed their own points of view, avoiding technical jargon and over-used “buzz words”.  
My fifth focus group was slightly different from the previous ones. Unfortunately, a young 
man had lost his life on a company drilling ship working in the same region as we were, 
again a victim of a so-called “routine job”. The 26-year-old man was crushed against a 
post by a heavy lift being moved by the main crane. The emergency helicopter was called 
in and immediately evacuated the injured person, but sadly he was already deceased 
when he arrived at the hospital. The fatality happened on a very similar, although older, 
drillship to ours.  
Shortly after the incident, we received a visit from upper management and a meeting was 
held at which the incident was discussed. We also received video messages from the 
corporate office in which top executives emphasised the workforce’s accountability for 
safety and stated that it was not acceptable for incidents to occur. All of the above 
suggested very heavy “top down” instructions. In other words, the executive management 
was saying “do not get hurt”.  
The focus group that was carried out just after the above incident include ten people of 
five different nationalities. I started by discussing the fatality. I asked if the messages we 
had received made any difference at all to them and to their daily operations. The group 
agreed that a top-down instruction was not effective, and that a bottom-up drive coming 
directly from the workforce was necessary. In facilitating this focus group I followed the 
agenda I had set for the previous ones. I gained valid data from this larger group of 
participants who were all involved in the discussion and had strong feelings about the 
above incident. In this meeting I felt there was a strong group involvement, and that 
suddenly the safety talks had become tragically real. A life had been lost and discussing 
hazard identifications and risk assessments was no longer just an abstract exercise but 
rather a process that could affect real life. One participant shared a personal experience 
about an incident he was involved in a few years previously. He attributed it to a lack of 
attention on his last day at work before his time off. In the light of this experience he urged 
other participants to be focused at all times while carrying out their work. In brief, in this 
focus group there was a lot of emotion and involvement, It was in some ways much more 
informal than other meetings but on the other hand it gave me some invaluable insights 
into the ship’s safety culture. 
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! 4.2.4 Activity 4: Research Diary 
The research diary captured my reflections and observations from my data collection 
activities but also from my professional practice in the offshore environment. Keeping a 
written record of my research certainly enhanced and developed the depth of my 
engagement in the project. I recorded conversations with peers, subordinates and upper 
management which were relevant to my research. I did, however, ensure that the ethical 
conduct already detailed extensively in Chapter 2 was followed at all times. I never 
mentioned names or used any other means of identification. 
In a way, I used the research diary to supplement the interview data and to record a rich 
level of information about the respondents’ behaviour and experiences, almost on a daily 
basis. In addition, the diary helped me to draw a metaphoric map of my research pathway 
that enabled me to stay focused on the aim of my project. 
I made regular entries during the fieldwork activities. The diary was an invaluable aid for 
recording hints and insights, progress, feelings and for developing original thinking and 
capturing my reflections as they emerged from the project activity.  
 
Figure 9: Graphical representation of my research diary 
Although one school of thoughts recommends restricting the research diary to 
observational notes, methodological notes and analytical memos (Blaxter et al. 2001), I 
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wrote my diary without using such a structured scheme. I used a free-text diary as 
opposed to the “structured” type.  
I wrote the diary regularly during the fieldwork. I always kept in my pocket a small 
notebook in which I briefly noted ideas, observations, hints or anything that caught my 
attention or that was related to the project. This was an easy and quick method of capture 
that I was able to expand on later in an electronic diary that I kept on my personal 
computer.  
I founded this strategy very useful. It was not really feasible to bring the computer into the 
various working areas of the ship during my data collection activity, but using the 
notebook allowed me to make rough notes immediately while in the field. I also used the 
same notebook to draw graphs and sketches that helped me to visualise the data, and 
some of these graphical representations were also captured electronically later and are 
used in this report.   
There were very few days of fieldwork activity on which I did not write something in the 
diary, and if I had not made an entry for two days or more, I forced myself to write 
something anyway even if I felt that I was not moving forward with the data collection. I 
feel that it was important to keep the entries flowing and, although I may have sometimes 
held the impression that I was moving at a slow pace, I was able to put in writing certain 
reflections that helped me at a later stage. Often a sketch helped me to gather ideas 
together and make sense of what I was doing in my ethnographic investigation. I found it 
very helpful to visualise what I was doing or what I was trying to achieve with the project in 
graphical form.  
The length of the entries varied from day to day. Often I wrote only a sentence but 
sometimes pages. 
I did not prepare forms to fill in, but recorded the date of the entry and then used a simple 
style, frequently with a heading to summarise the event. I mainly recounted conversations 
that were not formal in-depth interviews, but in some cases I also entered my reflections 
on the interviews and observations. I also found it interesting to keep a record of topics 
and questions for further study that emerged from this investigation.   
Certainly the diary acted as a regular writing practice that forced me, in some way, to form 
and develop original thinking, as I expressed earlier, about my project, but it also helped 
me with reflecting-in-action (Schön 1991) regarding my own research and development.  
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4.3 Consideration of my role as Master 
Throughout my research I was very aware of my position of Master and its possible 
impact on the validity of the data collection. I paid particular attention to this aspect when I 
was at the planning stage of my project. I highlighted very carefully the ethical implications 
of my role as a work-based researcher who was also in command of the ship. I planned 
the data collection phase carefully because I wanted to ensure that my position would not 
impact the validity, especially during the observations and interviews.  
For the data collection stage of my research, I used the informed consent approach 
(Davies 2008) to ensure that the participants were aware of my research, what it was 
about, why it was being undertaken and how it would be disseminated. I used the 
participant information sheet (Appendix E) for this purpose. However, the sheet also gave 
me the opportunity to explain very clearly that in the research context I was not acting as 
Master, but rather as a researcher involved in a work-based project. During the interviews 
I endeavoured to ensure that my position as Master had as little impact as possible, if any, 
on the data collection process, making certain that the participants understood that I was 
acting as a researcher and not as the ship’s Captain. I made this point crystal clear when I 
approached the potential participants to seek their permission for the interviews, also 
explaining in depth my goals and emphasising that I was engaged in work-based 
research.  
One important point about the observation process, however, needs to be highlighted. I 
want to emphasise, again, that nowadays the crews of offshore installations are used to 
being the subject of safety observations performed by colleagues, supervisors and 
management. The observations are treated as strictly anonymous. There is no mention of 
names or positions on the observations cards used in the industry. Further to this, I asked 
permission from the participants and explained that the observations would be used as 
data for my project. The ongoing industry practice of safety observations certainly helped 
me during my data collection. Because of the crew’s familiarity with this process my 
presence on site was considered normal.  
Moreover, I was fortunate to have spent a considerable amount of time with most of my 
crew during the construction and commissioning phases of the drillship in South Korea. 
Whilst the drillship was in construction in the Korean shipyard, we were all living ashore in 
the same building. After working hours we met regularly in a social atmosphere and this 
acquaintance helped me to create good relationships with many of the crewmembers. I 
have also spent a significant amount of time off the ship on training courses in different 
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countries, again with many of the same crewmembers, and this experience also 
contributed to building relaxed relationships, which has lessened the impact of my position 
as Master on the validity of the data collection. While I was holding the interviews, I used 
different strategies to reduce or eliminate the impact of my position. First of all, I decided 
that when approaching an individual to ask them to participate, I would spend some time 
engaging in an ice-breaking conversation in order to make him feel at ease. Also, as 
explained earlier, I decided to visit the participants in their own workplaces. I noticed that 
this approach was very beneficial as they seemed to feel much more comfortable in their 
own environment than they did in my office, which is a more formal place. I ensured that 
they were at ease with me and that they understood that I was metaphorically stepping 
down from my rank as Master and positioning myself in a work-based research context. 
The project context was well defined by the participant information sheet (Appendix E). 
This explicitly explains the potential benefits of the research, that is, improving the safety 
of offshore operations, that participants could withdraw voluntarily from the research at 
any time and that their data would be treated as strictly confidential.  
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4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have provided details of how I put into practice the research approach and 
data collection techniques designed in the previous chapter.  
I was able to gather qualitative data with the use of an ethnographic research approach. 
The fieldwork activity is the backbone of this project and the graphical representation 
below shows the strategy I used to collect coherent data. In the next chapter I will analyse 
these data extensively. 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Data collection techniques 
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C H A P T E R    5 
PROJECT FINDINGS 
5.0 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I discuss, critically analyse and interpret the findings of my work-based 
research. My ethnographic approach and role as participant observer throughout the 
project provided a framework for data collection that enabled me to record patterns of 
thoughts and behaviours.  
 
Specifically, I critically discuss the understanding of safety systems and perceptions of risk 
among the multicultural workforce on board the ship. I consider and interpret key themes 
about cultural bias in perceptions of health and safety (H&S) issues, shared values and 
risk perceptions emerging from the data analysis. 
 
The data I collected on the multicultural crew’s attitudes to risk are modelled into 
behavioural attitudes and analysed using qualitative techniques and the two dimensions of 
cultural theory (Douglas 1990) referred to in Chapter 2. The values gathered along the two 
dimensions of cultural theory, namely grid and group, provide a view of the multicultural 
workforce’s specific way of life. (See p. 33 above). 
 
In addition the data gathered from the interviews, focus groups, observations and in my 
research diary over the four-month period are triangulated to ensure reliability and validity.   
 
Finally, the concept of “cross-cultural safety consciousness” is developed, based on the 
cultural dispositions and shared values of the working community.  
 
My objective in this chapter is thus to evaluate and organise the data gathered during the 
ethnographic investigation, interpret them, and present them in a meaningful way, and 
most importantly, in a way which will contribute to policy formation and good practice in 
the international seafaring sector.  
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5.1 Data Analysis 
 
Data analysis in any ethnographic research is a challenging task and is often defined as 
the ‘art’ of processing the gathered information. Fetterman (1998:93) points out that “first 
and foremost, analysis is a test of the ethnographer’s ability to think – to process 
information meaningfully and usefully”. O’Reily (2005:184) expresses the same concept 
with this comment: “But what do I mean by analysis? By this I mean making some sense 
of it all.” This implies an intellectual and methodological process of ordering the materials 
in a way in which their implicit and explicit meanings and connections are revealed. 
 
I used content analysis (Krippendorff 2004) to process the data. Fraenkel and Wallen 
(2009) propose the following definition of the method: “Content Analysis is a technique 
that enables researchers to study human behaviour in an indirect way, through an 
analysis of their communications” (p.472). Because this methodology implies the analysis 
of written accounts of communication, I used it to process the transcripts of the interviews 
and focus groups. I analysed and interpreted the data with the aim of explaining the 
meaning of my findings through a systematic analysis of their content. Content analysis 
enabled me to include textual information and systematically identify its properties by 
detecting the more important structures of its contents. I coded and broke down the 
transcripts of my interviews into manageable categories on a variety of levels, such as 
word, word sense, phrase, sentence and theme.  
When collecting the data in the interviews and focus groups, I set a framework of themes 
to be explored in a two-way communication process. This allowed the respondents the 
time and scope to talk about a specific subject. The transcripts were therefore analysed 
using five different themes: 
! Concept of safety  
! Hazard identification  
! Risk assessment  
! Understanding of safety system 
! Accountability for health and safety 
To analyse these data, the themes were coded manually. Content analysis assumes that 
words and phrases that are mentioned often are important and reflect significant 
concerns. Using conceptual analysis (Fraenkel & Wallen 2000) within the content analysis 
framework, I established the existence and frequency of concepts related to the above 
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themes in a given text. Once established, the concept was then explored and the number 
of occurrences within the text recorded. This strategy enabled me to analyse, highlight 
and cross-refer concepts in a way which corresponded to the qualitative methodology I 
chose to use. 
 
 
Figure 11: A fragment of a coded transcript 
 
 
Figure 11 shows a fragment of a coded transcript used for the content analysis of the data 
collected through the interviews. In this transcript example I was able to establish the 
existence of a recurrent topic and record its frequency.  
In this instance I found a common pattern among the respondents, the data gathered and 
analysed for its specific qualitative implications was then triangulated by means of series 
of focus groups, observations and research diary. 
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5.2 Presentation of Findings 
 
In the following paragraphs, I consider the key themes that have emerged from my 
ethnographic investigation of the interaction between the multicultural crew and the safety 
management system on board a drillship in the offshore oil industry. I present my findings 
about the risk perceptions and understanding of the safety system among the crew. I 
follow this with the empirical application of cultural theory and the risk behaviour typology 
of the working community under study.  
The investigation revealed an uncharacteristic perception of what is considered to be a 
‘safe job’ by this working community. The community of practice indeed perceives this 
concept quite differently from what the company has set out in its policies and procedures. 
The expectation of the crew, in terms of safety performance, is certainly close to “zero 
incidents”, although the perception of how the risks should be controlled is quite different 
from what the company has clearly stated in its health and safety regime.  
Cultural biases play a role in this offshore community and this is evident from the values 
obtained along the two dimensions of cultural theory, which empirically demonstrate that a 
specific way of life is present in the working community under study.  
 
5.2.1 Perceptions of risk and the understanding of safety for the multicultural 
workforce 
 
Data on perceptions of risk and the understanding of the safety system among the crew 
were gathered through interviews, focus groups, observations and my research diary and 
then critically analysed.  
During the data collection phase, in my role as participant observer, I was able to interact 
with crewmembers of many different nationalities. I interviewed a total of fourteen 
individuals, descriptions of whom are given in the following table. 
 
 
 
 
' TP'
Participant Nationality 
Years 
Experience Department Supervisor 
A Indian 7 Maintenance No 
B Indian 2 Operation/Drilling No 
C Indian 6 Maintenance No 
D Indian 6 Operation/Drilling No 
E Filipino 2 Maintenance No 
F 
South 
African  20 Operation/Marine Yes 
G Polish 8 Operation/Marine Yes 
H Polish 9 Maintenance Yes 
I Brazilian 15 Maintenance Yes 
L Indian 7 Operation/Drilling No 
M Angolan  14 Operation/Drilling Yes 
N Trinidadian  9 Operation/Deck Yes 
O Malaysian 9 Maintenance Yes 
P Indian 1 Operation/Deck No 
 
Table 5.0 Participants in the in-depth interviews  
 
The interviewees were selected using the process described in Chapter 3. The target 
group was employees of different nationalities with at least one year of experience in the 
industry, representative of the multicultural crew present on board the offshore installation. 
Participant P was the youngest interviewee. He was in his late twenties with one year of 
experience working in a non-supervisory capacity, employed in the deck department. At 
the other extreme, the most experienced interviewee was participant F, who was in his 
mid-forties, with twenty years of experience and working in a supervisory position in the 
marine department. The combined number of years of experience of the interviewees was 
115. This is an impressive number that represents a wealth of practice and exposure to 
the offshore environment.  
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In addition to the interviews, I carried out five focus groups on board the offshore 
installation, as detailed in Chapter 4, involving 25 participants. Details are given in Table 
5.1. 
 
   
Focus Group Number 
Number of 
Participants 
Nationalities 
represented 
1 3 Indian 
2 3 Indian 
3 8 
Croatian, Filipino, 
Polish, Indian, South 
African 
4 3 Croatian, Polish, Indian 
5 8 
Polish, Indian, 
Canadian, Filipino, 
Australian 
  Total: 25  
 
Table 5.1 Participants in the Focus Groups  
 
Three of the focus groups included only three individuals each and two included eight. 
The first two focus groups involved only Indians with non-supervisory roles. However, 
many different nationalities were involved in the other three focus groups, namely, Indian, 
Croatian, Filipino, Polish, South African, Australian and Canadian. 
First of all, I analysed how the concepts of safety and risk were discussed in both the 
interviews and the focus groups. I transcribed the answers to each question into a 
spreadsheet, which made it easy to find words and concepts expressed by the 
participants.  
The interviews and focus group activities revealed that many of the crewmembers and 
officers associate injury and harm with the concept of “safety”. The content analysis 
revealed that terms such as “hurt” or “getting hurt” were explicitly mentioned by the 
participants.   
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Participant D, in one of the in-depth interviews, defined safety as:  
 
  ”not getting hurt”. 
 
Participant F, almost identically, stated that: 
 
    “for me safety means not getting hurt, avoid the hazards and risks”. 
 
Interviewee G reported that: 
 
“the first thing that sprung in my mind when I think about 
safety, is not getting hurt”. 
 
Participant I’s definition of safety was:  
 
 “Safety is to go back to my family without injury”. 
 
Participant H, a Polish national with a supervisory role in the technical team and nine 
years of experience, reported that: 
 
“For me safety is when I feel ‘comfortable’ with the environment around me. This 
perception helps me to understand if I am safe or not. I tend to eliminate all the 
hazards when I start a job, to reach the “comfortable” status.” 
  
The data gathered through the focus groups involving a total of 25 persons as detailed in 
table 5.1 supported the views expressed by the interviewees. Concepts such as “not 
getting hurt”, “no injury”, “protect yourself and the property” were recorded during the 
discussions about the concept of ‘safety’. 
Some confusion emerged, however, between the concepts of ‘hazard identification’ and 
‘risk assessment’. To reiterate, the definitions of these two terms, proposed in Chapter 2 
are that a hazard is a situation with the potential to lead to harm, and a risk is the 
probability of harm being realised. Kuo (2007:101) defines a hazard as “something that 
can lead to undesired outcomes or harm in the process of meeting an objective”. Douglas 
(1992:31) defines the concept of risk as follows: “a risk is not only the probability of an 
event but also the probable magnitude of its outcome”. Kuo (2007:273) pragmatically 
defines a risk as “a measure of a hazard’s significance involving simultaneous 
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examination of its consequence or severity of the outcome and the probability of 
occurrence”.    
From the data, there emerged some confusion and lack of understanding of the difference 
between a ‘risk’ and a ‘hazard’. It is important to differentiate between the two terms, 
which were often used synonymously by the participants in this research. This is quite an 
important finding, because knowledge of these two concepts is the basis for an effective 
safety management system. In an effective system, the process of hazard identification 
comes first, followed by the risk analysis, which measures the hazard significance based 
on the consequences of its outcome and the probability of its occurrence.   
Nearly all of the participants in the interviews and the focus groups were unable to clearly 
define a hazard. 
Interviewee I’s definition was: 
“the hazard is the ‘unknown’ and can be everywhere”, 
while participant O proposed that: 
“hazard and risk is the same thing”.  
Only a few participants were able to explain broadly what a hazard is. The closest 
definition came from participant E, who proposed that:  
 “a hazard is something with the potential to hurt you”.  
The data gathered from the interviews was triangulated with that from the focus groups to 
strengthen the validity of the findings. Together they revealed a lack of understanding 
about the concept of a hazard. Three of the focus groups, containing a total of fourteen 
people, were not able to define what a hazard is. One of the groups defined it as 
“something that can injure you” and another as “the potential to damage humans, 
environment and property”. 
Marine safety management systems (Kuo 2007) are based on a theoretical framework 
which assumes the ability to identify the hazards. This is the basis for effective risk 
assessments. It is evident that if a hazard is not identified, or worse, not understood, it will 
be impossible to reduce the risk associated with it from an intolerable to a tolerable level. 
Figure 12 below demonstrates how the process works.  
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Later on this chapter, I show that the data from the observations highlight a high number 
of risk-producing behaviours/determinants and that this data is consistent with a lack of 
hazard identification.  
In general, this working community does not show a clear understanding of the concept of 
a hazard. This lack of comprehension undoubtedly effects the perception of risk.  
 
Figure 12: Pictorial representation of risk reduction (source: Kuo 2007) 
 
Figure 12 demonstrates the importance of hazard identification as a first step in reducing 
risk, which is the probability of an event occurring and the probable magnitude of its 
outcome. When the hazard is in the “intolerable region”, its associated risk must be 
reduced to move it into the green zone, which represent the “tolerable region”. As a 
practical example, if a person is working at a height of above three metres, the hazard of 
falling and its associated risk are defined as intolerable. Using personal protective 
equipment, an inspected portable ladder, and a safety harness with an inertial reel 
connected to a solid anchor point directly above the worker, can reduce the risk to a 
tolerable level. Firstly, it is necessary to understand the hazard and then, if applicable, 
reduce the associated risk to a tolerable level.  
  
Remarkably, to the question “What type of Risk is acceptable for you, and why?” almost 
every participant answered “zero risk”. The following are some of the responses given 
during the fieldwork: 
 
 “there is no acceptable risk” 
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  “zero risk is the goal. I am not willing to take any risk” 
“for me is acceptable no risk, zero risk”  
“Zero risk in a perfect world” 
 
Nearly all the participants expressed a desire to work in a zero risk environment. 
This collective and homogeneous representation of risks surely illustrates the shared 
values and beliefs of this community. Douglas (1995) emphasises that the cultural 
relativity of hazard perception is an instrument for the maintenance of group solidarity. 
Each of the four groups in Douglas’s cultural theory framework, individualist, egalitarian, 
hierarchist and fatalist, is characterised as being culturally biased according to the ways in 
which their social commitments towards a preferred ‘way of life’ predispose them to adopt 
a particular view of society.  
One interesting view expressed by interviewee Q was as follows: 
 
“For me safety is working without hazard to complete the job”. 
 
Although this answer echoes the views mentioned earlier and illustrates the same shared 
values and beliefs, it also reveals an implicit contradiction in terms within the research 
context. The contradiction I am referring to relates to risk management. Although working 
without hazard would be theoretically possible, in an industrial environment hazards are 
virtually always present and the risks associated with them need to be dealt with. The 
answer given by this participant unveiled an understanding of the ‘safety systems’ which 
tend towards the ‘zero risk’ philosophy. In other words, the risk is not dealt with but 
eliminated altogether. '
According to Ball (2000), there are eight different concepts of safety. At one end of the 
spectrum is the “zero risk” approach and at the opposite end, the pragmatic ALARP (As 
Low As Reasonably Practicable) method, which, as the acronym suggests, does not 
necessarily eliminate the risk or reduce it to “zero”. Instead it reduces the risk from an 
intolerable to a tolerable level.   
The bias of a working community towards a “zero risk” philosophy is associated, in cultural 
theory terms (Douglas 1990), with an egalitarian world view, as opposed to the low risk 
perceptions typical of individualists and hierarchists.  
Egalitarians are characterised by their commitment towards a lifestyle that esteems the 
ideals of a safe environment (Wilkinson 2001), in which people live together according to 
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their chosen principles. (Douglas 2005). 
  
 
 
Table 5.2: Eight different concepts of ‘safety’ (source: Ball 2000) 
 
 
 
5.2.2 The Zero Risk approach 
 
The perception of the working community towards a “zero risk”, however, also suggests 
also that there is a lack of knowledge about company policies and procedures, which 
clearly and explicitly stipulated that the risk must be reduced according to the ALARP 
method, As Low As Reasonably Practicable. The Table 5.1 above graphically explains the 
eight concepts of safety, with the zero risk and the ALARP method are lying at two 
extremes of the range proposed by Ball (2000).  
Typical adherents to the zero risk approach are, for instance, pressure groups who aim to 
influence policy makers and force them to disregard costs completely. To give a practical 
example, the US Occupational Safety Health Act, 1987, stipulated that a formaldehyde 
standard would be established, at an estimated cost of $72 billion for each life expected to 
be saved (Viscusi 1996). This example of a zero risk approach was undoubtedly politically 
driven, incurring huge costs compared to the associated benefits, and reflects the 
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egalitarian view which puts a high emphasis on low risks combined with high 
consequences, without any formal cost-benefit analysis.  
 
5.2.3 The ALARP approach  
 
ALARP is a pragmatic approach to safety that was introduced by the UK Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE 1992-1). It is illustrated in Figure 13 below. 
 
Figure 13: The ALARP principle, adapted from Kuo (2007) 
 
The UK HSE sets out the general responsibilities that employers have towards employees 
and members of the public, and which employees have to themselves and to each other. 
These responsibilities are qualified by the principle of ‘so far as is reasonably practicable’. 
In other words, the degree of hazard in a particular job or workplace needs to be balanced 
against the time, trouble, cost and physical difficulty of taking measures to avoid or reduce 
the risk.  
The regulation requires acting in a way that good management and commercial wisdom 
would encourage anyway, that is, to look at what the risks are and take sensible 
measures to reduce them. My company, like most drilling contractors, uses this pragmatic 
approach, as it is not possible to eliminate the risks associated with activities on board 
drillships completely.  
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The zero risk is a politically driven approach, which would lead a major industry, if applied 
to an extreme, to a completely stop of its operations and consequentially of a loose of its 
commercial advantage. By politically driven approach I mean an approach that it is often 
dictated by lobbies, groups of influence and in general activists that working in the pursuit 
of a safer society are able to influence policy makers to embrace the zero risk approach. 
However Wildavsky and & Wildavsky (2010)  state that “opponents of the ‘riskless society’  
on the other hand, complain that government is unnecessarily proscribing free choice in 
the pursuit of costly protection that people do not need or want”. 
 
The workforce’s perception of the risk is therefore is not in line with the pragmatic ALARP 
approach sought by the company as a risk management tool in while pursuing its 
commercial gain applying the ALARP method as the risk management tool.  
 
5.2.4 An emerging ‘Way Of Life’ 
 
The data gathered from the interviews and focus groups imply that the perception of risk 
of the working community is towards the ‘zero risk’ category. In other words, the workforce 
perceives the work as safe when there is no risk associated with it.  
In the interviews, eight out of fourteen participants explicitly used the term “zero risk” in 
answer to the question “What type of Risk is acceptable for you, and why?”  
In the fifth focus group, composed of eight participants, the answer to the same question 
was “a zero risk”.   
These findings suggest that the workforce is following a specific way of life which falls into 
the ‘egalitarian’ category theorised by Douglas (Thompson et al. 1990, Douglas 1992). 
In order to triangulate the findings, in the next section I analyse and critically discuss the 
data gathered from the observations. During the observations I registered group and grid 
values in order to obtain an empirical bi-dimensional measure following Douglas’s cultural 
theory approach. In the following section I demonstrate that these observations support 
both the views discussed above regarding risk perception and the egalitarian way of life. 
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Figure 14: An egalitarian way of life is emerging 
 
5.2.5 Adaptation of Cultural Theory 
Chapter 4 provided details of how the workforce was observed in order to gather data. A 
structured observation table was used in the field by the researcher (Appendix A). 
My observations were made with two main objectives in mind: to observe the grid and 
group indices (Douglas 1992) and the risk behaviour types. 
A structured observation table, shown in Appendix A, was used to observe and measure 
the risk behaviour types, while the grid and group indices were adapted from Thompson et 
al. (1990), Douglas (1992), and Langford et al. (2000). The table was used as a practical 
“prompt” card during the fieldwork activities and permitted the researcher to record 
qualitative data through participant observations, the measurable group and grid indices, 
which captured the two dimensions of Douglas’s cultural theory, and the risk behaviour 
types. 
The ‘grid’ dimension captures the externally-imposed and formalised regulation of the 
actions of individuals, achieved for example through laws and/or regulations. The ‘group’ 
dimension describes how strongly people are bonded together and how the behaviour of 
the members is determined by relationships within the community. 
 
In order to record the determinants of Douglas’s approach, values along each dimension, I 
gave scores for five different coded indices for each dimension, the ‘group’ and ‘grid’ 
indices in five categories coded as; respectively from 1G to 5G for the group dimension 
and from 1I to 5I for the grid. (see Appendix G). 
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Figure 15: Codes for measurable group indices 
 
Figure 15 shows the codes used to assign values for each index along the group 
dimension. Where applicable, every observation was given a value from 1, representing a 
low group score, to 5, representing a high group score, for each of the five indices. Below, 
as an example, I report the scores for Observation #1 for each index. In this specific 
instance, the indices were all given a high group score, with a value of 5.  
 
      Observation #1 
Code Value Significance 
1G 5 (high group) Long portion of time together 
2G 5 (high group) Many meetings held 
3G 5 (high group) High closeness among members 
4G 5 (high group) High shared tasks 
5G 5 (high group) High boundary strength  
 
 
Figure 16 shows the grid indices and codes. Again, where applicable, every observation 
made was given a value between 1 and 5 for each code/index, where 1 again signified a 
low grid score and 5 a high score. 
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Figure 16: Codes for the measurable grid indices 
As an example, Observation #4 is reported below, low grid scores of 1 are given for 
codes 1I, 2I, 3I and 5I and a medium score of 3 is given to Code 4I. The latter 
represents an individualist work style.  
 
      Observation #4 
Code Value Significance 
1I 1(low grid) No leadership shown 
2I 1(low grid) No clear leader identified 
3I 1(low grid) No ‘underdogs’  
4I 3(medium) Someone on the group was working alone, individualist 
5I 1(low grid) No role classifications on the basis of age, sex 
 
 
For each of the indices for both the grid and group dimensions, I added together the 
scores assigned to each index across all of the observations. For example, for index 1G, 
which represents the time spent in the group, I added together the recorded scores for 
that code for each observation (n=74), which gave me a total value of 140. If code 1G was 
not applicable for a given observation, its value was considered to be zero. I then used 
these summed values to graphically symbolise the grid and group determinants, shown 
respectively in Figures 17 and 18. 
- Group 
The group dimensions of cultural theory is extremely important, as mentioned earlier, 
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because it describes how strongly people are bonded together. Thompson et al. (1990:5) 
state that “it refers to the extent to which an individual is incorporated into bounded units. 
The greater the incorporation, the more individual choice is subject to group 
determination” and that it “taps the extent to which the individual’s life is absorbed in and 
sustained by group membership”. 
Figure 17 represents graphically the group indices. 1G, 2G and 4G have high values. 
These indices represent the proportion of time spent in the group by the crewmembers 
(1G), the frequency of meetings (2G) and the proportion of shared tasks and job 
knowledge (4G). These aggregate scores suggest a high level of group tightness and 
strong boundaries in the workforce.  
Index 5G, which indicates the boundary strength of the group, has a value of 125, while 
index 3G, representing the members’ closeness, has a value of 123. 
  
 
   Figure 17 Graphical representation of the group indices 
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- Grid 
‘Grid’ is the other dimension of cultural theory, representing (as explained earlier) the 
externally-imposed and formalised regulation of the actions of individuals. Thompson et al. 
(1990:5) explain that ‘the grid denotes the degree to which an individual’s life is 
circumscribed by externally imposed prescriptions’ and that ‘grid refers to rules that relate 
one person to others on an ego-centered basis’ (1990:11). 
Figure 18 represents graphically the grid indices. 1I, 2I, 3I and 5I have low values. These 
indices and scores show that there is no leadership shown (1I has a total value of 42), that 
a clear leader is not identified in the working group (2I has a score of 41), that no 
“underdogs” are present (3I = 26, the lowest of all the grid indices) and that the roles are 
not distributed on the basis of social classifications such as age, nationality or sex (5I). 
However, 4I had a slightly higher aggregate value of 79, which represents an individualist 
working style.  
Overall, the aforementioned variables indicate a low grid score, except for some 
observable individualist working activity, mainly due to the peculiarity of certain offshore 
operations, such as mechanical checks, maintenance and repairs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
' SZ'
'
  Figure 18:Graphical representation of the grid indices 
 
5.2.6 Egalitarian way of life 
The combination of high group and low grid indices specifically suggests the “egalitarian” 
way of life proposed in Douglas’s Cultural Theory, corresponding towards an “Egalitarian” 
style as indicated by the dimensions Y represented by the closeness of the working 
community and X which indicates a lack of “underdogs” with a an egalitarian leadership 
style. This analysis is supported and triangulated by the findings from the interviews and 
focus groups discussed earlier in this chapter. 
This egalitarian “way of life” was also observed in the behaviours of the working 
community during their free time, both in the galley during meal times and in the 
accommodation quarters. I observed very low grid factors in these environments, such as 
very little distinction between supervisors and workers. For instance, everybody wears the 
same work clothing–there is one type of coverall for working activities and one uniform to 
be worn inside the accommodation quarters. Everybody shares the same galley and eats 
the same food. The meal is self-served without distinction between ranks. Other 
observable behaviours are evident during the crew changes to and from the vessel. 
Ashore, the crew is generally very sociable and often get together in bars and restaurants 
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during the voyage from their home towns to and from the work location, where the 
offshore unit may operate for months at a time. The period spent on board is four weeks 
interspersed with four weeks of rest. This rotation involves quite a lot of travelling 
worldwide to reach the vessel’s location, often in a group. In addition, I observed that very 
informal communication was used. First names are used among the employees and the 
shore-based management. All of the above corresponds with the egalitarian way of life 
because it shows that roles are not distributed based on social classifications and that 
there is closeness between the members of the group.  
Another important determinant observed is that the job in the working community are 
primarily allocated based on achievement, which implies that the grid constraints are low. 
Low grid scores occur when access to jobs depends upon personal abilities or a system of 
equality, and this is very much the case in the offshore oil industry. Every roustabout, (i.e. 
entry-level worker) can climb the ladder up to Drilling Supervisor; every mechanic can 
arise to become a Mechanical or Maintenance Supervisor. Formal education, other than 
vocational qualification, is required only for the core crew of marine- licensed personnel. 
Meanwhile, for the other dimension of cultural theory, the group dimension, this working 
community displays high values.  
I observed that the proportion of time spent in the group compared with the total allocated 
time is almost 100%. Time is spent together not only during work activities but also while 
sharing accommodation facilities such as the galley, the recreation room and the cabins, 
which have two or more bunks.  
In summary, the observations gathered during the fieldwork activity support the finding 
that the crew follow an egalitarian way of life.  
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Figure 19: Graphical representation of the egalitarian way of life 
 
 
In Figure 19 I represent the grid score along the x axis and the group score along the y 
axis. The white star represents the location of the working community on board the 
drillship. It is towards the high Group and Low Grid, which is the expression of an 
Egalitarian view. 
As described in Chapter 2, the `egalitarians’ are characterised by low grid and high group 
determinants as per figure 19. Egalitarians usually live in a group where everyone is 
considered equal, and where the good of the group comes before the good of any 
individual. Rules are less to do with law and more to do with values. From a risk 
perception point of view, egalitarians are sensitive to low-probability high-consequence 
risks and they advocate the precautionary principle. The empirical evidence so far 
presented supports the idea that this way of life is present on the drillship. 
 
5.2.6.1 Critical Incidents  
I recorded critical incidents through my observations and research diary as they are very 
relevant to my ethnographic approach and representative of this working community’s way 
of life. I would like to mention a particular critical incident, that occurred during an 
observation of a person working on a platform over the sea. The person was wearing a 
life-jacket and a full body harness, connected to an inertial reel, as mitigating controls. The 
observer, however, noticed that the inertial reel’s anchor point was not directly above the 
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worker and therefore the safety line coming from the harness formed an angle of more 
then 30° from the vertical. This is a deviation from policy, which stipulates a maximum 
angle of 30°. This requirement is made for a good reason. In the event of a fall, a line at a 
steeper angle would hold the person but, at the same time, would cause a dangerous 
swinging effect.  
The observer then went to the area supervisor, who was watching the operation, and told 
him what he had observed. He was slightly unsure about the safety policy, but also had 
the perception that the risk could be reduced fairly simply by moving the anchor point, in 
order to create an angle of less than 30°. He asked the supervisor if he was right in 
thinking that it was unsafe to work with such a large angle in the safety line but the site 
supervisor said that it was fine and that an inertial reel could also be used horizontally.  
The observer came away from the conversation quite frustrated, feeling that the operation 
had been incorrectly carried out, and he experienced a cognitive dissonance through not 
stopping the operation by exercising his right to call a Time Out For Safety, as explained 
in Chapter 4. He thought about the episode for an entire day, and then went back the 
following morning to speak to the supervisor. The observer told the supervisor that he 
really thought that the act was unsafe, and that he should have stopped the operation. 
This time the supervisor admitted that he was wrong and apologised. This was probably a 
difficult conversation for both of them, but this critical incident once more highlights the 
egalitarian culture present on the drillship, in which individuals with different job positions 
and responsibilities in the ship’s hierarchy can actually exchange opinions on level 
ground.  
I found this critical incident to be emblematic and it helped me to understand the shared 
values and cultural bias of the workplace better. Firstly, reflection-in-action about this 
critical incident made me aware of the observer’s risk perception. The worker was tied off 
and wearing a life-jacket, however, although there was a low probability of falling, the 
consequence could have been high, so I would classify this risk as low-probability high-
consequences. This perception of risk is typical of the egalitarian style. Secondly, the 
observer displayed safety consciousness as, although he was not personally involved in 
the job, he took the time to ensure that it was within the level of risk tolerance demanded 
by the company. This action shows that this individual was living the company’s safety 
culture, which stipulates an incident-free workplace. In addition, as he and the supervisor 
eventually agreed that the job could have been done more safely, although this was the 
day after the incident, this demonstrates shared safety values. They both understood that 
the observation was valuable and the supervisor was willing to acknowledge that he was 
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wrong. This is obviously not an easy thing to do, and again it helped me to frame this 
working community even more strongly within the egalitarian way of life. A worker can go 
to his supervisor and point out a better way of doing something and the good of the group 
comes before the good of any individual. 
Now, I want to briefly shift focus to the reflective activity, which was an implicit part of the 
reflection-in-action of this project. In fact, reflecting in action on this critical incident helped 
me to understand that the safety value is quite strong in the working community under 
study.  
 
. 
 
Figure 20: An Egalitarian Way of Life 
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5.2.6.2 Risk Perception 
Together the cultural biases and shared values present in this working community reveal 
an egalitarian way of life.  
I reported in Chapter 2 that every way of life has a different risk perception, based on 
shared values and cultural bias. From a Risk Perception point of view, the egalitarian way 
of life is sensitive to low-probability high-consequence risks. See, for example, studies of 
risk perceptions in health related risks in (Langford et al. (2000), on industrial safety 
(Gross & Rayner, (1985), and at collective and individual levels (Dake 1991). These 
investigations support the view of a risk perception based on low probability associated to 
high consequences by a community classified as ‘egalitarian’. 
 
Figure 21: An egalitarian’s risk perception 
 
Figure 21 illustrates the risk perception that emerges from an egalitarian community, that 
is, sensitive to low-probability and high-consequence risks.  
Examples of the types of risks that egalitarians are sensitive to, in our context, include 
explosions, blow outs, and sinking. On the other hand, egalitarians tend not to be 
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sensitive to high-probability low-consequence risks, such as might occur on so-called 
“routine jobs”.  
 
5.2.7 Classification of the Risk Behaviour Types   
The lack of understanding of the concepts of hazard and risk, as detailed earlier, might 
have an impact on risk behaviour type. In order to classify the risk behaviour type of this 
working community, I used a structured observation table (see Appendix A) as described 
in Chapter 4. I used the table as a “prompt” card during the fieldwork activity to record the 
measurable risk behaviour types qualitatively through participant observations. I used five 
codes (1B to 5B) to indicate the units of meaning for risk behaviour, as shown in Figure 
22.  
I assigned a “yes” or “no” value to each applicable unit of meaning during the 
observations. To clarify with a practical example, during one observation I observed two 
individuals handling lubricant oil without wearing safety glasses. In this instance, I 
classified this behaviour as risk producing, using the code “1B yes”. 
On another occasion, I observed an individual working on a valve for maintenance 
purposes without isolating the electric pump connected to the valve. Somebody unaware 
of the work in progress could have started the pump, which could have pumped fluid 
through the valve directly onto the individual working on it, possibly causing injury. Here, 
the hazard had not been identified and the risks associated with it had not been assessed. 
There are company procedures that specify isolating machinery prior to any maintenance 
and the need to obtain a permit to work before commencing any maintenance job. I 
therefore classified this action with a “no” value for the “procedural” unit of meaning, 
assigning the code “3B no”. In this particular example, the company policies had not been 
followed, the hazard of having the pump started not identified and the risk associated to 
this activity not assessed.   
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Figure 22: The risk behavioural types (source: Cooper 2002) 
Analysing the data, I observed that the determinant of behaviour 1B, Risk Producing, was 
a “yes” in almost 50% of the observations. This is a very important indication as far as risk 
behaviour, because it means that in about half of the operations observed during the 
fieldwork activity, a risk producing behaviour was present. This is a quite a worrying 
indication, as this types of behaviours may easily lead to an incident. As mentioned 
previously, the interviews and focus groups indicates a lack of understanding of the 
concepts of hazard and risk as detailed in the previous paragraphs, and this shortfall in 
appreciate these concepts may one of the reasons behind  such behaviours, which in turn 
produce risks.   
The table below shows the number of recorded values of “yes” and “no” for each unit of 
meaning (1B to 5B). Note that not all of these units of meaning were applicable for each of 
the 77 observations carried out, but for some of the observations more than one unit of 
meaning was applicable. The final column of the table shows the total number of 
observations for which the given unit of meaning was applicable. 
Code 1B, for instance, which represents risk producing behaviour, was recorded as a 
“yes” for 14 observations and “no” for 15, giving a total of 29 applicable observations. 
Code 
Value 
"Yes" 
Value 
"No" Total N 
1B 14 15 29 
2B 14 11 25 
3B 12 13 25 
4B 1   1 
5B 6 4 10 
Table 5.3 Number of recorded “Yes” and “No” values 
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Unit of meaning 2B, which represents mitigating controls, received a higher number of 
“yes” (14) than “no” (11) values. In other words, out of the observations where this was 
applicable, most of the time mitigating controls were in place to lessen the consequences 
of a potential incident. 
Interesting data can be seen for 3B, which represents procedural behaviours. There are 
more “no” values, indicating that company policies and procedures are not followed, than 
“yes” values. This indicates that there may be a lack of knowledge and understanding of 
company policies and procedures. This view is also supported by the data gathered 
through the interviews. 
Supportive behaviours, coded as 4B, were inapplicable for the majority of the 
observations. The one recorded “yes” value gives only a small indication of behaviour. 
Almost 50% of the observations for which 5B, safety leadership, was applicable, received 
“no” values, which indicates that there was no clear safety leadership observed during the 
operations. The lack of clear leadership is a typical trait of an egalitarian lifestyle.  
 
 
Fig. 23 Graphical representation of risk behavioural types  
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5.2.8 Interpretation of Safety Culture by the Company 
 
In the interviews and focus groups, few participants were able to name a policy from the 
safety management system. This is an important point, as in order for the crew to interpret 
the company safety culture it must first know and understand the safety policies and 
procedures. Moreover, around 50% of the observations, demonstrated that company 
policy and procedures were not followed.   
An interesting fact that came out of the data analysis is that the maintenance and 
operation crews have different perceptions of work pressure. The data shows that the 
maintenance crew do not feel under pressure while performing tasks and do not tend to 
take shortcuts in their daily activities, but the operations crew do.  
Participant D, who belongs to the operation team, stated: 
 
” I feel a lot of pressure when in production. It is easy to do everything 
correctly when there is time, but when we start drilling then it is all a 
‘run, run, run!’ ”.  
 
Another member of the operations team, participant I, said: 
 
“sometimes we take shortcuts to finish our work as we feel under 
pressure by our supervisor”. 
 
On the other hand, the maintenance personnel said that they were not under pressure 
when working, as this participant reported in one of the in-depth interviews: 
 
“I don’t feel pressured at all when doing my job. I am taking my time 
and my supervisor doesn’t push me”. 
 
The different perceptions of work pressure held by the maintenance and operation crews 
may be the result of the induced commercial stress on the operation team as a result of 
being urged to avoid non-productive time which would have a financial impact on the 
contracted day rate. In fact, if the drilling operations stop for any unforeseen reason a 
percentage of the stipulated compensation is deducted from the day rate by the client. 
The biggest pressure is therefore on the operational crews and their line supervisors, and 
this commercial stress may very easily induce the crews into non-compliance with the 
safety regime, which in turn could result in incidents and accidents. The maintenance 
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crew, on the other hand, are less likely to feel the same pressure because, most of the 
time, they follow a planned maintenance programme, under which pieces of equipment 
are taken out of service regularly, without any operational impact, to be maintained or 
repaired.  
Most of the participants expressed their belief that management is genuinely interested in 
improving the safety culture, although there were a few sceptics. Participant G said: 
 
“I believe it is only because of money. The company save money being 
safe. That is the main reason”. 
 
On the same topic, participant H reported that he doesn’t think that management is 
genuinely interested; he stated the following: 
 
“I don’t think management is genuinely interested in safety, but instead 
they push this to cover their positions. If an accident happens, they can 
say well, there are policies and procedures and we told you to work 
safe!” 
The tables below summarise the findings: 
 
 
Who What Objective How 
Company Company policies 
and procedures 
To create safe 
working conditions 
Controlling the Risk: 
ALARP Method 
Working 
community 
Workforce perception To create safe 
working conditions 
ZERO Risk 
Philosophy 
 
 
Definition Findings 
Way of life Egalitarian 
Hazard identification Lacking 
Perception of a “Safe Job” With Zero Risk 
Risk perception High-consequence / Low-probability Risks 
Maintenance crew Feels no pressure when carrying out work tasks 
Operation Crew Feels pressure when carrying out work tasks 
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5.2.9 The concept of “cross-cultural safety consciousness” 
The key themes that have emerged from this ethnographic investigation highlight the 
focus on high-consequence/low-probability risks among this working community. In this 
context, the cultural relativity of the hazard perception is an instrument for the 
maintenance of group solidarity. The group that has emerged over the course of this work-
based research is culturally biased according to a way of life that characterises and 
predisposes it to adopt a particular view of the society at work. More precisely, the data 
analysed shows, through the bi-dimensional framework of cultural theory, that an 
egalitarian way of life is present in the community.  
 
In other words, the data collected and analysed in this ethnographic investigation 
establishes that cultural bias and shared values have established a specific way of life 
among the working community, and this way of life has influenced how the safety is lived 
and most importantly seen and perceived by the workforce community.  
In the light of these findings, I therefore propose the concept of “cross-cultural safety 
consciousness”, which I define as follows:  
“an approach to safety which values a perception of risk that is based on cultural 
biases and shared values” 
I also propose a conceptual model of a practical approach to safety, based on the findings 
of this research, with the aim of reducing the number of incidents in the offshore oil 
industry.  
In the model, I define four distinct stages. In the first, I highlight the necessity to 
understand the cultural biases and shared values of the community of practice under 
study.  
In the second, I crystallise the need to classify the working community based on the 
cultural theory framework (Douglas 1990). 
The third stage is directly linked to the second. In it, the risk perception of the working 
community is predicted based on the cultural theory classification made in stage two.  
In the fourth stage of the conceptual model I found necessary to put controls in place, 
based on the risk perception predicted in stage three, as a barrier to incidents.  
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Figure 24: Cross-cultural safety consciousness model 
Applying the model proposed in Figure 24 to the current project, the first stage is to 
determine the cultural bias and shared values of the working community on the drillship, 
which the researcher was able to do by analysing the data provided by the ethnographic 
investigation. Stage two, classifying the working community according to cultural theory 
based on the aforementioned shared values and cultural bias, led to the conclusion that 
the way of life on the drillship is egalitarian. In stage three, it was deduced that the specific 
risk perception implied by this way of life is a focus on risks with high consequences and 
low probabilities. Finally, stage four of the proposed model will be to put controls in place 
for those risks that are perceived as having low consequences but high probabilities, 
which are the ones that are not apparent to this working community and thus likely to 
cause incidents. In other words the research findings suggest that it is necessary to put 
controls and barriers in place where risk is not perceived.  
With the implementation of this model a significant reduction in work-related incidents is 
expected, due to fact that barriers will be put in place against risks that are not currently 
being perceived and which therefore pose the biggest threat of causing incidents. Risks 
with low consequences but high probabilities can certainly escalate into serious injuries or 
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worse if not perceived correctly by the working community. Barriers need to be put in 
place to prevent these incidents from happening. 
 
5.3  Conclusion 
 
In summary, this ethnographic investigation has revealed that the egalitarian way of life, 
described in Douglas’s (1990) cultural theory, is present in the community of practice 
under study. This way of life is associated with a focus on high-consequence low-
probability risks. The research also highlighted that, among the multicultural workforce, 
there is a general lack of hazard identification and a “zero risk” philosophy as opposed to 
the pragmatic risk management method sought by the company.  
The implications for the professional practice are therefore to move towards a different 
safety management system in the offshore oil business, one which applies the analyses 
and findings of cultural theory to this very complex and multicultural environment in which 
the interaction between the human element and policies and procedures is not 
straightforward but governed by many different elements, as emerged from this work-
based research. 
Further research would be appropriate in the practice to look into applying cultural theory 
and the model proposed here, in order to test it and to reduce, and ideally eliminate, the 
incident rate in the industry.  
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C H A P T E R    6 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.0 Introduction 
 
This project investigated a multicultural workforce on an offshore installation engaged in 
drilling operations in the offshore oil industry, using an ethnographic approach where I 
acted as the participant observer.  
Specifically, the project has explored how the globalised, multicultural offshore working 
community understand their activities and their involvement in the safety management 
systems in place on board drillships. I attempted to accomplish this by placing a strong 
emphasis on fieldwork that was carried out aboard an offshore installation. Analytical and 
theoretical insights gained from cultural theories of organisational behaviour (Douglas 
1978, 1992, 2005, Douglas & Wildavsky 1982, Thompson et al. 1990) were used to unveil 
the cultural biases and shared beliefs, which could affect the safety and hence the 
performance levels of the personnel involved in offshore operations.  
This chapter links directly to the previous one, in which the findings of the project were 
presented. First of all I briefly outline the aim and objective of this work-based project, and 
then summarise the conclusions and recommendations of the research with reference to 
the research questions delineated in Chapter 2. Finally, major implications for the industry 
and suggestions for future research in the field will be considered.  
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My aim in this work-based project was to investigate methods of minimising occupational 
casualties in the offshore industry, with a focus on the social science paradigms of human 
action, taking into account the complexities involved in managing multiculturally diverse 
crews. The project addressed the variability in perceptions of risk between and among 
different groups and how this can affect the safety of offshore workers. Specifically, the 
objective of the research was to investigate the interaction between the multicultural crew 
of an offshore installation and its safety management systems, and whether this 
interaction influences occupational health and safety in this section of the industry.  
!
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In order to achieve the above, the project was guided by the following research questions, 
about which I now draw conclusions based on the findings presented in the previous 
chapter.  
1. How does the interaction between the human element, represented by a 
multicultural crew, and the safety management systems that are put in place, 
influence health and safety in the offshore oil industry? 
 
The occupational health and safety of the workforce on this drillship has been influenced 
by their perception of risks that is associated with a specific way of life. This way of life is 
defined by cultural bias and shared values, and this bias has affected the way the safety is 
lived and practised aboard the offshore installation. The way of life that has emerged from 
this research is labelled egalitarian. People in this group tend to be very sensitive to high-
consequence/low-probability risks and this perception has influenced how the safety 
management systems are lived by the crew.  
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2. How have individuals interpreted and put into practice the safety culture adopted 
by the company? 
The individuals making up the workforce on this installation have an interpretation of 
safety culture which differs from the company’s. Given the workforce’s egalitarian stance, 
it tends to see a job as “safe” only when there are no risks associated with it. This 
particular way of life tends therefore towards the “zero risk approach” (see p. 89) when 
performing a task. The company, however, stipulates in its risk management approach 
that risks should be reduced based on ALARP (as low as reasonably practicable).  
 
3. What do the crew expect in terms of safety performance?  
The crew’s expectation in terms of safety performance is quite homogeneous; the goal is  
mainly not getting hurt. At the end of a period of working aboard the offshore installation, 
the multicultural workforce expects to go back home to their families in the same physical 
condition as they were in when they arrived. To achieve this objective, the workforce aims 
to eliminate hazards and reduce the risk to zero.   
 
4. How does the multicultural crew perceive the risks? 
The crew is very sensitive to high consequence/low probability risks. This has a practical 
implication: stage four of the model proposed in Chapter 5 suggests putting controls in 
place that are related to risks perceived as having low consequences but high 
probabilities. These are the risks that are not currently apparent to the working community 
and likely to cause incidents. In other words, the research findings suggest that it is 
necessary to put in place controls and barriers where the risk is not perceived.   
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5. Is “zero incidents” a plausible goal? 
“Zero incidents’ is an ambitious goal and is yet to be achieved. The findings of this project 
show that risk producing behaviours that can easily lead to incidents. The interviews and 
focus groups indicated a lack of understanding of the concepts of hazard and risk and this 
may contribute to the prevalence of risk-producing behaviour.   
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I would like to draw some analytical generalisations regarding the findings of this 
research. This project enabled me to explore the important issue of how multicultural 
crews interact with safety management systems in the peculiar working conditions of an 
offshore installation. I applied cultural theories based upon the theoretical framework laid 
down by Douglas (1978, 1992, 2005) in order to understand the effects of this interaction. 
The chosen ethnographic approach with myself as participant observer enabled me to 
answer the research questions and hence to propose some conclusions and 
recommendations. 
• Cultural diversity is an important issue in safety management and needs to be 
understood and addressed by management and the supervisors delegated to 
manage human resources. This project has shown that “cross-cultural safety 
consciousness” is a key element in achieving a safe working environment. I 
propose therefore a practical application of the model presented in the previous 
chapter. Using a structured observation table with measurable grid and group 
indices (Appendix H), an observer can give a numerical value from one to five to 
each observable category. These structured observations empirically measure 
where the working community can be placed on the bi-dimensional cultural theory 
framework. This is stage one of the proposed cross-cultural safety consciousness 
(CCSC) model.  
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Figure 25: First stage of the CCSC Model 
Once the index scores have been collected, they are analysed to determine the 
way of life of the working community. This is the second stage of the CCSC model. 
 
               Figure 26: Second stage of the CCSC Model 
Next, in stage three, the way of life, emerged from the analysis in stage two, is 
related to a specific risk perception. 
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Figure 27: Third stage of the CCSC Model 
 
Given the way of life of the working community and the risk perception associated 
with it, I then propose putting controls in place to deal with those risks that are not 
currently perceived and thus where the likelihood of having an incident is higher. In 
this research, the working community follows an egalitarian pattern and is sensitive 
to high-consequence/low-probability risks, so extra controls need to be put in place 
for low-consequence/high-probability risks. 
A practical example could be cleaning drilling pipe threads. From a risk 
assessment point of view, the risk in this job can be classified as having low 
consequences but potentially a high probability of occurring. For instance, the 
solvent used for cleaning the threads could damage the skin or particles coming 
off the pipe could fly into the eye. The model gives us the advantage of 
understanding the lack of perception of these types of risks by this working 
community, and therefore raises awareness, which can be transformed into “safety 
barriers”. For instance, in this task, the “safety barriers” could be improved 
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personal protection equipment such as using a full face shield over the safety 
glasses and gloves for chemical use, and isolation of the surrounding area. This is 
the final stage of my proposed solution, the CCSC model. 
 
Figure 28: Fourth stage of the CCSC Model 
 
   
• Effective training in basic safety management is needed as some of the basic 
concepts are not understood by the workforce, namely, the importance of hazard 
identification and risk assessment. The training I envision would be composed of 
both a practical and a theoretical part. Firstly, I would propose carrying out some 
basic, practical exercises in the classroom involving hazard identification and risk 
assessment. At the end of the exercise, I would go over the exercise, pointing out 
the eventual lack of hazard identification followed by the risk analysis, assessing 
the hazard’s significance based on the consequences of its outcome and the 
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probability of its occurrence. At this point I would suggest possible safety barriers, 
which could be either preventive or mitigating.  
 
• Technical jargon should be avoided (De Rossi, 2010) by using a terminology easily 
understood by a workforce whose first language may not be English. The concepts 
of hazard and risk should be explained in simple terms, with practical examples of 
hazard identification and risk assessment highlighting the importance of the two 
processes; first the identification of the hazard, then the assessment of the risk. 
• This project has proven that assessing the “way of life” of a given community is 
instrumental in understanding its risk perceptions. This in turn allows us to put 
barriers in place where risks are not perceived and where an incident is more likely 
to occur. 
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Through my work-based research I aimed to investigate ways of improving the safety of 
offshore workers by looking at the influence that multicultural crews have on safety 
management systems. The new paradigm of cross-cultural safety is, in my opinion, 
becoming an important element in its own right in today’s global labour market, in which 
cultural influences cannot be left unaddressed in the quest for optimal safety. My effort to 
use cultural theories in this project has provided a possible answer to this important issue.   
The major implications of this project for practice and further research are outlined below. 
 
Implications for practice 
• My project highlighted the implications of cross-cultural safety on an offshore 
installation, and proposes the application of the CCSC Model to improve safety. A 
practical guide to implementing this model on an offshore installation is provided in 
Appendix O. As a practitioner, I welcome the practical application of such a model 
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aimed at improving the health and safety of offshore workers while focusing on the 
multiculturalism of this population.  
• This project will help the community of practice to gain awareness of cross-cultural 
effects on safety management systems. I have presented my research at two 
international conferences and published articles in professional magazines, with 
the aim of disseminating the proposed model and my findings. In my opinion, this 
is an important issue that deserved investigation.  
• Moreover, the research highlighted the fact that risk can be perceived in different 
ways by diverse groups, as defined here by the “way of life”, and that this 
perception is formed through shared values and cultural bias. 
• Finally, the project highlighted the importance of basic safety training using clear 
language that is free of technical jargon, and can be understood easily by a 
multicultural workforce whose first language is unlikely to be English and whose 
education level could be relatively low. The training I suggest would aim to explain 
to the audience the concepts of multicultural diversity and the four different “ways 
of life” with their associated risk perceptions. 
The specific aim would be to highlight the different perceptions of risk based on 
shared values and cultural biases and raise awareness of the types of risk that are 
not being perceived, in order to improve safety. For practical and training 
purposes, a Cultural Diversity Indicator (CDI) questionnaire should be developed 
to determine the individuals’ “way of life”. As a ‘spin off’ of this project, I aim to 
create such a questionnaire, which will be part of some consultancy activity I plan 
to carry out based upon the findings of this research.  
The CDI will tell individuals what their cultural bias and shared values are, 
expressed as one of the four ways of life, egalitarian, individualist, hierarchical and 
fatalist. The individual will then be made aware of his cultural positioning in terms 
of the bi-dimensional cultural theory, and in turn the risk perception associated with 
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it. Being aware of their own risk perceptions will help individuals during the risk 
assessment process. For example, an egalitarian should pay extra attention to 
identifying high-probability/low-consequence risks, as he is less likely to identify 
them automatically.  
 
6.3.1 Implications for practice, transferability to other industries.  
My project has highlighted the implications of cross-cultural safety in a working community 
and my conclusions are transferrable to other industries. The work of Mearns & Yulea 
(2009) addresses the issue of occupational safety and how the process of globalisation 
can potentially influence the attitudes, beliefs, and risk-taking behaviour of the workforce 
of a multi-national engineering organisation operating in six countries.'
Welch et al. (1988) report that the hospitality industry in the US has become culturally 
pluralistic and that there is a need for management to understand the cultural basis of 
value systems, social and interpersonal interactions, the work ethic, motivation, and 
communication systems. They also show that a multicultural awareness in the hospitality 
industry will provide individuals with a cross-cultural perspective on management styles 
and skills.  
Europe is facing the same challenges. For instance, Prendergast (2009) says that Irish 
workplaces have gradually had to confront the complex issues faced by other multicultural 
organisations, and proposes an investigation into the levels of transfer of learning on 
completion of Health and Safety training programmes by non-Irish workers in Ireland. The 
research also proposes an extension of the current Health and Safety Authority Research 
to all industry sectors, to investigate perceptions of risk and language knowledge among 
non-Irish nationals. Safety statistics still show a high number of fatal incidents. The UK 
alone reports that 152 workers were fatally injured during the years 2009/2010 as of June 
2010 (HSE 2010). 
Internationally, construction sites are nowadays a multicultural working environment. This 
important element has been analysed and studied by various researchers. See for 
example the work of Enshassia & Burgessb (1990) who highlight the importance of cross-
cultural training for construction site managers working with multicultural workforces in the 
Middle East. Further to this, the work of Santoso (2009) raises the issue that construction 
projects have become progressively multicultural, especially in countries with a limited 
labour force, where there is need to depend on migrant workers. Santoso’s (2009) study 
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suggests that communication, wage segmentation, task assignment, trust, scapegoatism, 
belief and religion are the most important aspects which need to be taken into account in 
order to produce an effective working and living environment on a multicultural 
construction site. 
Ochienga & Priceb (2010) report that the increasingly global nature of construction 
projects has highlighted the importance of multiculturalism and the new challenges it 
brings to project execution. Busta et al. (2008) write that the challenge to convert health 
and safety systems to accommodate multinational/multicultural workforces is being 
addressed through initiatives such as the translation of safety materials, the use of 
interpreters and the use of visual methods of communication. However, they also report 
that there is little scientific evidence to support the effectiveness of these initiatives and 
propose that investigations into these methods and the effects of the migrant workforce on 
health and safety are carried out.   
Hovdena et al. (2010) discuss occupational accident modelling challenges associated with 
a changing working life, and ask whether ideas from models developed for high-risk, 
complex socio-technical systems can be transformed and adapted for use in occupational 
accident prevention.  
The complexity of the social science paradigms of human action and cultural diversity 
explored in my work-based project suggest that my conclusions could be transferred to 
any multicultural environment, as defined by Cultural Theory (Douglas 1982), in which 
safety management systems interact with a working community. The CCSC Model 
proposed here could be an alternative method for minimising occupational casualties in 
the emerging global labour market, where multiculturalism may have a significant impact 
on occupational health and safety regimes in different industries. 
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Disseminating and testing the emerging propositions, and engaging in debate with the 
professional community  
 
In order to disseminate my research, I presented it to international conferences and 
published articles in professional magazines. 
I first had the opportunity to publish in ReportIsm, a regular electronic newsletter providing 
news and opinion from around the world on International Safety Management System 
related issues. Please see Appendix K for a copy of the article.   
In the newsletter, I presented my research aim and objective and argued that the risk 
perceptions among different cultural groups are dissimilar, based on the assumption that 
such perceptions are socially constructed.  
I then wrote an article entitled “Has the ‘global village’ influenced the Safety of our ships?” 
for the International Human Element Bulletin, an online journal sponsored by Lloyd’s 
Register Educational Trust (Appendix P). 
As the research began to develop, I presented a paper to the International Conference on 
Services Management at Oxford Brookes University, which demonstrated my work in 
progress for a cross-cultural track. (see Appendices H and I). 
In September 2010 I presented a paper in Rome entitled “Cultural Theories in Offshore Oil 
Health and Safety”, at the 8th International Scientific Conference for Health, Work and 
Social Responsibility. This provided another opportunity to disseminate my research in the 
scientific and professional community. 
! Articles in professional magazines 
While carrying out my research, I began to collaborate with the Nautical Institute, writing 
for the its international magazine “Seaways” as author of the Captain’s Column. The 
Nautical Institute is a thriving international professional body for qualified mariners, with 
over forty branches worldwide and more than 7,000 members in 110 countries. Writing for 
the magazine gave me the chance to touch on some of the topics that have emerged from 
my project (see Appendices M,N,L). 
I plan to write an article for “Seaways” in which I will present my research findings to the 
international professional community.   
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I also plan to present my findings to the Maritime Training & Human Element Section of 
the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), a United Nations agency, as the head of 
the section has welcomed my research (Appendix D). 
The editor of Nautilus International Telegraph, an award-winning monthly newspaper for 
maritime professionals with an international circulation of around 34,000 copies, has 
shown a keen interest in publishing the findings of this research. The newspaper is the 
official voice of Nautilus International, the union for maritime professionals at sea and 
ashore (see Appendix D).  
An article entitled “How to build a better industry” was published in the August 2010 issue 
of the Nautilus, presenting the findings of my research. (Appendix Q). 
Implications for further research 
This work-based project has clearly highlighted the need for further research into applying 
cultural theories to safety management systems in a cross-cultural context. Specifically, in 
the light of my findings, the following research would be welcome: 
 
• The CCSC Model should be applied in a working environment to determine the 
dominant way of life and the associated risk perception and, based on this 
knowledge, to implement a safety programme of barriers against those risks that 
are being ignored. These barriers would consist of methods of preventing 
accidents happening in cases where the risk is less apparent. Such barriers would 
be preventive measures, such as hardware modifications, personal protective 
equipment, working methodologies, or training.  
• Comparative case studies would be welcome to compare safety management 
systems with and without the use of the CCSC Model.  
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6.4 Recommendations 
This work-based project has provided an opportunity for an investigation of the way safety 
management systems are implemented on board an offshore installation and its impact on 
multi-cultural crews. The findings of this project should be used in a careful consideration 
of the implications of cross-cultural biases on the health and safety of the offshore working 
community.  
The following recommendations have arisen from my review of the findings.  
 
1. The Safety Management Manual should be revised in the light of my findings to 
reflect the impact of multiculturalism on health and safety. A chapter about cross-
cultural consciousness should be developed, in order to raise awareness among 
the workforce. The chapter should explain the effect of cultural biases and shared 
values on perceptions of risk. The grid and group concepts should be explained as 
well as how different combinations of these values produce the four ways of life. 
Finally, the particular type of risk perception associated with each “way of life” 
should be explained, with an emphasis on the fact that accidents are more likely to 
happen when workers are unaware of the risks.   
2. A pilot study of the CCSC Model should be implemented on an offshore installation 
to determine the way of life on board. 
3. Once the way of life has been established, and hence the associated risk 
perception, safety barriers should be set in place for those risks which are not 
currently being identified. These would involve preventive measures which would 
reduce the likelihood of an incident happening. Such measures could involve 
hardware, such as structural modifications or procedural actions. The safety 
barriers should be discussed during the job planning stage. Once in place, the 
leader of the team performing the job should monitor the barriers, but the 
accountability would lie with the workers. 
4. Safety management policies and procedures should be revised in order to remove 
technical jargon, which is not appropriate for the offshore workforce. 
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5. Training for supervisors and managers about cross-cultural safety consciousness 
should be implemented in order to achieve a safer working environment. The 
training should provide information about cultural differences, with an emphasis on 
the effect of shared values and cultural biases on risk perceptions. The CCSC 
Method should be proposed in the training, with an explanation of the risk 
perceptions associated with each way of life. The training should also explain that 
an accident is more likely to happen if the risk is not seen. Practical examples 
drawn from offshore operations should be presented to the audience, showing the 
implications of a lack of awareness of certain risks and the need to bring such risks 
to the attention of the workforce. The course should be run before and after the 
implementation of the CCSC Model, with feedback sought from the attendees.  
6. Feedback from the course attendees should be taken into consideration for further 
development of the training syllabus.  
7. Effective training in basic safety management is necessary for those in non-
supervisory roles because fundamental concepts are currently not fully understood 
by the workforce. 
 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This work-based project has given me the opportunity to investigate the important issue of 
health and safety in a multicultural environment. In today’s globalised labour market it is 
impossible to ignore cross-cultural implications and certainly the impact on health and 
safety is worth investigating. Cultural biases and shared beliefs have an impact on the 
perception of risks, and the knowledge of this correlation would give practitioners an 
insight into where they need to put ‘safety barriers’ to reduce the likelihood of an incident 
occurring. I believe that with this research I have unveiled some important issues and I 
hope that my findings will lead to further research into social science paradigms of human 
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action, taking into account the complexities involved in crews with multicultural diversity. I 
believe that my research will have international implications and importance, I claim 
‘copyright’ for the model proposed and suggest that new strategies and policies can be 
developed  based on its basis,  and diffused at a company level, IMO and international 
level.  
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C H A P T E R    7 
CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 
 
7.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides a reflexive account of my personal learning and professional 
journey, firstly regarding this work-based research and then the DProf programme as a 
whole.  
7.1 Reflections on the Work-Based Research Project Process 
This research has given me the opportunity to investigate an important aspect of my 
profession, the safety of our operations. Health and safety is strongly linked to the 
success of our activities, as there can be no successful operation if it is not also incident-
free. My objective was to research the interaction between multicultural crews and safety 
management systems and the influence of this interaction on health and safety in the 
offshore oil industry. The project started in South Africa, continued in South Korea and 
Malaysia and finally ended in India. The research therefore became multicultural not only 
with regards the research topic but also as far as work locations. This international 
dimension added further value to the project because I was able to explore cultural 
differences using an ethnographic approach in many different geographical locations.  
I enjoyed the entire research process, especially the 120 days spent on fieldwork 
activities, which I found both stimulating and challenging. My dual role as ship’s captain 
and researcher required a strong ethical commitment and I must add that, although I 
enjoyed the project, wearing two hats at the same time was not easy. I appreciated the 
careful planning made beforehand during the research proposal stage. This helped me to 
deal with ethical and practical issues that had been thought through beforehand, in 
Module 4561.  
I must also add that my commitment to the doctoral programme added more strain to my 
already busy life, as I am a full-time professional working aboard offshore drilling units 
worldwide, with a family at home waiting to spend time with me when I am off the ship, 
and requiring my full attention during these periods. I was, however, aware of the 
challenge, having achieved a Master’s degree in Work Based Learning a few years ago, 
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again while working full-time. I was therefore conscious that I needed to balance my work 
activities, my life and my studies very carefully. The distance learning approach surely 
requires a strong commitment from the candidate; this for a very pragmatic reason, as 
there is nobody telling you what to do and when to do it.  The Work Based Learning and 
the Professional Studies courses do have, however, a distinct advantage compared to 
more traditional study patterns: the advantage is, in my opinion, that the DProf in general 
and the research project specifically are firmly grounded into the candidate’s profession. 
This was certainly the case in my research. In my professional life, safety plays a key role, 
since, as mentioned above, any successful operation must be safe and incident free. 
Thus, investigating possible ways to improve safety in our operations is closely linked to 
my professional activities.  
My main reason for investigating multicultural crews, safety management systems and 
health and safety in the offshore oil industry was my keen interest in the subject. I truly 
believe that every effort should be made in order to make our working environment safer. 
It is in fact unbearable in today’s society to face the ethical dilemma of seeing human lives 
lost in the working arena merely in the pursuit of financial gain. I feel passionate about this 
and, moreover, as a practitioner at the sharp end of the industry, I felt that I was privileged 
to be able to carry out such important research.  
 The work-based approach was beneficial as I was not a ‘professional researcher’ on 
board the offshore unit, trying to understand behavioural patterns and the way of life. On 
the contrary, I was a ‘researcher-professional’, at ease in its own practice. This is one of 
the benefits of a work-based project, and it must be added that the research was 
underpinned by a rigorous doctoral programme of study. I also believe that my chosen 
approach of ethnography was appropriate for the investigation I decided to pursue, given 
that I was immersed in the working community virtually 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. I 
had the advantage that I had shared half of my life with my crews and did not need to go 
‘native’ because I was already ‘out there’ as a participant-observer of the community I was 
investigating. I saw this characteristic as a distinct advantage. Moreover, the chosen 
research method was certainly appropriate for the nature of this qualitative research.   
I must add that I was obviously connected to the objective of the research. I have 
acknowledged the reflexivity and subjectivity of my studies and clearly outlined the ethical 
considerations I took into account earlier in this project. This is, however, the very nature 
of Work Based Learning, the so-called worker-researcher duality. It is undoubtedly true 
that in social science we investigate something ‘outside’ ourselves, but this paradigm has 
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an exception in the WBL investigations, in that the researcher is always, in some way, 
connected to the objective of the research. 
The ‘full immersion’ into the subject under study meant that I was constantly reflecting in 
action about my project while I was aboard the drillship. This is an important point, I 
believe. During the whole DProf programme, I reflected upon my professional practice, by 
reflection I mean thinking deeply about my role as a researcher-practitioner trying, through 
the work-based learning structure, to make an impact on my profession. 
This project was carried out under the umbrella of the work-based learning paradigm 
(Armsby 2000), and I am sure that learning through reflections has been a big part of the 
process, where in fact work-based learning put its emphasis as opposed to more 
traditional academic qualifications.   
I would also like to add that I have generated a ‘Mode 2’ (Gibbons et al. 1994) type of 
knowledge among professionals and organisations, which differs from the discipline-
based ‘Mode 1’ of the academic community, which is investigator-initiated and likely to be 
produced within academia. Sharing and disseminating the knowledge gained through this 
work-based project is another important part of the DProf programme. It is essential to 
share research findings with one’s professional community in order to test propositions 
and engage in debates with fellow professionals as well as with the academic community. 
Below, I outline how I have begun to disseminate my emerging propositions. 
 
7.1.1. Sharing and Disseminating  
 
When I started working on the research project, I was keen to disseminate and share my 
findings and I welcomed the chance to present my project at international conferences 
and publish articles in professional magazines. 
In April 2009, I had the opportunity to publish to ReportIsm, a regular electronic newsletter 
providing news and opinion from around the world on International Safety Management 
System related issues. Please see Appendix K.  
In the article, I presented my research aim and objective and argued that the risk 
perceptions among different cultural groups are dissimilar, based on the assumption that 
this perception is socially constructed. I stated that my professional experience suggested 
that there was a lack of cross-cultural awareness among multicultural crews. Many studies 
on health and safety have been carried out during the years, focusing on psychology, 
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rather than on multicultural diversity, which I was investigating. Although it was a short 
piece, the newsletter was distributed worldwide to the professional maritime community.  
As the research developed, I looked for an opportunity to share my thoughts and progress 
with the academic and professional community. I submitted a paper to the International 
Conference on Services Management at Oxford Brookes University, in May 2009, with the 
aim of presenting my work in progress at a cross-cultural track. I was pleased to have my 
paper, entitled “The interaction of multicultural crew with safety management systems in 
Offshore Oil Industry”, accepted with useful feedback from the peer reviewer. At the 
conference, I present my research topic to an academic audience which gave me the 
opportunity to test my emerging propositions about cross-cultural impacts on safety 
management systems. I had the chance to exchange thoughts on cross-cultural studies 
with fellow doctoral candidates and academics with a research interest in the topic (see 
Appendices H and I). 
 
! Articles in professional magazines 
While carrying out my research, I began to collaborate with the Nautical Institute, writing 
for its international magazine “Seaways” as the author of the Captain’s Column. This gave 
me the chance to touch on some of the topics that emerged from my project, such as risk 
perception concepts and the safety jargon widely used by experts, which I see as a barrier 
to the understanding of critical concepts. I found this a productive way to share my 
thoughts and experiences with the professional community. I received emails from 
colleagues about some of the topics and this was stimulating for me, as I was able to 
discuss safety topics with fellow practitioners. I wrote the following articles:  
o De Rossi, V. (2010)  Captain’s Column: Clear away the jargon. Seaways, 1, p. 3 
(Appendix M). 
 
o De Rossi, V. (2009e)  Captain’s Column: Risk Perception. Seaways, 10, p. 3 
(Appendix N). 
 
o ·De Rossi, V. (2009d) Captainʼs Column: A Maiden Voyage. Seaways, 8, p. 3 
(Appendix L). 
 
I also wrote an article for the International Human Element Bulletin, an online journal 
sponsored by Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust, with the aim of improving awareness of 
the human element in the maritime industry (see Appendix P). 
An abstract of my research, entitled “Cultural Theories in the Offshore Oil Health and 
Safety” was accepted by a peer review for the forthcoming 8th International Scientific 
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Conference for Health, Work and Social Responsibility, which I presented in September 
2010. This was another opportunity to disseminate my research to the scientific and 
professional community.   
Finally, I wrote an article entitled “How to build a better industry” in which I presented the 
findings of my research to the professional community. This was published in the August 
2010 issue of the Nautilus Telegraph, an award-winning monthly newspaper with an 
international circulation of around 34,000 copies (Appendix Q). ZBM!Whole Picture: Professional Knowledge  
In this section, I look at the whole picture now that I am at the end of the programme. I 
reiterate that I am not new to work based learning, having achieved a MSc degree in Work 
Based Learning Studies (Marine Operations and Safety Management) from Middlesex 
University in 2004. My work-based project for that degree was recognised as an example 
of good work (see Appendix J). My final project was a case study aimed at improving 
safety in offshore operations. A paper based on it was published in the Seaway magazine 
(De Rossi 2004). During that experience, I became fascinated by the processes involved 
in work-based learning, and when I finished my Masters I contemplated pursuing another 
degree in higher education. I decided to spend a few more years on my professional 
practice first, and then I applied to the Doctorate in Professional Studies programme 
(DProf) at Middlesex University. An extremely important aspect of the Middlesex 
University DProf is, in my opinion, that the learner is situated outside the academic sphere 
(Costley & Stephenson 2005), as a practitioner based in a work environment. I found this 
aspect of the programme crucial because I wanted to expand my existing area of 
expertise, and carry out research that would have an impact on my profession and make a 
contribution to my field.  
Credibility, capability and continuous development (Stephenson et al. 2004) played a role 
in my choice of programme. My expectations from the DProf are to be recognised for the 
highest level of professional achievement, through a commitment to continuous learning 
and developing intellectual skills; in other words, I aim for a ‘legitimisation of alternative 
forms of knowledge within the academy’ (Bourner et al. 2001). 
Moreover, I heartily concur with Lester’s (2004) assertion that today’s professional world 
demands an increasing commitment to and focus on field-based practice, rather than the 
more traditional (and, inherently, isolative) research model currently used for advanced 
degrees in many other disciplines. Furthermore, as a practitioner, I was not aiming only for 
a self-serving (and ultimately disjunctive) research model that made “a valid contribution 
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to existing practice” in any given field, but rather, to achieve a doctorate in professional 
development.  
The pinnacle of my DProf studies was for me, certainly the project. My work-based 
investigation, as already mentioned, was embedded into my professional practice. This is 
the peculiarity of work-based research, which is an investigation with a practical aim to 
benefit the professional community. In this endeavour, I have used my knowledge, 
experience and skills to manage the project, especially when facing unforeseen events. 
Dealing with such unplanned events has greatly enhanced my project management skills. 
Reflecting on the work I did over the course of my project, I realise that it has been on my 
mind constantly. I think that abandoning a piece of work for a long period of time can 
cause problems. Nevertheless, in order to maintain this constant involvement, I had to 
learn how to balance my professional activity, my personal life and my studies, so I 
learned to allocate my time, and manage my busy days in order to dedicate enough hours 
to my project. Often, during my time on the ship, the project and my professional activities 
were closely linked. For example, during safety meetings I was able to discuss safety 
topics that were useful for my project as well.  
Managing this project has been a great learning opportunity. I not only had to design the 
research process but, most importantly, put it into practice. I found it challenging, for 
example, to carry out the interviews and focus groups in the work place. It was not easy to 
find the time between our busy work days, and moreover, as the Captain of the ship, I had 
to make it very clear that I was wearing my researcher hat in that context. This was 
definitely a task that took me outside of my ‘comfort zone’ but I have since realised that it 
helped me to build confidence in dealing with unfamiliar problems. It is often too easy to 
get used to simply dealing with the daily routine. This experience has widened my 
professional boundaries, enabling me to ‘look over the fence’ of my own practice. In fact, I 
found this fascinating. I discovered new ways of learning, for instance while networking 
with fellow DProf candidates.  
With one particular candidate, I shared information about the programme structure, the 
RAL requirements and the oral presentation for the Programme Approval Panel (PAP). 
We initially started to communicate via email and asynchronously through the University’s 
VLE (virtual learning environment). We then started to communicate synchronously 
through Skype, a free VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) software, which also permits 
videoconferencing. This tool enabled us to communicate in an effective way and, most 
importantly, in real time. I used this tool for a dummy presentation of my project proposal. 
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It was an effective way to test my presentation using a web-based videoconference very 
similar to the one I would use for the University PAP. We critically discussed the content 
as well as the structure of the presentation and this built my confidence. 
I believe that, in collaboration or peer support, learners have two distinctive and alternate 
roles: ‘peer supporter’ and ‘peer supported’. The roles are interchangeable and each peer 
acts as both supporter and supported during the relationship. To sum up, I explored this 
pedagogical paradigm with a fellow candidate. We reflected on the learning processes 
and on the peculiar approach to knowledge of the DProf programme, and this 
collaboration enhanced my critical thinking and research management skills. 
To conclude, I feel confident that I will be able to tackle future projects under the Work 
Based Learning paradigm. The true value of this approach is that real problems are dealt 
with in the work place, underpinned by the solid academic background provided by this 
programme, and most importantly there is a practical outcome that is valued by 
organisations. 
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APPENDIX A 
Structured observation. 
This project aim to understand the interaction of multicultural crew with safety 
management system and if this influences the health and safety in the Oil Offshore 
Industry; the research is based on a Mobile Drilling Unit where the nationalities involved 
will be in the region of eighteen/nineteen and possible even more (Fig.2 on proposal).  
The structured observation schedule adopted as qualitative data collection technique aim 
to concentrate on the “workplace culture”; the anthropologist Mary Douglas (1992) does 
not view this concept as “static” but on the contrary she affirms that it is a way of life 
created constantly by everyone involved in the organization, in other words it is the result 
of the daily activity, conversations and negotiation between members of the organization. I 
will definitely benefit of my insider researcher role as participant observer to understand 
the workplace culture from an “inside” perspective. 
To comprehensively assess a “workplace culture”, I believe that it is important to measure 
it, qualitatively in my research context, based upon an adequate model of culture. I 
propose the use of the Cultural Theory or Grid/Group theory (Appendix D) for this 
purpose.  
I trust that often organizations do not recognize the variability in perceptions of risk 
between and among different groups; in addition Douglas (1992) affirmed that the Risk 
Perception is socially constructed. 
Cultural Theory has been applied to studies related to risk perception, both in health 
related risks (Langford et al, 2000) and industrial safety (Gross & Rayner, 1985) with 
qualitative and mixed methodological approaches to identify factors that influence the way 
the risk is perceived.  
The group/grid methodology is qualitatively measurable through the use of structured 
observations indices (adapted from Thompson et al, 1990; Douglas 1992; Langford et al, 
2000) which can capture the two dimensions of the theory. With this strategy I aim to 
understand where in the two proportions of grid and group the observed multicultural 
workforce can be collocated. The theory expresses, based on the position of grid and 
group, four categories: individualist, egalitarian, hierarchist and fatalist. (Douglas, 1992: 
Thompson et al, 1990) 
The measurable Group indices are as follow: 
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! Proportion of time spent in the group by a worker compared with other 
crewmembers. 
! Frequency of meeting and/or “Think” plan (discussion and planning of operations) 
! Closeness of connecting character links. 
! The proportion of shared to unshared interest, job knowledge. 
! Strength of the boundary of the group. 
Measurable Grid indices are as follows: 
! Is the style “egalitarian” or is there a clear leader? 
!  Are there underdogs and top dogs types in the observed group of workers? 
! What are the theories of social justice that supports this distinction? 
! Grid is high whenever roles are distributed on basis of social classifications such 
as: \ age-grading \ nationalities \ sex 
In the observation schedule, I have decided to structure the grid and group indices (table 
1a) in order to qualitatively measure the position of the crewmembers in the two 
dimensions of the Cultural theory. 
The workplace culture includes the Safety Culture of the multicultural crew, which is 
defined as follows: 
“A belief, philosophy or faith held by groups or individuals on safety matters which is 
demonstrated in practice through the attitudes, actions and behaviour adopted by the 
people an organisation or a nation.” (Kuo 2007) 
The Safety Culture is observable by a researcher with an insider knowledge of he 
community of practice, he or she in fact will be able to qualitatively appraise specific 
characteristics such as shared attitudes, values, beliefs and practice of the people at 
work. 
A positive example of workplace culture is when competent people put in practice their 
sound safety values, while an example of bad or weak workplace culture is when a group 
of persons or an organization adopt an indifferent approach to safety management.  
I am interested in measuring qualitatively the risk behaviour types and for this purpose I 
will use the table adapted from Cooper (2002). For example, an action of a crewmember 
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attempting to lift a heavy weight using the crane, which is an operation very common in 
the daily activities of an offshore unit, with a lifting wire inadequate for the weight that is 
being lifted, is applicable as a risk producing behaviour. Again, if the employee or group of 
employees is wearing the proper personal protective equipment (PPE), this behaviour will 
definitely falls under a mitigating category.  
 
 
Table 1a Structured Observation  
Observation # _________________________ 
Data   
Time  
Location  '
!!BEHAVIOUR TYPE:       Example 
Risk Producing Y / N Improper Lifting 
Mitigating Y / N Wearing all PPE 
Procedural Y / N Following procedures, 
plan, Risk Assessment 
Supportive Y / N Reporting accidents 
Safety Leadership Y / N Acknowledging safe 
behaviour 
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Measurable Groups indices:    
Proportion of time spent in the group by 
crewmember(s) (High/Low group) 
 
Frequency of meeting and/or “Think” plan 
(discussion and planning of operations) 
(High/Low Group) 
 
Closeness of connecting character links 
High/Low group) 
 
Proportion of shared tasks and job 
knowledge.(High /Low Group) 
 
Strength of the boundary of the group 
(High/Low Group) 
 
 
 Measurable Grids indices:    
Leadership style, i.e. no clear leader 
“egalitarian” style (low Grid) 
 
A clear leader is identified  (High Grid)  
“underdogs” in the group (High Grid)  
Individualist type, work alone type (Low 
Grid)  
 
The roles distributed on basis of social 
classifications such as age nationalities, 
sex (High Grid) 
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     APPENDIX B 
 
Semi-structured interview. 
 
 
This project aim to understand, by the mean of an ethnographic methodology, the 
interaction of multicultural crew with safety management systems and if this process 
influences the health and safety in the Oil Offshore Industry; the research is based on a 
drillship engaged in oil and gas exploration world wide.  
One of the qualitative data collection techniques planned to be used in this research is the 
semi-structured interview (Cohen et al, 2000:270). I aim to set a framework of themes to 
be explored in a two-way communication; this allows the respondent the time and the 
scope to talk about a specific subject, with the objective to collect research’s data. In 
addition, this technique is a way of getting data about feelings and emotions that can’t be 
easily recorded during observations. Cohen et al (2000) suggest that this type of interview 
is useful to frame questions that will contribute to provide the knowledge sought. In 
addition this qualitative data collection technique allows the respondent to talk in depth 
and in detail about the given topics. Here complex subject can be clarified, picking up 
issues that may not surface during observations; it is also easy to record these interviews 
with a tape recorder for future analysis. Unstructured interviews (Bell 1999:138) may 
produce a wealth of valuable data but they require a great deal of expertise to control and 
a great deal of time to analyse, therefore I trust that the choice of the semi-structured 
interviews is the more appropriate in the research context.  
In light of the research’s questions and in order to contextualise and frame the topics I 
elected to explore, I have divided the interview in five categories, based on the arguments 
explained in detail here below.  
Section 1 
In this first section, my aim is to qualitatively measure the understanding of “safety” as a 
concept, I am interested in comprehend participants’ opinion, how do they define this 
notion, do they see this as a value, as a priority or else?  In addition, in this first section I 
am interested in exploring the reaction, if any, at the company safety Vision, which is 
"Operations conducted in an incident-free environment, all the time, everywhere". I trust 
that it is an important step in the research’s context, whether the multicultural crew is 
aware of the safety vision. This is the goal set by management with regards to safety, can 
it be achieved if it is not known or worst understood? 
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Section 2 
In this section I aim to measure the understanding of the hazard identification, which is 
defined as the potential to lead to harm. I am interested in exploring this concept because 
I believe that if it is not understood, the whole safety management system is in jeopardy. 
Hazard identification is the very first step in an offshore oil environment, the lacking of this 
appreciation will make virtually impossible to assess a risk involved in the operations. If 
the participant is not able to understand this concept most likely he or she will not be able 
to identify hazards involved in the operation.  
Section 3 
This part links with the previous one; in specific here I aim to gauge the understanding of 
the Risk, which is defined as the probability of harm being realised. The orthodox 
approach would be first to identify the hazard, then to assess the risk. Often the two terms 
are confused; I want to explore these concepts to understand if there is a biased 
perception which could have an impact on safety management. Therefore section 2 and 
section 3 are conceptually linked and cover important issues that deserve to be explored 
in the research context. 
 
Section 4 
Here I aim to understand if the respondent has an understanding of the health and safety 
management system, and whether he or she is committed to it. I am also interested to 
understand the view of the multicultural participants about the management commitment 
to the safety system, as the literature suggests that this commitment impact employees 
safety behaviour by anywhere between 35 to 51 percent (Cooper 2006). In addition, in this 
section I am trying to understand if a “cognitive dissonance” (Festinger 1962) is 
experienced. (See proposal p.3) 
Section 5 
With this final section, I intend to understand if the workforce feels accountable for the 
health and safety, in other words I want to appreciate if they are aware of their role played 
in the safety system. The company expectation is a pro-active approach to the safety 
system; this is done by empowering the employees with the authority to stop any unsafe 
act. Is this reality? The last question of this section regards, if applicable, the impact of 
incidents in the participant’s life.  
' OUZ'
Semi-structured interview. 
• Introductions, ice break session, explain the purpose of the research.'
• Guarantee of confidentiality. 
• Explain that there are no right or wrong answers. 
• Ask for permission to take notes, offer to show the notes at the end of the 
interview. 
• Ask permission to use a tape recorder. 
 
• Section 1 Understanding of “Safety” as a concept. 
• A1 What do you understand by the word “Safety”? 
• A2 Do you know the Safety Vision of the Company? 
• A3 Do you believe that it is achievable? If not, why? 
• A4 Can you give me an example of good safety in you work, and explain why and 
how it is good? 
• A5 Can you give me an example of bad safety in your work, and explain why and 
how is it bad? 
 
• Section 2 Understanding of “Hazard Identification”. 
• B1 What do you understand by the word “Hazard”? 
• B2 Can you give me an example of an Hazard? 
• B3 Do you identify hazards prior to start a job? 
 
• Section 3 Understanding of “Risk Assessment”. 
• C1 What do you understand by the word “Risk”? 
• C2 Can you give me an example of a Risk? 
• C3 Do you assess a Risk prior to start a job? If yes, how? 
• C4 What type of Risk is acceptable for you, and why? 
 
• Section 4 Management of Health and Safety 
• D1 Does the company have policies and procedures for Safety? 
• D2 Can you mention a policy? 
• D3 Do you believe your Senior Management Team are genuinely interested in 
improving your Safety Culture? Can you give me an example? 
• D4 Do you believe your direct Supervisor genuinely attempt to improve your Safety 
Culture? 
• D5 Do you have a monitoring process in the Company? 
• D6 Do you feel you are pressured to take short cuts in your daily activity? If so, 
why? 
 
• Section 5 Responsibility of Health and Safety 
• E1 Do you have any obligation in regards with Health and Safety? 
• E2 What would you do if you see an unsafe act? 
• E3 Did you experience any incidents in your working life? 
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A P P E N D I X   C 
Cultural Theory of risk 
 
One of my aims in this research, is to classify qualitatively the risk perceptions of the 
multicultural workforce, it is my intention to do it through the use of the Cultural Theory of 
risk (Douglas & Wildavsky 1982). Risk perception is the subjective judgment that people 
make about the characteristics and severity of a risk, which is defined as the probability of 
harm being realised.  Several theories have been proposed to explain why different 
people make different estimates of the probability of risks, and two major families of theory 
have been developed by social scientists: the Psychometric Paradigm and Cultural 
Theory. Cultural theory refers to theories of risk perception that focus on culture, rather 
than individual psychology as an explanation for differences in risk judgments, thus I 
consider this theory appropriated for my project. 
 
Cultural Theory arose from the work of Mary Douglas, she argued that social structures 
differ along two principal axes: "grid" and "group." Grid refers to the degree to which 
individuals' choices are circumscribed by their position in society. Group refers to the 
degree of solidarity among members of the society. These dimensions were based on the 
work of the classic sociologist Emile Durkheim.  
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) introduced the concept of grid/group to the risk analysis 
community  and this typology has been very influential in the field of risk perception 
research. It proposes four major biases:  
 
•Individualist 
Low grid and low group. That is, their choices are unconstrained by society and they lack 
close ties to other people. They value individual initiative in the marketplace, and fear 
threats like war that would hamper free exchange. The individualist view of nature is 
described as cornucopian or resilient. Like a ball resting at the bottom of a cup, nature will 
return to its original stable position after any disturbance. Thus, individualists embrace 
trial-and-error, as they have confidence that the system will fix itself in the end. 
 
•Egalitarian 
Low grid and high group. They live in voluntary associations where everyone is equal and 
the good of the group comes before the good of any individual. In order to maintain their 
solidarity, egalitarians are sensitive to low probability-high consequence risks (such as 
nuclear power), and use them to paint a picture of impending apocalypse. Risk and 
Culture was, in part, a polemic against the environmental movement, which Douglas and 
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Wildavsky saw as sharing the worldview and social organization of religious cults. 
Egalitarians see nature as fragile, like a ball balanced precariously on an overturned cup. 
Any small disturbance will send it crashing down. Thus egalitarians advocate the 
precautionary principle and cling to traditional ways of life that have proven to be 
sustainable, rather than risking disaster by trying new technologies. 
 
• Hierarchist 
High grid and high group. A hierarchist society has a well-defined role for each member, 
like the caste system in India. Hierarchists believe in the need for a well-defined system of 
rules, and fear social deviance (such as crime) that disrupts those rules. Hierarchists see 
nature as "perverse/tolerant": it can be exploited within certain limits, but if those limits are 
exceeded the system will collapse. They thus rely heavily on experts, who can identify 
those limits and establish rules to keep society within proper bounds. 
 
•Fatalist 
High grid and low group. They feel isolated in the face of an external world imposing 
arbitrary constraints on them. They view nature as a ball on a flat surface, rolling randomly 
in any direction. Thus, they feel that there is little they can do to control their situation, and 
resign themselves to riding out whatever fate throws at them. Because of their passive 
stance, fatalists are often excluded from Cultural Theory analyses 
 
There is also a fifth asocial Autonomous perspective. 
The hermit who withdraws from social interaction is described as having an autonomous 
way of life. Because so few people fit this description, and it is by definition not a viable 
basis for a society, it is often ignored in Cultural Theory analyses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!
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Graphical representation of the Cultural Theory 
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A P P E N D I X   D 
 
Evidences of the interest shown by professional organisations to my proposed 
project.  
 
 
1. Extract from the correspondences with Commodore David Squire, editor of the 
Alert, the International Maritime Human Element Bulletin, a Nautical Institute 
project, sponsored by Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust, to improve the 
awareness of the human element in the maritime industry. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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3. Message from Mr. Mahapatra, Head of Maritime Training & Human Element 
Section at the International Maritime Organization (IMO). 
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' OVY'
A P P E N D I X  E 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Research Project Title: “Health and Safety in the Offshore Oil Industry” 
 
Introduction:  
The purpose of this research project is to analyse the interaction of the multicultural crew 
with safety management systems in the offshore oil industry, with the aim to improve the 
health and safety of the community of practice.  
 
Information about Participants’ Involvement in the Research 
Participants accepting the invitation to take part in the research will be involved in the 
process of in-depth interview and observations with their permission as data collection 
methods. Analysis of interviews and observations is based on the ethical agreement 
between the researcher and the participants. The researcher will keep a research diary 
with the aim to gain insights on research process and to record reflection in action; the 
data will be treated strictly confidential.  
 
Benefits 
The research would benefit the whole community of practice and hence the participants 
as well. The greater benefit is to improve the safety in the offshore operations with the aim 
to achieve an incident-free work place.  
Risks 
No risks to participants are anticipated. As mentioned above, all steps of collecting data 
will be taken to guarantee confidentially and privacy. Participants may voluntarily withdraw 
from the study if they choose to do so.  
 
Confidentiality  
Data gathered in the research study will be kept confidential. All the data will be stored in 
the researcher’s residence. No participant shall be mentioned by name in any written or 
oral presentation of the findings. Pseudonyms will be used. If there is information that 
participant prefer to keep in confidence or information that might jeopardize confidentially, 
that information will be deleted from the data analysis.  
 
Contact Information 
If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures, you may contact the 
researcher, Valerio De Rossi at:  VD152@mdx.ac.uk 
  
' OVZ'
Participant Consent Form 
 
Research Project Title: “Health and Safety Management in the Offshore Oil Industry 
 
Researcher’s Name: Valerio De Rossi  
 
• I have read the Participant Information Sheet and the nature and purpose of the 
research project has been explained to me. I understand and agree to take part in 
research. 
 
• I understand the purpose of the research project and my involvement in it. 
 
• I understand that I may withdraw from the research project at any stage and that 
this will not affect my status now or in the future. 
 
• I understand that while information gained during the study may be published, I will 
not be identified and my personal results will remain confidential. 
 
• I understand that data will be stored at the researcher’s residence 
 
• I understand that I may contact the researcher if I require further information about 
the research, if I wish to make a complaint relating to my involvement in the 
research. 
 
Signed ………………………………………………..(Research Participant) 
 
 
Print name …………………………………………...  Date …………………… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
' OVT'
A P P E N D I X  F 
Extract of the correspondence with my colleague Capt. Marco Saba, a practicing Master 
Mariner in command of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODU) in the Offshore Oil Industry. 
I have discussed with him my research proposal, as I trust that his vast experience in 
multicultural context makes his advice valuable. He assessed my schedule ratings and in 
addition Capt. Saba was willing to discuss the future steps of my research, as it will 
develops. This strategy was beneficial for my research’s reliability, as I was able to 
discuss my data analysis and findings with a colleague within my practice who gave me 
an independent evaluation of my work.  
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' OYN'
A P P E N D I X   G  
.,79/1!J&'=+!
Risk Behavioural Types 
.,7+!! \/9%!,-!B+'/9/1! E+$(&93%9,/!OK' Risk Producing K"&#>0364'R&0:&' 843)6:"2' D02J' 26:&' #2' #('0/8438"4'$0+%B'MK' Mitigating -0%0.#%0(.' :3(%43$2' R&0:&' $"22"(' %&"':3(2"?6"(:"2' 3+' 83%"(%0#$' 0(:0)"(%' 34'#::0)"(%E' 26:&' #2' ;#440"4' %#8"2E' A"423(#$'A43%":%0>"'_?608/"(%2B'PK' Procedural F3$$3R2' :3/8#(,' 83$0:0"2' #()' 843:")64"2E'"$#;34#%"'8$#(2E'0)"(%0+,'&#d#4)2'#()'#22"22'D02J2B'UK' Supportive *68834%2'%&"'2#+"%,'/#(#."/"(%'2,2%"/E'+34'"<#/8$"'4"834%0(.'0(:0)"(%2B'VK' Safety Leadership @"/3(2%4#%0(.' #' :$"#4' $"#)"42&08' 0(' *#+"%,E'+34'"<#/8$"'#:J(3R$").0(.'2#+"';"&#>03642B'
Group 
.,7+! B+'$8&'#*+!S&,83$!6/79(+$! E+$(&93%9,/!O]' Proportion of time spent in the group by 
crewmember(s)  
7(' "<%"()")' 8"403)' 3+'%0/"'28"(%'0('%&"'.4368';,':4"R/"/;"4W2X' 0()0:#%"2'!0.&']4368'M]' Frequency of meeting and/or “Think” plan 
(discussion and planning of operations)  
Q&"'+4"?6"(:,'3+'/""%0(.2'#()^34' )02:62203(E'8$#((0(.' 0()0:#%"2' !0.&']4368'P]' Closeness of connecting character links High/Low 
group) 
H$32"("22' ;"%R""('/"/;"42' 0()0:#%"2' !0.&']4368'U]' Proportion of shared tasks and job knowledge. *&#4")' %#2J2' #()^34' 93;'J(3R$")."' 0()0:#%"2' !0.&']4368'V]' Strength of the boundary of the group  Q&"' 2%4"(.%&' 3+' %&"';36()#4,' 3+' %&"' .4368'0()0:#%"2' R&"%&"4' %&"4"'#4"'!0.&'34'L3R']4368B'
' OYO'
Grids '
.,7+! B+'$8&'#*+!S&97!6/79(+$! E+$(&93%9,/!O5' Leadership style, i.e. no clear leader “egalitarian” 
style (low Grid) 
Q&"' $"#)"42&08' 2%,$"'0()0:#%"2'R&"%&"4'%&"4"' 02'#' !0.&' 34' L3R' ]40)B' G3':$"#4' $"#)"4' 0()0:#%"2' #('a".#$0%#40#(c' 2%,$"' R0%&'L3R']04)B'M5' A clear leader is identified  (High Grid) 7'H$"#4'L"#)"4'0()0:#%"2'#'!0.&']40)'0()0:"2''P5' “underdogs” in the group (High Grid) a=()"4)3.2c' 84"2"(%' 0('%&"' .4368' 0()0:#%"2' !0.&']40)B'U5' Individualist type, work alone type (Low Grid)  7(' 0()0>0)6#$02%' %,8"' 3+'8"423('0()0:#%"2'L3R']40)'V5' The roles distributed on basis of social 
classifications such as age nationalities, sex 
(High Grid) 
5+' 43$"2' #4"')02%40;6%")'3(';#202' 3+' 23:0#$':$#220+0:#%03(E' !0.&' ]40)'0()0:#%342''
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
' OYM'
A P P E N D I X  H 
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 “The interaction of multicultural crew with safety management systems in Offshore Oil 
Industry” 
Valerio De Rossi, Institute of Work Based Learning at Middlesex University 
Vd152@live.mdx.ac.uk 
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The globalisation had an impact in the Health and Safety aspect of many industries. 
Safety is a hot topic in today’s world market, it is evident that every industry is putting a lot 
of effort in making the work places safer, and this for many different reasons. Surely big 
corporations face the ethical dilemma of standing on a social ground where it is not 
acceptable by today’s society to see employees, and hence member of the society, suffer 
from incidents while working. I would add that the endeavour of avoiding incidents is also 
dictated by marketing reasons and more pragmatically for the cost involved in dealing with 
unfortunate events. Again, a safe company is surely more “marketable” than competitors 
with poor safety records. Policy makers are constantly developing new rules and 
regulations trying to set a framework within the workers should be able to practice their 
trades in an incident-free environment. The globalisation has surely added another 
ingredient to the already complex issue; we are moving from the local village to a global, 
borderless market and this has been crucial in creating a multicultural environment.  
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The Offshore Oil Industry, as many other industries, is constantly putting efforts in making 
its operations safer. Big interests are involved and safe records are now carefully 
scrutinised in order to remain successful in the fiercely competitive energy market. A big 
corporation cannot afford incidents and accidents for the reasons earlier mentioned as its 
performance is measured in safety terms, there is no successful operation if it is not also 
safe and incident-free. This work-based project focused in exploring the health and safety 
of the offshore oil industry in a multi-cultural environment, more precisely in the field of 
upstream oil sector or exploration and production (E&P). This is the very sector where the 
energy operators develop oil and gas drilling exploration campaigns worldwide. Here 
technology is paramount, the exploration is moving on deeper and deeper water depths, 
what was a wild dream a decade ago is now the norm and equipments and crews are 
working at the cutting edge of the know-how. Mobile offshore Drilling Units (MODU’s) are 
exploring oceans hundreds of miles off the continental shelf; the world fleet is expanding 
year after year in the search of energy supply for the world needs. The globalisation has 
affected very much this industry, the very nature of the worldwide explorations has helped 
the flexibility of the global human resources market, and this has created during the years 
a multicultural community bounded by the expertise in the oil and gas industry.  
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The rationale of this work-based project is to improve the health and safety in the industry, 
tackling the problem from a cultural point of view. First of all the question should be, is 
there a problem in the industry? What are we going to investigate? Well, despite the set of 
rules and regulations laid down to regulate the health and safety in the Industry, my 
' OYP'
interest in exploring this topic is based on the number of incidents and accidents that are 
still taking place; In 2007 the drilling offshore industry has suffered five fatalities, 445 
medical treatment cases and 277 restricted work incidents. (IADC 2008) The thought of 
lives lost during the exercise of a profession is unbearable in today’s society, in my 
opinion this problem deserve a thorough effort and I for one want to contribute in 
achieving a safer working place. The high numbers of incidents and accidents suggest 
that something must be done in reducing drastically these figures, perhaps the lack of 
cultural awareness may play a role, and tackling the problem from a different prospective 
may shed some light in this very articulate matter. The different prospective suggested is 
to stance at the issue from a cultural point of view; in fact many studies on health and 
safety have been carried out during the years focusing on psychology, (see for example 
the work of Stranks 2007, Sutherland et al 2000, Cooper 1999 and 2002) rather than on 
multicultural diversity, where instead I want to put the emphasis.  
Another paradigm worth to mention is the work-based concept of this research, the 
Institute for Work Based Learning has developed an innovative approach to personalised 
learning for full-time professionals who are also, in the research context, practitioner 
researchers. In fact, a formal learning agreement is signed by the stakeholders defined as 
the University, the doctoral candidate and a representative of the professional practice. In 
this particular instance the researcher is a Master Mariner serving in the community of 
practice under study.  
This project aim to understand the interaction of multicultural crew with safety 
management system and if this interface influences the health and safety in the Oil 
Offshore Industry; the research is based on a ultra-deepwater Mobile Offshore Drilling 
Unit (MODU) engaged in oil and gas exploration worldwide where the nationalities 
involved are in the region of twenty in a crew of 172 persons. 
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Multicultural crew in the maritime world is an irreversible trend, Kahveci et al (2002) 
reports that approximately 65 percent of the world merchant fleet have adopted 
multicultural strategy. The recent study of Bailey et al (2007) proposes that nationality is 
the most significant factor in determining perceptions of risk at sea: this study underpin, if 
needed, the concept that multi-cultural crews have a heterogeneous perceptions of risks 
thus a possible impact on health and safety.  In addition the fact that human factors are 
cause of accidents at sea in the region of fifty to ninety percent (Kuo 2007, Horck 2005, 
Thompson 2008, Sutherland et al 2000) highlights the importance of this project, it is 
worth to mention that every study reports an involvement of the human element at some 
point in the causal chain.   
In order to comprehensively assess a “workplace culture”, I heavily draw from the work of 
the Anthropologist Mary Douglas (1921-2007); my argument is based on the concept that 
I need to measure, qualitatively in my research context, the multicultural environment 
based upon an adequate model of culture. What I propose therefore is the use of the 
Cultural Theory or Grid/Group theory (Douglas 1982; Thompson et al 1992), which is a 
two-dimensional framework of cultural comparisons that comprehend four distinctive 
ideologies or values. The work of Douglas had a wider influence outside the discipline of 
social anthropology; she is widely cited in diverse disciplines such as political science, 
policy studies, organizational theory and risk management. Her Cultural theory has been 
applied to predict perceptions of risk  (Thompson et al. 1990), both in health related risks 
(Langford et al, 2000) and industrial safety (Gross & Rayner, 1985) with qualitative and 
mixed methodological approaches to identify factors that influence the way the risk is 
perceived.  
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This project addresses the variability in perceptions of risk between and among different 
groups, Douglas (1982) affirmed that the Risk Perception is socially constructed; this is 
often unrecognised in modern organisation with multi-cultural employees. Although 
working in a multi-cultural environment maybe be a big effort, it can also be seen as a way 
of cultural enrichment, as one early definition of culture by Edward Tylor (1871 Quoted 
Monagham & Just 2000) is the “accumulation of human accomplishment”. The German-
American anthropologist Franz Boas (1858-1942) defined as the father of American 
Anthropology, described this value as a set of cultural glasses lens that provide us with a 
means for perceiving the world around us, I believe that the latter definition is indeed 
applicable in the offshore community. Personal experiences suggested that often the set 
of cultural glasses are quite different as well as the perception of the world for different 
communities.  
Culture is a concept that has been studied for long time and it has been defined in 
different ways and often used with different meaning, even as a ”way of life”. For instance 
when we refer to the “American Culture” or the “Japanese Culture”, these terms implicitly 
suggest a particular perception of the world and hence a way of life. In the Cultural 
Theory, Thompson et al (1990) define the “way of life” as a combination of cultural bias 
and social relations: the former referred to shared values and believes, and the latter 
definition is a pattern of interpersonal relations. 
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I trust that investigating the interaction of the human element, composed by the multi-
cultural crew working on mobile offshore drilling units (MODU’s), with the safety 
management system and its influences on the health and safety in the Oil Offshore 
Industry is definitely beneficial for the Industry. This project is not only providing a different 
prospective in dealing with safety concept, it is also developing the literature on and for a 
specific professional “Community of Practice” (Wenger et al 2002), formed by multicultural 
human resources engaged in a process of collective learning in a shared domain of 
human endeavour.  Cultural awareness in this globalised world is not only recommended 
but it should also be mandatory and hopefully the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) and offshore regulatory bodies will acknowledge this need and set the framework to 
develop training courses for practicing seafarers and oil offshore workers.  
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The study is a qualitative research with an ethnographic methodology carried out as an 
insider work-based researcher, in order to collect and analyse data on how the globalised, 
multicultural offshore workers understand their activities and their involvement in the 
safety management system, with strong emphasis on the fieldwork that I will carry out as 
a participant observer. (Fetterman 1998, Kirk & Miller, 1986, O’Reilly 2005). 
Because of the aims and the qualitative nature of the research, I have chosen three main 
data collection techniques; structured observations, semi-structured interviews and a 
research diary. With these techniques, my objectives are to classify qualitatively the risk 
perceptions of the multicultural workforce through the use of the Cultural Theory of risk 
(Douglas & Wildavsky 1982), to determine the risk behaviour types (Cooper 2002) and the 
understanding of the safety systems. 
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I will develop a manual for safety management system in an offshore multicultural 
environment, which will focus on culture; I will also build up a safety management training 
scheme for professionals. In addition there will be dissemination in form of papers and 
articles through the company, national and international Professional Bodies and the 
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Union for maritime professionals (Nautilus), who has founded my project of great 
relevance to improve the industry's health and safety culture.  
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Has the ‘global village’ influenced the Safety of our ships? 
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Vd152@live.mdx.ac.uk 
 
The Human Element is mentioned periodically in every safety statistics as it accounts for 
between 50 to 90 % of accidents at sea, in addition every incident’s investigation reports 
an involvement of the human element at some point in the causal chain.   
Many studies have been carried out to investigate this issue in the shipping industry in 
different terms, such as the impact of new technology, lack of training, psychological 
factors just to mention few of them.  
I trust that the globalisation has had an impact on the Health and Safety aspect of many 
industries, we are moving from the local village to a global, borderless market and this has 
been crucial in creating a multicultural environment. This is not new in the shipping 
industry, a recent study reports that approximately 65 percent of the world merchant fleet 
have adopted multicultural strategy, which is an irreversible trend in the maritime world. 
The very nature of the worldwide trades has helped the flexibility of the global human 
resources market, and this has created during the years a multicultural community 
bounded by the expertise in the maritime practice. 
A survey carried out in 2007 by the Seafarers International Research Centre at Cardiff 
University proposes that nationality is the most significant factor in determining 
perceptions of risk at sea: this underpin my proposition that multi-cultural crews have 
heterogeneous perceptions of risks and thus a possible impacts on health and safety 
behaviours.  
I trust that there is variability in perceptions of risk between and among different cultural 
groups, cultural studies highlight that the risk perception is socially constructed; this is 
often unrecognised in modern organisation with multi-cultural employees. 
My professional experience suggests that there is a lack of cultural awareness and still 
wrong stereotyping among the multicultural crews; in my opinion the multicultural diversity 
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and its influence on the health and safety in the maritime industry has not been 
investigated thoroughly. Interesting enough, despite the substantial attention devoted by 
management and scholars to the ‘organizational culture’, there are still few attempts of 
bringing cultural theories of social anthropology into the management arena. 
In brief, I do believe that the culture, defined in many ways such as the ‘accumulation of 
human accomplishment’ and as a set of cultural glasses lens that provide us with a means 
for perceiving the world around us, plays a big role in the safety management. I trust that 
the cultural concept is a very powerful tool, which I founded very useful in understanding 
modern organization. In fact in order to make sense of situations biased by our own 
assumptions, it is necessary to take a cultural perspective, learning to see the world 
through “cultural lens”.  
The word “culture” in most Western languages means civilization or “refinement of the 
mind” and that the result of such refinement of the mind includes education, art and 
literature, however it is argued that the cultural stability, especially in the Western world, is 
short lived, as homogeneity is achieved with difficulty and is always about to dissolve.   
Managers often speak of developing “the right kind of culture”, this suggests that the word 
“culture” is used in a superficial and perhaps incorrect way with the assumption being that 
there is are “good” and “bad” cultures. In realty, the culture of a group is what personality 
or character is for an individual, the way we see people is mainly through their personality 
traits and behaviour.  The former can be broadly defined as what a person is, the latter as 
what a person does. This concept is also true for a culture, in fact we can observe the 
behaviours of the group in a particular culture, but very often we cannot see what really 
constrain it, which is what really matter the most. 
In a complex society, individuals belong to many different organizations and therefore a 
given cultural unit is in reality a complex set of overlapping subcultures. Just to mention 
one model that we always bring to any new group situation is our own model of family, 
which is the group were we spend most of our early life.  
The concept of organizational culture has been extensively studied in the last two decade, 
and it is widely acknowledged that this concept is critical to determine an organization’s 
success or failure. 
In the organizational culture framework it is possible to appreciate how the values, attitude 
and beliefs about safety are expressed and how these influences the organisation 
directions.  In the Offshore Oil Industry the disaster of the Piper Alpha in 1988 rapidly and 
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dramatically highlight the importance of these values and the term of ‘safety culture’ arose 
by its own right in this industry as well as in the general opinion, in this case after the 
disaster of the nuclear power station in Chernobyl in 1986.   
Cultural Theories have a wider influence outside the discipline of social anthropology, they 
have been applied in diverse fields such as political science, policy studies, organizational 
theory, risk prediction and management, industrial safety, theoretical criminology and 
even in information systems risk management strategies. 
I trust that it is now time to bring these theories into the maritime industry, Health and 
Safety is a key concern in today’s world of work, every industry is putting a lot of effort in 
making the work place safer, for a variety of reasons. Big corporations face the ethical 
dilemma of standing on a social ground where it is not acceptable by today’s society to 
see employees, and hence member of the society, suffer from incidents while working.  I 
would add that the endeavour of avoiding incidents is also dictate by marketing reasons 
and more pragmatically for the cost involved in dealing with unfortunate events. Again, a 
safe company is surely more “marketable” than competitors with poor safety records. 
Policy makers are constantly developing new rules and regulations trying to set a 
framework within the workers should be able to practice their trades in an incident-free 
environment. Globalisation has surely added another ingredient to the already complex 
issue; I trust that an effort should be made to investigate its impact on the health and 
safety aboard our ships. 
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1. Introduction 
 
I am claiming a Level 5 advanced developments in professional practice in Marine 
Operations and Safety Management. This assumption is based on the use of 
interdisciplinary professional knowledge with high level of autonomy and responsibility for 
complex and high level nature professional projects as detailed here below. This type of 
knowledge is clearly heterogeneous and not solely discipline-based such as the Mode 
1(Gibbons et al 1994 p.19), which distinguishes what is fundamental and applied, with a 
theoretical insight translated into operational application. The knowledge I am putting 
forward in this claim is of different nature, as it is characterised by the shifting from 
fundamental principles, discipline-based primarily cognitive, towards contextualised 
results clearly trans-disciplinary, embracing science and technology, as well as social 
sciences and humanities.  
 
The professional projects I am putting forward for this claim required for their planning and 
execution interdisciplinary skills and knowledge, such as Nautical Science, navigation, 
meteorology, ship’s stability, marine engineering, regulatory compliances, safety and 
security management, ship’s manoeuvers, human resources management, dynamic 
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positioning operations.  I trust this was a quite high nature and complex challenge, the 
practical application of the trans-disciplinary knowledge that I would define as Mode 2 
(Gibbons et al 1994) has enabled me to programme, prepare and also execute extensive 
ocean passages autonomously and with full responsibility of the crew, asset and 
environment, in a safe, efficient and commercially astute way. I will demonstrate that I 
have used my knowledge, skill and experience to make executive decisions that had 
financial and operational impacts; in addition I will also demonstrate that I was able to 
manage an emergency situation in an efficient and professional way, where I trust I used 
what Schön (1987) defines as “artistry”, the competence a practitioner uses in 
indeterminate zone of practice, trying to fill the gap left by professional curriculum. The 
Ship is a state of the art Dynamic Positioned Drill Ship built in 1999, able to drill in a water 
depth up to 10,000 feet, with  a length overall of 171 metres, a breadth of 28 metres and a 
load displacement of 26,537 MT with a crew of 130 persons. These professional projects 
were carried out without any supervision, submitted only for approval to my direct shore 
based Manager. I was leading, in the planning stage, the shipboard team composed by 
the Ship’s Officers, directing supervising the Chief Mate, two Second Mates, two Third 
Mates, the Chief Engineer, the First and two Third Engineers. during the execution of the 
plan, I was in charge of the full crew of 130 persons. 
 
Level 5 indicator(s): 
C2: I have used effectively a wide ranging resources to plan the professional projects. 
C4: I have autonomously operated within my professional practice with the highest level of 
responsibility and leadership to achieve the given goal. 
 
2. Authority and responsibility. 
 
To better understand my professional role I would like, first of all, explain the level of 
authority that I,as a ship’s Master, have aboard my vessel, which is clearly specified by 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) with resolutions and Codes. To be more 
specific, the IMO Resolution A.443 (XI) adopted on 15 November 1979 invited 
Governments to ensure that the shipmaster is not constrained by the shipowner, charterer 
or any other person from taking any decision which, in his or her professional judgment is 
necessary to operate in a manner consistent with safety of human life, equipment and 
protection of the marine environment. In addition, the shipmaster is protected from 
unjustifiable dismissal or other unjustifiable action by the shipowner, charterer or any other 
person, as a consequence of the proper exercise of his or her professional judgement.  
This important resolution was also taken into the preamble of the International Safety 
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Management (ISM) Code, entered in force the 1st July 1988, amended by resolution MSC 
99(73) accepted on 1st January 2002 and become effective the 1st July 2002, date on 
which the ISM Code became mandatory for a wider range of cargo ships and for mobile 
offshore drilling units (MODU). 
 
The ISM Code Section 5.2 requires the Company to ensure that the Safety Management 
System (SMS) operating onboard the ship contains a clear statement emphasising the 
Master’s Authority, and his or her overriding Authority and Responsibility to make 
decisions regarding safety and pollution prevention and to request the Company’s 
assistance as may be required. This is particularly important in situations where quick 
decisive action has to be taken by the Master. The professional judgement of the Master 
is also recognised in Regulation 10.1 added to Chapter V of the International Convention 
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), ‘Master’s Discretion for Safe Navigation’, in 
November 1995. It states that “The master shall not be constrained by the shipowner, 
charterer or any other person from taking any decision which, in the professional 
judgement of the master, is necessary for safe navigation, in particular in severe weather 
and in heavy seas”.   
 
The Master therefore has the legal authority and responsibility with regards to his crew, 
owner’s property and pollution prevention. To be able to cope with all the above, beside 
the professional experience gained in around twenty years at sea, I went though formal 
training and I hold an unlimited Master Mariner certificate of competency. (Appendix G)  
In addition to all the above, the SOLAS regulation V/33 imposes on shipmasters a duty to 
respond to distress alerts. The paragraph 2 confers on shipmasters a right to requisition 
assistance from other ships, and imposes on masters of requisitioned ships a duty to 
comply with the requisition. I have attended a specific course to cope with this duty, this is 
the RADAR ,A.R.P.A., Bridge Team Work, Search and Rescue Training Course at 
management level in accordance to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
STCW/95 convention. (Appendix I) 
 
Level 5 indicator(s):  
C4: I have demonstrate that I am well aware of my legal and ultimate responsibility and 
authority while exercising my professional practice, and that I have used my leadership in 
an appropriate manner. 
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3. Description of Learning  
 
3a. Planning  stage (Appendix A, B)  
The objective of the passage plans were to prepare the Drill Ship I was commanding to 
leave Brazil, where we finished a long term contract with the national Oil Company 
“Petrobras”, to then start a new contract with Shell in Egypt to execute four exploration 
wells in deep water; then from here to the Atlantic coast of Morocco, in a safe and efficient 
manner. I had to plan in details the routes, where I have used my navigational and 
meteorological skills and knowledge; then I planned the bunker management, the stability 
requirements, the loading and offloading operations, the emergency response and 
security issues.  
 
If we analyse the first passage plan in Appendix A, it can be noted that I have planned to 
start sailing with a Northerly route from Rio de Janeiro up to the city of Recife. I made that 
decision for several reasons; first of all bearing in mind that I had a crew of 130 persons, 
so should an emergency medical evacuation arose, a helicopter would have been able to 
fly from the Brazilian coast to the ship. In addition, I have also taken in consideration my 
ship’s relatively slow speed and the action of the NE wind which was predicated in that 
time of the year. As I was sailing almost towards such wind, the choice to sail closer to the 
coast would, in my opinion, improved the ship’s speed. The ship I am referring too is a drill 
ship with a peculiar shape, having a derrick in the middle of it and an opening on the hull 
that permits the pipes to go through it. This particular profile has quite a sail and drag 
effect and the meteorological condition have a drastic consequence on the ship’s speed. I 
trust that here I have used my navigation and ship’s stability knowledge in a synergic 
endeavor with my safety management skills.  
 
In addition, I had divided the voyage in two legs, the first one across the ocean from Rio 
de Janeiro to Las Palmas, Canary Island, and the second one from there to the well 
location. This decision was taken again for several reasons; mainly loading of our client 
materials was necessary, but in addition we also took the opportunity for bunkering, load 
food, fresh water and performing a crew change. The choice of stopping in Las Palmas 
was my suggestion, then approved from my management and client representative. I was 
asked for the best port where we could stop to load our client’s materials, before starting 
the drilling operations offshore Egypt. I then proposed Las Palmas. This choice was made 
for the following reasons; it is about a day sailing time to Mediterranean Sea and it is in a 
strategic position almost at the end of the ocean passage. It has good port facilities, shore 
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cranes able to lift heavy equipment, and sufficient water depth in the inner port.  
 
This is a very important issue, the main draft of the ship is about 12 metres, which is quite 
a lot and it is not always feasible to enter a port if it does not have enough draught. As 
stated in the passage plan, there was the possibility to choose between Gran Canaria and 
Tenerife Islands, but Puerto de la Luz situated in Bahia de Las Palmas offered better 
repair than Santa Cruz de Tenerife harbor, which is more open to the Easter sector. In 
fact, the Admiralty Sailing direction (Africa Port Vol. 1) reports that in Tenerife the 
anchorages are open to winds between ENE and SSW, and swell generally sets in owing 
to the prevalence of Easterly winds. In winter time there are often SE gales, therefore in 
light of these elements, I have proposed to stop in  the port of Las Palmas, Puerto de la 
Luz, where we could benefit of the shelter of the NW side of the Isla de Gran Canaria.   
In the Passage Plan in Appendix B, leaving Egypt to Morocco, I have planned to use the 
Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) North of Malta and North of Isle de la Galite, this 
decision was made with the aim to to minimize the counter effect of Easterly going ocean 
current coming from the Gibraltar Strait. After passing Gibraltar Strait, I planned a WSW 
course to the final well coordinates. I was expecting a Northerly wind of force 4 to 5 with a 
20-25% probability in that period of the year. Unfortunately the weather encountered 
during the passage was force gale, which corresponds at force 8 as detailed in the next 
section, and this has lead to a management of change where I took a decision that had a 
financial impact on the project. 
 
Level 5 indicator(s):  
B3: I have autonomously managed my own learning using professionally my team in 
support of my decisions.  
C1: I have definitely used interdisciplinary approaches and understanding in these 
projects, in a very specialised work context. 
 
3b. Financial aspect, execution and decision making impact 
 
The Ship was contracted on a day rate of USD 240,000 (1) for the drilling campaign in the 
Mediterranean Sea, the passage plan from Brazil was about 36 days, for a total revenue 
of USD 8,640,000. This revenue figure is without taking in consideration the days of stop 
over in Las Palmas, for an additional USD 1,200,000 ; the total income of the ocean 
passage from Brazil to Egypt was about USD 10 million for my company. This cost does 
not take in consideration consumables, such as fuel oil and lubricants for the voyage, 
again provided by our client. If we take in consideration an average maritime fuel oil price 
' OTU'
of about 450 USD/MT, and a fuel consumption of about 50 TPD (Ton per day) we have a 
total consumption of about 1,980 MT, with an expense of USD 891,000. In light of this 
financial aspect the choice of an appropriate route and the stop over was quite important 
and had an impact on my organization. 
The next contract was for a day rate of USD 320,000 (1) and I had to plan the voyage from  
offshore Egypt to the Atlantic coast of Morocco. The voyage was planned for 12 days (see 
Appendix B) for a total revenue of USD 3,840,000. This passage was executed in winter 
time and I requested a weather forecast through out the route. When I approached the 
Gibraltar Strait the weather was forecasted to force gale, with wave heights of 13 metres 
in the Atlantic Ocean. I then decided to stop the ship and wait inside the Mediterranean 
Sea for a weather improvement. This decision was made based on my interdisciplinary 
knowledge, skill and experience; it had a financial impact as the ship was waiting on 
weather for about two days, with a cost of about USD 640,000 for our Client. 
 
 This decision, as earlier mentioned, was based on my interdisciplinary knowledge, and it 
was mainly dictated by safety reasons and operational considerations. Going out in the 
Atlantic ocean with that kind of weather would have meant to jeopardize the safety of the 
ship and crew under my responsibility. Secondly, I considered that I was about 24 hours 
from my final destination, the well location in Morocco, so even if I managed to sail 
through the Gale force, I would have been unable to start the exploration well as the 
weather would have been above the ship’s operational criteria. I therefore decided to 
monitor constantly the weather forecast in order to pick up the right moment to leave our 
sheltered water. I was constantly in touch with my shore based Manager and client, who 
understood my reasons and respected my decision. One of my actions was to ask for a 
second weather forecast from a different source,(i.e. a different forecast provider) I then 
called personally the forecasters in order to discuss the weather situation, requesting a 
detailed route forecast. At the end, my decision was found to be the most appropriated, 
we arrived in location with a perfect timing to start our operation, and this was 
acknowledged by my Management.(See Appendix C and D) 
Level 5 indicator(s):  
A1: I trust that the above description evidenced my knowledge in a complex professional 
area underpinned by sound theoretical understanding.  
A3: I have dialogued with peers, client and superiors, well aware of a possible dilemma 
and conflicting values which could arise in the aforementioned situation. I founded a 
solution that have pleased all parties and most important it was found to be the best 
choice in that particular context.    
B3: I have planned and managed the situation, drawing from my own learning and 
' OTV'
experience, to then using professionally others in support of my decisions. 
3c. Stability Knowledge and management.  
 
I am quite conversant with ship’s stability, and during the voyage the stability calculations 
were carried on a daily basis, ensuring that the vessel remained within the stability margin 
and to minimize the Bending Moment and the Shear Force. The term stability refers to the 
tendency of a body or ship to return to its original state after it has suffered a small 
disturbance. As Master I am responsible to ensure that my ship floating upright, will return 
in this position after it has been hit for example by wind or wave. If a ship is very stable it 
will return quickly to the upright position and may produce motion sickness; but if it is just 
stable, any interference which is not small may cause it to capsize. The stability therefore 
must be carefully calculated in order to have it in the range of conditions which allow the 
ship to return to the upright position during its operations. If the ship, subject to a small 
disturbance from a position of equilibrium, tends to return to that state it is said to possess 
positive stability. If, following the disturbance, the body remains in its  new position, then it 
is said to be in a state of neutral equilibrium or to possess neutral stability. If, following the 
disturbance, the excursion from the equilibrium position tends to increase, then the body 
is said to be in a state of unstable equilibrium or to possess negative stability.  
  
' OTY'
 
The GM value expresses the stability of the ship; this value is the distance between the 
center of gravity G and the metacentric height M. The latter is the point of intersection of 
the buoyancy force’s line of action with the z-axis, the metacentric height is said to be 
positive when M lies above G. Should M lie below G the body is unstable, If M and G 
coincide the equilibrium is neutral. 
 
    
In the projects in Appendix A and B I have stated that the ship will have a GM of 2,10 
metres, the aforementioned explanation highlight the importance of this value which 
expresses the stability of the ship. In addition, for the safety reasons I have to consider the 
stress on the hull caused by the  the bending moment in a given stability condition. Figure 
1 represents graphically the bending moment TM calculated from the distribution of the  
weights on the ship, and the limit curve which is the buoyancy distribution of the hull.  
In the instance in Fig. 1 we have 0 tm of sagging moment ,  but we do 
have a quite high hogging moment,  caused by excessive amidships 
buoyancy of 26.409 tm.   
 This is caused largely by the “moon pool”, which is the opening in the centre of the vessel 
that permits to lower tools and drill pipes into the sea. The total weight of a vessel must be 
supported by an equal and opposite upwards force of buoyancy, in a vertical line wit the 
centre of gravity. In my case, the distribution of the separate weight along the length of the 
hull, does not match exactly the buoyancy distribution because of the said moon pool. 
I have to carefully calculate the ballast water needed aft and forward to remain even keel, 
and although I have ballast tanks next to the moon pool where I can add water and 
therefore weight, often I have still an excessive amidships buoyancy causing the hull to 
hog. In this context I have to use my inter-disciplinary knowledge which embrace the 
safety management to deal with this specific problem. In fact the Safety of the ship and its 
crew play a role here as I have identified  an Hazard, which is a situation with the potential 
to lead to harm. In this particular instance the Hazard is the excessive stress to the hull 
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which has the potential to jeopardize the ship’s watertight integrity with the consequence 
of water ingress which could undermine the ship’s stability. Once I have identified the 
Hazard, I need to assess the Risk, which is the probability of the harm being realised. 
Although there are complex Risk Assessment tools, a basic process includes answering 
three questions;  
1 What can go wrong? 
2 How likely is it? 
3 What are the impacts? 
Answering qualitatively to these questions is often sufficient for making good decisions 
about the allocation of resources. Here I have to utilize my knowledge and experience to 
ensure the Risk is as low as reasonable practicable, as per Company policy, with 
preventive and mitigating controls. The former impede an incident by reducing its 
likelihood to occur, while the latter reduce the consequences of an incident should the 
preventive controls fail.  
The preventive controls I have putted in place is the daily check of the ship’s stability in 
order to establish firstly that the ship possess positive stability, and secondly that the 
Bending Moment does not exceed the limit curve. A mitigating control is to check 
constantly the tanks’ level to capture any water ingress due to compromised watertight 
integrity, so to reduce the consequences of an incident.  
 
Level 5 indicator(s):  
C1: I am aware of the complex and specialised professional practice I operate in; I have 
used interdisciplinary approaches and understanding underpinned by theoretical 
knowledge, into workable frameworks. In specific, I have managed the ship’s stability and 
the Risk assessment into a feasible model of practice.  
B1: I was able to analyse and synthesise complex information in order to contextualize the 
knowledge and then develop the best approach for a successful project. 
B4: I was able to evaluate professionally the given situation and then assess the correct 
approach. 
 
4. Safety Management and risk assessment 
 
I am well aware that Risk Assessment is a key issue in any offshore operations, (De 
Rossi, 2004, Appendix E) as well as an effective Safety Management System. This is an 
important aspect of my working practice, safety is directly linked with the operations, and 
there is no a winning enterprise without a perfect safety record. I have taken in the right 
consideration the safety management in both projects; as a matter of fact, one of the 
' OTT'
actions I have planned was to carry out a complete fire and abandonment drill, 24 hours 
prior to sail, involving the total crew of 130 persons under my direct responsibility. This 
was done to verify our emergency procedures and to ensure that everybody was aware of 
his duty during a crisis. (Please see Appendix A and B) 
 
 In addition, when the vessel was outside of immediate medical assistance, I reviewed the 
planned daily activities to determine if any of these needed to be postponed due to limited 
emergency response resources. To avoid any navigation dangers, a full watch was 
maintained on the bridge at all times. I appointed the Chief Mate and Second Mates 
responsible for ensuring that all navigation aids were in good order at all time. I also 
delegated them the responsibility to inform the Electronic Technicians if there was any 
defective apparatus. These checks were carried out at the beginning of each watch and 
logged appropriately according to good seamanship, company’s polices and safe 
behavior. I am glad that I have taken the necessary step to prevent, manage and control a 
possible emergency, because we did have a fire on board during the stay in the Canary 
Islands.  
 
Brief Description of events and emergency management 
The 21 December 2006 the ship was tied up along side a quay in the port of Las Palmas, 
Spain, where a fire was discovered in the warehouse at 5,15 am. I immediately proceeded 
to the bridge where I took control of the emergency. I had two fire teams on the scene 
coordinated by the Chief Mate, and two men with fire suit and breathing apparatus had 
entered the warehouse. In the mean time I communicated our emergency status to the 
port authority and our shore based manager and started to get all the crew accounted for 
at the Muster point. I instructed the Chief Mate to send a search party to check the 
adjacent compartments and the thrusters room underneath the store to ensure there were 
no hot spots nor casualties.  
When the Chief Mate reported that the Fire was out, I instructed him to keep a fire watch, I 
was satisfied only when I had all personnel accounted for. 
 
Learning and reflection on this emergency: 
My main concern was to use the fire teams to fight the fire as soon as possible, to save 
lives and property. My other concern was to achieve quickly a full head count, to ensure I 
had no casualties in the warehouse. This for good reasons, as one method to extinguish 
the fire in a closed compartment is to use inert gas to flood the area in order to remove the 
oxygen. Releasing inert gas without the entire crew accounted for, could mean to have 
potentiality a casualty in the area and therefore put his or her life in danger. Once I had 
' OTS'
the full crew accounted for and no casualties reported, I was really relieved; in addition the 
fire was putted out with portable fire extinguishers. The total asset loss due the fire was 
around 25,000 USD but the potential could have been enormous, such as the entire 
warehouse stock, for a value of over 4 millions USD, not to talk about the loss of the entire 
ship plus the loss of the revenue, should the ship has gone for major repair (Please see 
Appendix F). 
 I trust that effective emergency management requires specific skills. As the Person In 
Charge, I was concentrated to develop an overall strategy, delegate responsibilities, 
provide instructions and support, initiate the correct level of emergency response, and 
meet the overall team requirement and expectations. I trust that these are special skills 
that go in an uncharted territory beyond professional knowledge and practice competence, 
described by Schön (1987 p.13) as “artistry” or the ‘competence by which practitioners 
actually handle indeterminate zones of practice’, in short something that elude 
conventional strategy of explanation and unexamined epistemology of practice. I have 
done formal Emergency Management Courses (See Appendix H, and L) where I was 
taught how to react at the different emergencies we ought have on board our vessels. My 
argument is that not all the emergencies are on the book; this was a classical example, 
we do have emergency procedures for fire on board, but in this situation we were in a port 
with extra day trippers involved in our operation, which makes a unique situation 
altogether. I trust that I have then filled the gap using my “professional artistry” , managing 
the ‘out of the book’ situation relying on my competence, knowledge and skills as a 
practicing Master Mariner.  
 
This is the type of incident I aim to avoid, I believe that rather than working on the 
mitigating controls, we need to work on the preventive measures. What I would like to 
investigate with my Research is the human behaviours of the offshore community, with 
strong emphasis on the fieldwork that I will carry out as a participant observer. I believe 
that it is important to understand why incidents occur and try to explain the accident 
involvement, the safety performance in terms of attitude and climate into an organizational 
culture. The project would be valuable because it is my company’s Safety Vision to avoid 
incident in the workplace.  The Safety Management Systems are quite comprehensive, in 
my Case Study (De Rossi, 2004) I demonstrated that big hazards are identified and 
controls are in place to reduce the risks according to the company’s expectation, but it is 
from the so-called routine job that we are experiencing incidents. 
Level 5 indicator(s):  
B2: I trust that this is a solid evidence that I am able, in my professional contest, to self 
appraise my practice and to reflect in action.  
' OSN'
A1: I have demonstrated that I have a deep knowledge of this specific and complex 
aspect of my practice.  
 
5. Influence On My Organization 
 
With the projects in Appendix A and B I am confident that I have made an impact on my 
operations using a holistic approach to the management of the passage plans. When I 
assumed my present command, I founded that the previous passage plans where merely 
a route planning to move the ship from the point A to B, without taking in consideration the 
important issues addressed in my projects, such as safety and security management, 
bunker requirement, meteorological and stability issue, safe havens, medical protocol, 
salvage and damage control. The “passage plans” in Appendix A and B were approved by 
management and they had all the relevant information needed to execute the ship’s re-
location, including a graphical map showing the ship’s route for those users not familiar 
with the nautical terminology. I trust that the projects have improved a possible 
communications’ problem between technical, operation, quality, health and safety, client 
and marketing departments, as they address the re-location of the Drill ship from one 
operation’s site to the next in a clear, professional and exhaustive manner. In addition I 
have set a standard for future planning which has to be met by peers, because my 
projects will be definitely used by management as reference for quality assurance.   
 
Level 5 indicator(s):  
B4: I was able to evaluate independently the projects and to then assess the best 
approaches for the different aspects of the profession, which formed the bases for 
improvement in practice.  
C2: I have effectively used resources in a wide range, which has impacted the work of 
peers, subordinated and clients. 
C3: I have clearly communicated in writing the professional projects to peers, superiors 
and clients. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
I trust the Area of Learning here represented reflect my professional practice as a Master 
Mariner operating in the Drilling industry, where the Marine Operations are directly linked 
with Safety. My practice is very dynamic, and I systematically use my professional 
knowledge in order to achieve a clear objective, which is a safe and efficient operation 
which will generate a profit for my company. in terms of performance, the safety 
' OSO'
management in place in the offshore oil industry in general and in my company in 
particular is becoming more concentrated on the behaviour of personnel involved in the 
operations in order to effectively plan, control and eventually improve the overall  
production. I firmly believe that the only way to achieve a winning operation is to eliminate 
or mitigate the risk, and this can be done only through hazard identification (De Rossi, 
2004 Appendix E). In fact, it is evident that if you do not identify the hazard, the risk could 
not be eliminated, prevented or mitigated. In my field of practice I am well aware of the 
presence of risks, but must be bore in mind that analyzing and assessing a risk does not 
lead to a hazard-free environment. All it does is tell you what the risks are. It is then 
necessary to decide what to do, and whatever is done will leave some residual risk, 
reduced as per company policy to as low as reasonable possible. (ALARP) In the projects 
in Appendix A and B I have planned the safety of the vessel with a proactive approach, 
although when an emergency arose I had to respond reactively. In fact, I believe that 
being a Master of an Offshore Unit demands a level of command ability which is not a 
normal feature of management posts. As I stated in the incident description, specials skills 
needs to be used. I have to obtain and evaluate  information quickly in an emergency, but 
I also have to make valid interpretations in order to make sound decisions. In addition, I 
have to review potential outcomes and identify possible contingencies. This reactive 
approach should be anyway the “ultima ratio” and not the norm; it is important to possess 
the skills, knowledge and experience to react in emergency, but the point is that the 
incident should be avoided in a first place. The Company Management supports the 
preventions of incidents, injuries and occupational illness and also seeks to reduce the 
risk of damage to the environment and property. I trust that this can be achieved with 
proactivity and individual commitment, and I believe that my proposed work based 
research, which is focused on the human behaviour, will help the company in achieving 
the Safety Vision of an incident free workplace, and in addition it will produce a unique 
opportunity for an insider research to explore the Human Factor in the offshore activities. 
 
Level 5 indicator(s):  
A2: I trust that I have demonstrated a critical selection of professional Research and 
Development skills in carrying out this professional projects.  
 
Summary of Level 5 learning claims.  
Passage Plan 2006 Brazil to Egypt (Appendix A) 
Passage Plan 2007 Egypt to Morocco  (Appendix B) 
De Rossi, V. (2004) ‘The quest for optimum safety’, Seaways, 6, pp. 15-16/21 (Appendix 
E) 
' OSM'
De Rossi, V. (2004) ‘An Incident-free working environment: an achievable goal or an 
improbable dream? The human factor’. The International Maritime Human Element 
Bulletin [Online] Feb. 2004, Available from: http://www.he-
alert.org/documents/published/he00235.pdf  [Accessed 10th March 2007] (Appendix M)  
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
 
(1)See day rate for the “Deepwater Expedition”,  
http://www.deepwater.com/_filelib/FileCabinet/fleetupdate/RIGFLT-FEB5-2008-
web.pdf?FileName=RIGFLT-FEB5-2008-web.pdf   [Feb 08] 
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